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Glossary 
  
diaosi, n., 屌丝. Literally penis hair. It refers to low status men. Since diaosi 
cannot afford either car or property which is considered 
necessary for marriage, they cannot find a girlfriend and are 
marginalised in the urban marriage market. The term is 
derogatory but sometimes used as a form of self-deriding modesty.  
beijing, n., 背景. Background. If a person has beijing he is connected to 
powerful people particularly from the government.  
huonaogui, n., 活闹鬼. In local setting the term literally means living 
rowdy ghost. The term is used by vendors or ordinary people to 
refer to different strands of rascals, street loiterers or social 
bandits who pose a threat to their personal and business safety.  
hun, v., 混.  Mix; scam; get by or muddle through. Hun can mean doing 
something without making it explicit; to spend one’s life aimlessly; 
or obtain resources in an opportunistic manner. Hun is often 
associated with achieving status and wealth without making 
means explicit to others.  
jianghu, n.,  江湖. Literally rivers and lakes, Jianghu refers to “a realm of 
freedom, where the laws of family, society and state no longer 
apply” (Shahar, 2001:380). As Boertz (2011:35) argues, it is 
imagined rather than practical. I suggest Jianghu be understood as 
“beyond the pale”. A lao Jianghu, literally veteran rivers and lakes, 
is a sophisticated man who knows how to avoid risks and pitfalls 
in his outbound life.    
shehui, n., 社会. Society. As I shall explain in the introduction, the Chinese 
society carries very different meanings from the English society. 
Shehui is written as the capital, italic Society throughout this thesis. 
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shili, n., 势力. Scope of influence.  Shili often refers to a localised group 
which uses violence to defend or secure its members’ interests. It 
can also mean the personal possession of ties to such a group. 
yiqi, n., 义气. Spirit of honour. A man having yiqi can sacrifice his own 
interests to save others from danger or plight particularly in 
urgent times.  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the social lives and subjectivity of domestic 
migrant vendors at a night market located at the urban rim of Nanjing city, 
China. The thesis asks what kinds of social connections (guanxi) are 
produced when migrant vendors try to adapt to city lives.  The effective 
cultivation of guanxi is vital for migrant vendors, or household-based 
producers (getihu) to get a foothold and profit in the local market, 
particularly when general environs and local conditions brought about by 
contemporary urban transformations are unfavourable for these non-local 
petty entrepreneurs.  By exploring the ways vendors (mainly men) make 
connections with local hooligans, grassroots government/local institutions 
as well as amongst themselves and with the other gender, this thesis 
argues that local terms such as hun (literally to get by, to scam or to 
muddle through) in Society (in Chinese shehui) precisely capture the 
subjectivity and sociality of these self-employed entrepreneurs. Society 
represents the fluid, complex social tapestry which entails riskiness and 
uncertainties rendered by migration, local conditions and business 
competitions. Hun entails a variety of tactics, ethics and masculinities and 
bears rich performative meanings when subjects are adapting to Society. 
Both hun and Society are crucial for understanding the subjectivity, gender 
and political identity of the self-employed rural migrants in contemporary 
China.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
One night in September 2011, when the warm, humid weather began 
to cool down with the evening breeze, I was strolling along a night market 
in the outskirts of Nanjing. My attention was grabbed by a street 
restaurant boss and hostess (as commonly addressed by customers), who I 
later came to know as Han and his wife Rui. They were roughly my age. 
While Han was standing facing the street cooking, Rui was serving 
customers under the canopies of the restaurant. Next to the cooking stand 
was an old man barbequing fish over an oven and an old lady preparing 
and garnishing foods. The four people looked like a Chinese family of two 
generations. The sign on the front of their stand indicated this family was 
from Sichuan, a hinterland province of China. The strategic location of 
their stand and the high turn-over of customers showed that this family 
must have had achieved some success in the host society. I walked into 
their stand and ordered a barbequed fish and two bottles of beer. In the 
next hour I ate and drank slowly, and kept an eye on the activities of my 
potential informants and wondered about how to start a conversation.  
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Figure 1.1: A street restaurant in the 800-metre long night market. 
When I paid for the meal, I asked the hostess (the wife) if I could 
work for her family for research purposes. Unprepared for my request, the 
hostess asked me to sit for a while and turned to her husband, who then 
stopped his cooking and started a talk with me. Having checked my ID card 
with my (former) university’s address and major on it, the husband 
remained quite suspicious of my purpose for studying people as 
“insignificant as them”. Still, he agreed on my proposed “internship”. I 
began my job wiping tables, catering to customers and washing plates the 
next day. The reward was free dinners, and sometimes free lunches.  
So far so good.  However, in a couple of days, the old father also 
wanted to interview me. Encumbered by a language barrier, he could not 
make himself understood. I could only speak Mandarin and Nanjing dialect. 
But the old man found a way to communicate with me. He borrowed a 
carton case of cigarettes from a nearby stand and we began to chat by 
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writing down our intended words on the outside of the case. The dialogue 
read: 
Old man: Who are you? Why are you here? 
Me: I am Liang, a student from Peking University.1 I would like 
to do some research here. 
Old man: I am a member of the CCP (China Communist Party). 
Me: I am a member of the Youth League. But my father is a CCP 
member. 
It was a weird dialogue for me, but the old guy seemed to be happy 
with my answer. His neck hardened and his eyes narrowed as if two 
underground party members had just exchanged a secret code as often 
happens in novels about China’s revolution.  
“[People in] todays’ Society (shehui) don’t believe in the 
Communist Party. Do you believe in it or not?” he asked 
seriously. 
“I don’t believe in today’s CCP”, I wrote.  
Annoyed by my political stand, the old man yelled at me in his 
incomprehensible accent. Nonetheless, by repeating it slowly he made his 
points clear: the Nationalist Party, the old enemy of the CCP, was merely a 
“looting party” (whereas today’s CCP is not). “Didn’t you know, university 
graduate?!” he tried to give me a lecture on Chinese history. 
                                                          
1
 I had graduated from Peking University and was now at ANU. But as Peking University was well 
known in China I saved the detailed explanation for later. 
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To clarify, I underlined “today’s” and added a clause after my 
statement “because of the corruption”. 
He pondered over my remarks, looking me up and down for a few 
more seconds. Then he grasped the pen and wrote: 
The stand on the right has connections (guanxi) with the Public 
Security Bureau (Police). So they took over the stand on the left.  
I looked around and was about to ask who was running the right-
hand stand and who was running the left-hand stand when his son, Han, 
returned from his conversation with another street restaurant boss. Han 
picked up the case pack, read it word for word, and then threw it back 
onto the table.  
“Don’t listen to my father. He has a mental illness and can’t 
understand today’s Society anyway,” Han remarked on his father’s 
comments about the neighbourhood. 
Infuriated by his son’s attitude, the father scolded his son, who just 
left. I reached out to the cigarette case pack on the table, hoping to collect 
it as ethnographic evidence. But the old man snatched it away and 
crumpled it into a ball. An hour later, I saw it was still in his hand when he 
escorted his two grandsons back home. As he told me several months later, 
his intent was to keep the dialogue confidential and keep me safe as he 
realised that I was not an investigative journalist, but only a university 
student. 
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This scenario introduces some of my research questions. Why did 
Han, a migrant vendor, think his father did not understand today’s Society? 
What did Han and his cranky father mean by Society (shehui)? And why 
had Han jibed his father and told me to ignore the neighbourhood 
situation?  
This dissertation asks what, how, and why complex social 
connections are produced, performed and improvised by migrant vendors 
in urban situations. My field site is a night market in a suburban area 
where some 300 migrant vendors produce and sell food or small 
commodities. Central to my analysis and cultural interpretation are a few 
local terms used by migrants. These include Society as a pervasive yet 
inhospitable social context which a migrant is exploring; and “hun” (a 
concept roughly translated as juggling [life’s expectations] or getting by) 
which describes the way in which vendors make and use connections. This 
thesis shows that hun practices in Society reflect the lived experience of 
rural-urban migration for petty entrepreneurs in contemporary China.  
I distinguish the Chinese word shehui from English society. Shehui 
lies at the very core of migrants’ subjectivity and experience. In English, 
society can mean “companionship or association with one's fellows” 
(2015a), “the aggregate of people living together in a more or less ordered 
community” (2015b), or “the community of people living in a particular 
country or region and having shared customs, laws, and organizations” 
(2015c). However, the Chinese ‘society’, when it comes to relations, is 
somewhat different. The nuance of the Chinese term that I translate as 
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capitalised Society (shehui) is very often opposed to the family where 
people’s relationships are secure and where there is love, warmth and 
safety. In contrast, Society is a place of risk and where everything is 
unclear and unstable.  
Furthermore, Society is also opposed to the fundamental socialist 
institutions and morality of China. Formal Chinese state-led social units 
include urban danwei (work units) and rural communes. These units were 
designed partly to transform the whole population into a productive 
labour force and to realise full employment starting in the 1950s. Then 
and now Society refers to the social context that had not been absorbed by 
work units and communes. According to Xiaobo Lu and Elizabeth Perry 
(1997, 11), people “speak of events as occurring ‘out in Society’ (shehui 
shang), as if their own danwei were entirely separate from the wider social 
environment.” In light of such socialist demarcation of space, the 
unemployed and dropout students are called people of Society and youth 
of Society respectively (shehui renyuan and shehui qingnian). Although 
work units have been gradually giving way to ever-expanding private 
sectors, and communes were abandoned in the 1980s, the pejorative 
connotation of Society carries into today’s vernacular Chinese, not only 
among rural migrants but also urbanites.  
In spite of its negative connotations, however, Society is the very 
place where migrant vendors exist, because Society also includes markets 
which grew outside of danwei and communes in post-socialist China. If one 
is self-employed, away from his home village, and does not belong to any 
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institution, he is necessarily in Society. And it is in Society and through trial 
and error that one develops his interpersonal skills with people from 
different spheres and gains Society experience (shehui jingyan), a laudable 
‘expertise’ that distinguishes a veteran from a novice.  
Society also entails mobility and endless associations and 
disassociations with other people on the move. Caroline Brettell (2008) 
reminds us that the movements of migrants cannot be defined exclusively 
as one-way and definitive, for there are sojourners whose initial 
movements are intended to be temporary, or situations where migrants 
leave a destination either because the site does not live up to their 
expectations, or because economic or political circumstances in the host 
society have changed. Indeed, migration in China is often a prolonged and 
intermittent process; spatially, migrants travel not only to and fro between 
the cities where they find work and their home towns and villages2, but 
from one city to another. Moreover, the primary way to obtain urban 
citizenship under the current hukou 3 system is through buying property. I 
observe that although a few of my informants have achieved getting a 
hukou, many more can only afford to buy (or have bought) residences in 
their native towns or in county-level cities, and continue to work outside 
their new homes. Thus the night market in Nanjing’s outskirt is a working 
                                                          
2
 Note that both towns and villages have been categorised as rural households (hukou), 
though township residence has gradually been reckoned as urban household. 
3
 Dating back to 1958, the hukou, or the family register system, was officially promulgated by 
the Chinese government to control the movement of people between urban and rural areas. 
People were broadly categorised as a "rural" or "urban" household in rural communes or in 
urban work units, respectively. The policy initially served as a tool of social engineering to 
extract agricultural surplus to feed the development of socialist industries in cities (Naughton 
1996) and has resulted in an ever-expanding urban-rural divide. Another way to obtain urban 
hukou is through receiving higher education in universities in cities.  
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place but not a home for most of the vendors. Figure 1.2 shows the places 
of origin of vendors in the night market (in most cases their places of 
origin overlap with their hukou status). In this thesis, I use “migrants” 
mainly to refer to these non-local vendors whose places of origin are out of 
Nanjing.  
 
Figure 1.2: Places of origin of the migrant vendors. 
Generally, domestic migrants flow from hinterland to coastal provinces. 
Among the 187 households that I surveyed in the night market, one third (32%) 
are Nanjing locals, and large groups came from north Jiangsu province (16%), 
and Anhui province (26%).  
Rural migrants in many cases cannot stay put in cities also because, 
although the unfolding market economy has allowed them to break the 
constraints of the hukou system and to exploit the huge potential of the 
urban consumer market, most of them are subject to pervasive injustice 
and periodic evictions in the city so that they have to move from place to 
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place. An illuminating example is depicted in the ethnography by Zhang Li 
(2001) in which Wenzhou entrepreneur migrants obtained power through 
construction of fortress-like communities in Beijing, which were only to be 
destroyed by local government. The vendors in the night market are 
similar. In 2011 and 2012, the local grassroots government attempted 
twice to close or to relocate the night market. As a result, many vendors 
left this region.  
 
Figure 1.3: Home, Society (shehui), cities and movements. 
Despite such typical oppression and expulsion that cause migrants to 
wander, Li Zhang (2001) also notes that the meaning of “floating” (liudong) 
in official discourse of “floating population” (liudong renkou) of migrants is 
subverted by the floating population themselves. In mainstream official 
Chinese ideology, grounded as it is on territorial-based governance and 
earth-bound sentiments that derive from agricultural culture and 
Confucianism, the word floating carries connotations of rootlessness, 
instability and danger. However, Wenzhou migrants “link their spatial 
movement to a series of positive qualities such as vitality, bravery, 
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flexibility and being market-oriented”, thus subverting “xenophobic urban 
attitudes” (Zhang 2001, 33-39).  
I suggest that such movements of individuals, voluntarily or 
involuntarily enacted, raise important questions about the complex yet 
fleeting way migrants make connections and their agency. I offer an 
illustration to show the typical trajectory of a single migrant vendor in 
Society and in cities (see Figure 1.3). The complexity is derived from the 
“meshwork”—to adopt Tim Ingold’s term (2011) — of people’s 
connections in Society. The meshwork is a mesh of lines, “with each line 
representing a person’s trajectory of life movement” (Ingold 2011, 145-
155). From the lens of this heuristic device, the night market is a 
temporary aggregate of vendors with various kinds of life experiences. We 
can make things even more complex, because each person does not only 
preserve existing connections but also creates new connections and may 
or may not break localised connections when he leaves the site. Such a 
meshwork features endless associations and dissociations, and sets off 
Society and the night market as separate from sedentary societies in which 
people are bounded by preordained, relatively unchanged relationships. 
Though sedentary society can be complex, too, the complexity is another 
kind.  
Herein Society should be recognised in a dual sense: while migrant 
vendors see opportunities and freedom in Society, they experience 
uncertainties and threats of Society as well, because the people with whom 
they connect are complex and the conduct of making connections (in 
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Chinese da jiaodao, literally crossroading) is full of uncertainties. I argue 
that such complexity forces the vendors to reformulate their ways of 
making connections in it. In this thesis I explore the kinds of people with 
whom they are connecting, and the ways in which they make connections.  
The ways of making connections have performative meanings. As a 
result of frequent associations and dissociations, interactions amongst 
strangers necessarily features indeterminacy; conclusive information of 
others is always lacking to direct one’s own activities. Such indeterminate 
and fleeting interactions form the context for vendors’ presentation of self. 
Erving Goffman described various motivations for different types of self-
presentation:    
[a man] may wish [others] to think highly of him, or to think 
that he thinks highly of them, or to perceive how in fact he feels 
toward them, or to obtain no clear-cut impression; he may wish 
to ensure sufficient harmony so that the interaction can be 
sustained, or to defraud, get rid of, confuse, mislead, antagonise, 
or insult them. Regardless of the particular objective which the 
individual has in mind and of his motive for having this 
objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the 
others, especially their responsive treatment of him. This 
control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the 
situation which the others come to formulate, and he can 
influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as 
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to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act 
voluntarily in accordance with his own plan (Goffman 1959, 2). 
In viewing the open space of the night market as a theatre, then 
vendors can either be players or spectators. It is thus crucial to understand 
how actors define or manipulate a specific situation and how audiences 
interpret the situation.  
Among all the people who have been leading a life outside their 
homes and in Society, the experienced ones are called “veteran of Rivers 
and Lakes Society” (lao jianghu). In light of Goffman’s theory, I argue that 
they can be defined as masters of situations or those who bear 
clairvoyance of various kinds of situations, just like an experienced 
boatman navigates unforeseen underwater rocks in “rivers and lakes”. 
They may gain their understanding and mastery of situations not in a 
specific place, but through their dwelling in Society for years and even 
decades. Even if they are new to a place, they know it already by drawing 
on past experiences from elsewhere they had travelled.  
Theories of urban transformation in contemporary China help 
delineate the local urban context in which the vendors operate. In the past 
decades, fuelled by rapid government-led development and 
redevelopment, China’s urban geography, demography, and urban 
governance have undergone profound transformations. These 
transformations include the creation of Special Economic Zones as spaces 
of political exception in response to globalisation (Ong 2004), the 
expansion of metropolitan core areas and establishment of university 
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towns and real estate projects (Hsing 2010), and the use of administrative 
power by local governments to appropriate farmlands in the vicinity of 
cities, turning farmers to urban citizens and causing social unrest (Hsing 
2010, Lin, Hao, and Geertman 2015, O'Brien, J, and Li 2003). Since the 
night market is located in an outlying district or the so-called urban-rural-
transitional belt (Zhang 2001, 64), it has undergone several of  the 
aforementioned transformations. In which way does the transforming 
urban political economy give rise to the night market, periodically 
absorbing and expelling vendors, and continuously shape the ways 
migrants are making connections? 
As I will show, local urban transformations have brought about both 
opportunities and hazards for the vendors. On the one hand, hundreds of 
thousands of migrant workers from nearby prospering industrial parks 
and the existing urban population provide a strong customer base for 
migrant vendors (some of whom used to be migrant workers). On the 
other hand, the administrative structures of governance are weak and 
segmented in this area. This has allowed for a “chaotic” condition to exist 
in the eyes of migrant vendors.  
The night marketplace in this outskirt district was initially a 
spontaneous spatial agglomeration of migrant vendors. It was later 
subjected to the regulation of city police and then by a local Community4 
(shequ) of resettled farmers in this area. I will frequently refer to a number 
of institutions which these vendors directly or indirectly deal with, and it 
                                                          
4
 Community (shequ) is an administrative unit under subdistrict (jiedao).  
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is important to differentiate these institutions by administrative level. 
Figure 1.4 serves as a point of reference. The two institutions that I shall 
frequently refer to are CALE (City Appearance and Law Enforcement, 
known as the chengguan in Chinese) and the EMO (Entrepreneurship 
Management Office) which is set up by the resettled Community A.  
 
Figure 1.4: The administrative structure above the night market. 
I explore the ways vendors connect to these two institutions in 
everyday life and in time of crisis, namely when the grassroots 
government attempted to evict vendors or relocate the night market. How 
do the vendors get a foothold in the city by creating connections with local 
authorities, and how have they collectively survived government 
expulsions through open protest or through individual strategies?  
As far as the “chaotic” situation is concerned, I show that not only 
market regulators and city police but also the informal power of “ghosts” 
(hooligans) of different backgrounds (some of them migrants!) execute 
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power on migrant vendors. The sources of their powers are diversified 
and sometimes unidentifiable for any newcomer. How do these groups of 
people derive and exercise power? How are migrant vendors exploited 
and coerced by such powers, and how do migrants improvise connections 
with these people so as to resist, moderate and even transform such 
inimical forces for their own use?  
This study focuses on self-employed (getihu, individual household) 
migrants rather than on migrant workers (nongmingong). The major 
difference is that the former possess property for production while the 
latter is wage labour. While some scholars analyse rural migrants in 
factory settings through Marxist perspectives (for instance Lee 2007, Ngai 
2005) or portray them as segmented working classes in their formation 
(Shen 2006), my informants, the self-employed getihu, are close to Li 
Zhang’s migrant entrepreneurs.  
According to Phillip C. C. Huang (2009), self-employed getihu belong 
to the “petty bourgeoisie”, a class standing between the capitalists and the 
proletariat, which is obscured by both Marxist and neoclassical 
economic/sociological theories. The petty bourgeoisie refer originally to 
artisans and small shopkeepers in the writings of Marx and Weber (Huang 
2009). A history of petite bourgeoisie in 1780-1914’s Europe (Crossick 
and Haupt 2013) also illuminates the lives of vendors in Nanjing. 
According to Crossick and Haupt, the petite bourgeoisie are mainly from 
the countryside (ibid, 64), and their “family and labour are bounded 
together in a world of honest effort and close personal relations, where 
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paternal authority in the family was reflected in the patriarchal nature of 
the business “(ibid, 109). They often resist heavy tax burdens imposed by 
local elites (ibid, 140). But they are less politically organised, because 
“organisations represented better capitalised and more stable small 
enterprises”, and “only in occasional crises did associations appear for 
marginal businesses, and they were generally short-lived” (ibid, 156). In 
social movements they have "an ideology of modest resources, hard work, 
and independence, one whose enemies were injustice and 
subordination"(ibid, 148). 
According to Huang (2009), the petite bourgeoisie existed 
pervasively in China before 19495 and have returned on a massive scale in 
the reform era, making up a major proportion of the self-employed getihu 
of today. National statistics and those who analyse them fail to distinguish 
self-employed rural migrants from rural migrants who become blue or 
pink collar workers (see for example, Huang 2009). My work is an 
ethnography of the self-employed, rural population or petty bourgeoisie in 
contemporary China. 
Although the away-from-home population consists of both men and 
women, I focus my research on men and the masculinities that are forged 
in the urban setting and in nebulous Society. The focus on men herein has 
                                                          
5
 According to some archive documents I collected from Shanghai Municipal Archive, the 
socialist transformation (shehuizhuyi gaizao) of street vendors and self-employed people 
from other service sectors started from 1951 and peaked in 1955-1961 in Shanghai.  
Amongst these documents, a Working summary of the development of socialist 
transformation of small merchants and vendors (draft, 1959), 148,099 vendors participated in 
the “rectification movement” (zhengfeng yundong) in Shanghai. The transformed population 
was either enrolled to urban co-operatives and factories or sent down to outskirts farmlands. 
The rest of them returned to their home villages and some were “politically cleansed” 
(zhengzhi qingli).  
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been prioritised for the following two reasons. First, although many 
illuminating works have been done on migrant women (for instance Jacka 
2015, Ngai 2005, Yan 2008),  less has been said specifically about men and 
migrant masculinities. Thus, one of the aims of this thesis is to enrich our 
understanding of the migration process through the purviews of men. 
Second, a culture of man-to-man relationships and almost misogynistic 
masculinity, which is the subject matter of this thesis, requires the 
researcher to distance himself from women 6 . Nonetheless, this 
methodological bias is partially addressed by interviewing as many 
women or hostesses (wives) as possible. It turns out that accounts from 
women are often at odds with those from men.   
I inquire into two types of masculinity developed in Society through 
looking at the social relationships of men. The first is between men who 
call each other “brother”. I examine how they perform bromance on many 
different occasions. The second is romantic relationships. I examine how 
single men develop intimacy with the other gender and how married men 
sustain their marital ties in urban settings. How have companionship and 
intimate relationships changed men in Society? Is a good brother 
necessarily a good husband? What new subjects are generated from 
making, performing and “juggling” these relationships? Through 
                                                          
6
 Everyday activities in the night market feature a strong gendered division of labour, with men 
working as chef and their wives catering to customers and doing errands. When people have 
meals together, men often dominate conversations while women often put down their 
chopsticks and bowls in response to the needs of customers. After-hour activities are also 
gender divided. Women are assumed to be carers of their children, while men have more time 
to socialise with their peers, either visiting each other for casual conversation, playing mah-jong 
at home or gambling in the night market, etc. Speaking to other’s wives seems to be a social 
taboo, albeit only loosely observed. 
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developing brotherhood and intimate relationships, have men 
transformed an inhospitable Society into a home?  
Connections, Guanxi and “Hun” 
Since the 1990s, many scholars (Gold, Guthrie, and Wank 2002, 
Kipnis 1997, Yang 1994) have investigated guanxi practices, the social 
connections and conducts of connecting in China. Guanxi practices can be 
seen as the Chinese version of gift exchange as analysed by Marcel Mauss 
(1970). Guanxi involves endless obligatory paying, receiving and repaying, 
and such reciprocity is accompanied by human sentiments (ganqing) 
(Kipnis 1997). Based on his research in rural China, Andrew Kipnis (1997) 
argues that guanxi practice originated from and is fermented by kinship 
ties. It originates in circles of family (benjiaren), relatives (qinqi) and 
friends and manifests in many ritualised occasions such as banquets, 
weddings and funerals (Kipnis 1997). It is through the practices of 
production and re-production of guanxi that one forms his or her 
subjectivity (Kipnis 1997, 8).  
In the 1990s, in Chinese socialist cities and work units where 
housing, foodstuffs, education, marriage and transportation were 
controlled by the state (Whyte and Parish 1985, Lu and Perry 1997), 
guanxi practices and discourses also prevailed. Nevertheless, in what 
Mayfair Yang (1994) describes as “guanxixue”, the knowledge of guanxi or 
the art of guanxi, only certain aspects of traditional kinship are preserved 
in urban settings. In her words, guanxixue or the art of guanxi “dispenses 
19 
 
with genealogical tracings, descent and inheritance, marriage and affinal 
ties” but retains “the notions of connectedness, familiarity, obligation, 
reciprocity, mutual assistance, generosity, and indebtedness” (Yang 1994, 
305). Drawing upon Karl Polanyi’s (1944) tripod typology of redistributive, 
reciprocal and household economic systems, Yang (1994) further argues 
that both guanxi practices and knowledge can be understood as everyday 
resistance against the impersonal, redistributive socialist state.  
For this project which focuses on rural migrants, guanxi practices 
should be contextualised in four further points. First, the redistribute 
socialist state that was central to guanxi practices and guanxixue in Yang’s 
analysis has undergone profound transformations. The rise of the market 
economy for more than three decades has shaken the ideologies 
fundamental to socialism, but the state has also managed to incorporate 
market institution for its own sake through what Anna Kruger called 
“unproductive rent-seeking activities” (Krueger 1974). Such incorporation 
can lead to monetised patron-client ties. Li Zhang (2001) has identified 
multiple layers of agents who mediate between individual migrants and 
formal state power among Wenzhou migrants in Beijing. “Courtyard 
bosses” (dayuan laoban) in the Wenzhou migrant community create 
informal clientist ties with local officials and pay high prices to obtain 
water, electricity and other services for the compounds they constructed. 
They then lease out working space and residences to other Wenzhou 
migrants and become “patrons” of the latter (Zhang 2001, 75-84). In the 
enclosed cottage-like households within the compounds, Wenzhou 
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migrant tenants appropriate the labour of their wives and exploit migrant 
workers from other provinces (Zhang 2001, 115-136). When it comes to 
the urban fringe of Nanjing city, are the local conditions similar to the 
Wenzhou village in Beijing? Would the urban transformation in recent 
years generate similar clientist ties between locals and migrants?  
Given the absence of strong kinship ties and short-livedness of 
connections caused by mobility, what type of guanxi connections do 
vendors develop in relation to strangers who share similar background? 
Early urban theorists from George Simmel onwards have proposed that 
owing to the quantitative intensification of the money economy and the 
growing network of corporations in cities, individuals may develop blasé, 
cosmopolitan attitudes in urban areas (Wirth 1938, Simmel 1971). As I 
have already mentioned, some male migrants foster companionship with 
other men and call each other “brothers”. How can we account for the rise 
of such companionship? Does this type of connections dispense with 
sentiments but retain only the practicality of guanxi connections? We may 
also examine this dimension of guanxi from another perspective. If we see 
the night market as a stage, then in Erving Goffman’s sense of self-
presentation in everyday life (Goffman 1959), how do migrants perform 
brotherhood when they socialise,  corporate and even confront with each 
in the night market and in Society?  
Scholarly writings about guanxi tend to assign to it communal values 
such as reciprocity, friendship, decorum and appropriateness in both 
urban and rural settings (Yang 1994, Kipnis 1997). The literature 
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sometimes gives an impression that guanxi practices are devoid of tension 
and conflicts. If there is antagonism, it is found in the crevices between 
egalitarian village identity and the CCP rhetoric (Kipnis 1997) , or between 
guanxi knowledge/practices and the state’s effort to manipulate guanxi 
and to monopolise distribution of resources (Walder 1988, Yang 1994). In 
the same vein, in the Melanesian context, Marilyn Strathern contrasts 
relation, a self-organising mechanism, to the systematic thinking which 
has been brought by technological and scientific dominance (Strathern 
1995). However, latent conflict within guanxi networks can manifest on 
many occasions, particularly when resources become scarce and when 
interests within a confined space are segmented, such as when local 
government’s decisions reduce business opportunities and thus intensify 
competition amongst vendors, when the non-local migrants are bullied by 
equally marginalised locals, and when external social and economic 
pressures convert to domestic conflicts. All of these mishaps take place 
when migrants are outside their homes and in Society. Latent antagonisms 
may vent out in the form of open protest against local authorities, fights 
among “brothers”, and quarrels between husbands and wives. Therefore, 
how can we account for such conflicts or breakage of guanxi ties and 
network, and how do vendors solve, moderate, avoid or suffer from such 
negative elements of guanxi in urban settings?  
 Finally, if making guanxi connections creates a guanxi subject 
(Kipnis 1997), then we may ask what kind of migrant subject is being 
formed in Society. Perhaps no other Chinese words capture the content of 
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guanxi subject in mobile and fleeting lives in Society than “hun” (混) does. 
When asked to evaluate their lives and the lives of others, vendors often 
replied that they are “hun’ ing well” (hundehao) or “hun’ ing not well” 
(hunde buhao). To hun literally means to mix; to scam and disguise; and to 
muddle through or to get by. A little “hunhun” (混混) is a rascal who gets 
by on the margins of Society. 
I argue that hun practices can be understood as tactics in Michel de 
Certeau’s sense (1984). Such practices are also improvisations of guanxi 
practices in the urban situations. Pierre Bourdieu saw improvisation as 
arising from habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions 
(Bourdieu 1978, 72). He specified the relations between habitus and 
improvisation to fit a new situation as follows: 
The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of 
regulated improvisations, produces practices which tend to 
reproduce the regularities immanent in the objective 
conditions of the production of their generative principle, while 
adjusting to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in 
the situation, as defined by the cognitive and motivating 
structures making up the habitus ... These practices can be 
accounted for only by relating the objective structure defining 
the social conditions of the production of the habitus which 
engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is 
operating, that is, to the conjuncture which, short of a radical 
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transformation, represents a particular state of this structure 
(Bourdieu 1978, 78). 
For Bourdieu, the situation is “the cognitive and motivating 
structures making up the habitus”, “a particular state of this structure” and 
the conjuncture which is “short of a radical transformation” (ibid). Even if 
there is improvisation or witticisms, they are from “the buried possibility”, 
and “subjects do not, strictly speaking, know what they are doing that 
what they do has more meaning than they know” (Bourdieu 1978, 79). 
Criticising Bourdieu, Michael de Certeau  (1984, 58) postulates that 
societies which have “all the characteristics that define the habitus: 
coherence, stability, unconsciousness, [and] territoriality”. He said that 
territories and habitus lead to strategies. He used “tactics” to refer to 
temporal practices, particularly those of the memory that evade strategies. 
The relations between memory and situation (occasion) is redefined so 
that 
the occasion is taken advantage of, not created. It is furnished 
by the conjunction, that is, by external circumstances in which a 
sharp eye can see the new and favourable ensemble they will 
constitute… The memory is thus mobilised relative to what 
happens, something unexpected that it is clever enough to 
transform into an opportunity. It inserts itself into something 
encountered by chance, on the other's ground (de Certeau 1984, 
86).   
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I agree with de Certeau. I will show that to hun in Society requires a 
sharp eye, not only from a spectator’s position in Goffman’s dramaturgical 
performances, but also from the vantage point of a practitioner. By 
integrating guanxi to the hun practices, I will show that vendors form 
connections with many different spheres of people; that they boast of their 
connections or pretend not to have connections for different purposes, 
and that they are “hun-ing” in and beyond the night market. Ideally, 
through improvising their connections vendors manage to adjust to 
situations, thereby achieving success; otherwise they lose prestige and 
honour, and can only muddle through or endure their urban life. I will 
examine the relations between Society and local society, the conditions of 
existence, and vendors’ practices. I will also elaborate the repertoire of 
hun practices by examining the ways they make connections in different 
regards.  
Exploring the night market: Access and methodology 
The night market hosts three hundred-odd stalls of migrant and local 
vendors. It is located at Y sub-district (jiedao) of Sunglow district 
(pseudonym), an outskirt district of Nanjing city. The surrounding area is a 
typical urban-rural-transition belt (chengxiang jiehebu). The Y sub-district 
used to be Y town until 2000, and it was named after a city gate at the 
outer ring of the imperial city of Nanjing, though the city gate no longer 
exists. In the 1960s, some large-scale petroleum and refinery factories 
(work units) were established by railway soldiers and migrants from 
northern China in Sunglow district. Nevertheless, the district hasn’t been 
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fully industrialised, as some villages and farmlands remained. As part of 
folk culture, Y town was famous for a temple fair held very close to the 
current night market. There, farmers and vendors sold farm produce, tools 
and everyday commodities, until the district government closed the fair in 
2005. The vanishing of such township liveliness was perhaps a sign of a 
new wave of urban development and redevelopment projects, which have 
profoundly changed the landscape of this area since the 2000s.  
My family lives in a downtown district of Nanjing. In September, 
2011, I came back home and asked my relatives, school mates and 
acquaintances about any night markets where migrants were likely to 
cluster. Unfortunately, their suggestions proved to be either invalid or 
outdated. The sites they visited a few years ago had either been 
transformed into indoor restaurants or been removed by authorities in the 
name of urban gentrification or because of the upcoming Nanjing 2014 
Youth Olympics.  
So I hired taxi drivers, the “eyes and ears” of the city, to drive me to 
many other night markets, but these markets were either small or did not 
have many migrants. The drivers took me farther and farther away from 
downtown. The last one took me to a lit up street at the urban rim. He was 
surprised that the night market he knew had also disappeared. He then 
suggested that we had a last try at the “biggest one in Nanjing”. After 
another ten-minute drive we arrived at the site. It was already midnight, 
but the market was lit up. Canopies of street restaurants lined up along the 
long street, with each cooking stand facing the street. Above each stand 
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hung a light bulb, whose halos formed a bright, glamorous river which 
stretched nearly half a mile. Steam and flavours diffused in the air and 
tickled my senses. I decided to begin my eleven-month fieldwork there.  
Having no connections with any of my informants, I began my 
research journey using what Buroway (1998) calls the extended method. 
Buroway (1998) describes this approach as an inchoate tradition in 
community studies, but one which combines positive and reflexive science. 
According to him, the extended method should 
start out from dialogue, virtual or real, between observer and 
participant, embedding such dialogue within a second dialogue 
between local processes and extralocal forces that in turn can 
only be comprehended through a third, expanding dialogue of 
theory with itself (Buroway 1998).  
Accordingly, I began my research scope from my own interactions 
with several vendors, and then traced their network in the night market 
and in the wider society, and then reflected upon the Society they dwell in 
order to explore extralocal factors that have influenced vendors’ 
interactions at microscopic levels.  
In the beginning, I worked as a kitchen hand and waiter for Han’s 
restaurant for a month.  Then I chose several other vendors to do the same 
job in the next a couple of months. During my spare time I carried out 
informal and formal interviews. I also used surveys. By so doing I managed 
to map out several vendors’ family members and kinship ties (sometimes 
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as detailed as three generations), their past working experiences as well as 
the way they started their businesses in the night market. I familiarised 
myself with family members of some migrant families as well as some 
single men so as to understand their relationships with the other gender.  
Later on, I included many more vendors in my research through 
snowballing. Sometimes I was referred to my informants’ friends; in other 
cases I took the initiative to expand my network, and exchanged my 
research findings with my acquaintances.  However, the more people I 
investigated, the more I felt that I was “trapped” by the network I had 
established. For example, I met my second key informant, Master Jin, at 
Han’s stand. But he refused my self-referral to be his kitchen hand. It 
turned out that recruiting assistants from another boss was unethical or 
even “offensive” to the ex-employer, even though Jin and Han had made 
acquaintance with each other and called each other brothers. Fat Man, 
another key informant and one of my “gurus” in the field, was unhappy at 
my “hanging around” with Pebble Zhang, his business competitor who 
“stole” his secret receipt of barbeque fish. Some other vendors kindly 
advised me not to study “ghosts” (so-called hooligans) for safety 
considerations. Despite these “stop signs”, however, over time, I became 
more aware of who got along well with whom and the reasons behind 
their connections. The knowledge of people’s networks also sheds light on 
their behaviours when they ubiquitously faced external pressures such as 
the market relocation (chapter 4).  
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In this stage, I participated in a variety of daily (nocturnal) activities 
including serving customers and doing other errands, deploying and 
collecting equipment, visiting wholesale centres with some small 
commodity vendors, joining drinking banquets, playing mah-jong and 
chess, distributing beers for a “ghost”, tutoring vendors’ children, and 
sometimes mediating quarrels and conflicts among vendors and so forth.  
Interviewing about one’s connections has many obstacles. On the 
part of informants, exposing their connections to a third party can bring 
unwanted troubles or is simply unnecessary. In some cases, my own 
experience echoes that of Sudhir Venkatesh (2013) when he asked the 
whereabouts of an evasive informant from another informant. The reply is 
worth quoting in full:  
It is very important that the rest of us don’t know anything— 
that we don’t talk or say anything. Our ignorance is what can 
save us, and keep us in this country. And for you, I would also 
suggest that you not ask too many questions. That is not a safe 
way to be (Venkatesh 2013, 91). 
Oftentimes, the obstacle is because the informant had a very 
unpleasant experience with the person concerned, or he has to get along 
with that person so he feels a need to keep the secrets or unethical 
behaviours of that person private.  
In contrast, participant observation proved to be more useful than 
mere interviews, not only because one obtains embodied experiences, but 
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because ongoing life dramas are unfold. Indeed, the ways people “perform” 
their connections are perhaps more crucial to the understanding of social 
interactions than interviews. Still, I had to rely on several experienced 
vendors to fully understand the world of connections. These vendors—Fat 
Zhao, Fat Man, Old Wang, Master Jin and JR Cui (all pseudonyms)—will 
repeatedly appear in following chapters.   
In the third stage, I explored the ways migrants make connections 
with government agents and with powerful locals in their everyday lives 
and in response to the market relocation. By so doing I tried to associate 
migrants’ connections at the microscopic level to the local political 
economy. I collected data such as government registers, debates on the 
Internet, media coverage concerning the relocation, and contracts signed 
between migrants and market regulators and so on. 
In March 2012, with the help of EMO staff, I contacted local city 
police (CALE) in their office. There, I obtained a register of all the stalls 
(households) presented by the EMO to CALE in preparation for the market 
relocation. The register has facilitated my interviews with almost two 
thirds of the vendors in the night market. However, the registered 
households did not match my own data. Upon scrutiny, the discrepancy 
allowed me to understand the power relations between individual 
vendors, CALE and EMO (see chapters 2 and 4).  
At that time, the market was threatened with relocation and the 
vendors had divided opinions over what to do about it. While many 
vendors were afraid that the relocation was inevitable, a few thought 
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otherwise because there had been a successful protest against an eviction 
of non-local vendors by CALE and EMO in 2011. I traced the event and 
conducted an in-depth interview with the organiser of the protest, and his 
narratives not only enriched my understanding of political connections of 
vendors, but also shed light on the subsequent interactions among 
vendors, local government and powerful locals before and after the market 
relocation in June 2012.  Two months later, when the aftermath of 
relocation seemed to subside, I left my field. 
Chapter Outline 
With this ethnography I hope to illustrate how vendors make 
different kinds of connections in their urban lives. Each chapter has its 
own thematic focus. The individuals, groups or institutions with which 
individual vendors are connected and which have impacts on their lives 
range from local rentiers and hooligans, grassroots government officials 
and policemen, as well as vendors themselves and the other gender as far 
as men are concerned. As I shall show, each type of connection bear more 
or less performative meanings of hun practices. Thus we can see vendors 
perform gratitude and compliance to market regulatory personnel when 
they aim to obtain stands in the night market, feign brotherly friendship 
when they deal with local hooligans, disguise themselves as apolitical 
when they resisted government decision to relocate the night market, and 
perform masculine, ritualistic gestures among themselves to ensure 
business success and personal safety, and actively construct their images 
as able men in relation to the other gender.  While chapters 3 and 4 
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explore more about vendors’ networking, chapters 5 and 6 see vendors’ 
performances more as presentations of their socially sanctioned selves: 
what is a good man among his ‘brothers’, and what is a good man in 
relation to a woman? 
Chapter 2, Vendors and the marketplace, provides vendors’ narratives 
of their past mobile lives and how they connect to locals to start their 
businesses. I also give an account of the creation of the night market as an 
aperture to the local political economy. In chapter 3, Trapping ghosts, I 
explore a sphere of so-called “ghosts” who pose threats to vendors’ 
personal safety and businesses, and analyse the ways vendors deal with 
these “ghosts”.  
Chapter 4, To protest or to comply, describes the successful open 
protest by vendors against an expulsion by the local government in 2011, 
as well as vendors’ responses to the market relocation in 2012. My focus is 
the leadership and political mobilisation of the first event and individual 
tactics in the second event, as well as conditions that generate the two 
modes of political connections. The market relocation also accounts for the 
mobility of my informants, so this chapter shares similar concerns with 
chapter 2.  
In Chapter 5, Masculinities among men, I select several social settings 
such as street fighting and drinking to characterise three types of 
masculinities used by men to survive the capricious commercial and social 
environs and to develop companionship with other men. Chapter 6, 
Conjugal masculinity, deals with the relations between men and women by 
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exploring identities of unmarried and married male migrants. This chapter 
can be read in conjunction with chapter 5, because men are often caught 
between their connections with friends and with the other gender.  
The conclusion assesses the overall status quo of the migrant 
vendors. Through a synthesis of the themes discussed in previous chapters, 
it examines the implications of this study for rethinking power, class, 
migration and subject on the edge of Chinese society.  
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Chapter 2 
Vendors and marketplace 
The night market has been around for years. Every evening, a few 
hours before the sun goes down, the No. 2 Road becomes a confluence of 
beeping vehicles. Buses, trucks and cars push their way through the traffic 
as best as they can. From various lanes that run off the No. 2 Road, a strand 
of motor trikes and minivans join this current, and the drivers pull over 
along the 12-metre pavement on the north side of the No. 2 Road, awaiting 
the opening of the night market. Around 5:00 p.m., these vendors unload 
all their goods from the vehicles in a highly synchronised manner, 
establishing two linear arrays of clothes, small merchandise and food 
stands in about half an hour, and leaving only a very narrow lane for the 
pedestrians. The outdoor restaurants on the outer array of the night 
market often extrude into the No.2 road, occupying one fourth of the 
roadway. With the emergence of colourful articles and the rise of food 
aromas that tickle the senses, the exuberance of life begins along this 800-
metre long street market. 
Who are the vendors? Where do they come from? How does one start 
a business here? The answers can appear to be very simple at first sight. 
For a food vendor, he needs to set up a food cart (Figure 2.1, left) with 
cooking equipment and a canopy to receive customers. For a small 
merchandise vendor, who wholesales clothing or scarves and lays them on 
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a blanket on the ground (Figure 2.1, right). Yet the answers can be a bit 
complicated if we look into their life trajectories, and ponder over why 
they chose to employ themselves in this way. In this chapter, I highlight 
the historical and social institutions as well as personal ambitions that are 
conducive to such transformation of people from farmers, and migrant 
workers to vendors. 
The market as a site, on the other hand, is a confluence of people in a 
confined space. But how was the space created in the host society? How do 
we understand the market as a place that grows out of the local political 
economy in a place where urbanisation precedes rapidly? How do vendors 
access the market to start their businesses and what is the nature of the 
ties they form with the local society? 
Vendors: out of village and factories 
 
 
  
Figure 2.1: Business beginners. 1) JR Liu is cooking at his stand. He sets his stand 
across from Pebble Zhang’s stand, and unfolds his canopy to receive customers 
behind him.  2) A young woman lays a cloth on the ground and displays scarves 
and hats on it.  
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Two cases: Old and young 
Two personal narratives of vendors, one each from elder and 
younger generations, serve as a starting point. Old Shi was born in 1962 
and is one of the oldest outdoor restaurant bosses at the street market. 
According to him,  
I am from L County, H city,7 north Jiangsu province.8 L County is 
an economically backward region. However this region is 
famous for its education—that is why many rich businessmen 
send their children to the county high school. We are also very 
proud of our countrymen Premier Zhou En Lai9 as well as Li 
Yuan Chao, a member of the standing committee of the CCP. 
When I was 25 (1986), I went to Suzhou and worked in a 
factory for one year. I bought a Mazda10 and stayed in Suzhou 
for 15 years. During Suzhou’s transition into a tourist city, 
Mazdas were forbidden so I went back home. I built a three-
storey house, and cultivated farm land. I also engaged in some 
                                                          
7
 In terms of administrative hierarchy, the Chinese county is a jurisdictional and territorial 
division of a city. For example, Nanjing city has ten urban districts and five counties. 
8
 Jiangsu province is divided into two regions, north Jiangsu and south Jiangsu. Jiang means 
big river and it refers specifically to the Yangtze River. North Jiangsu (subei) is north of the 
Yangtze River and is economically backward compared to south Jiangsu where several mega 
cities are located. The Yangtze River is not only a geographical divider of China but also an 
economic and cultural watershed. The South Yangtze River region (jiangnan) has been known 
for its prosperity for centuries, even before industrialisation and urbanisation, so it has been 
the destination of migration from the upper Yangtze basin and north China for hundreds of 
years.  
9
 Zhou was the first Premier (office term 1949-1976) of PRC.  
10
 Mazda is a vernacular for motor trike which was introduced to China by Mazda Company, 
hence their name: all motors with three wheels are called Mazda in Nanjing. Mazdas are very 
common in newly developed counties and cities all over China. They are operated by private 
drivers as taxis and are convenient for short trips. But they are forbidden in downtown 
Nanjing because of their pollution and low speed that may interfere with automobile traffic. 
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other agricultural activities such as raising fish, ducks and 
silkworms. I raised pigs for one year. I also raised cows, but it 
was not profitable—if I were successful I would be a millionaire 
now. 
My mother does not take care of my three kids so they 
have to come with me to work. 
“What?” His wife interrupted the interview. “You take care of the kids? 
Don’t listen to him, he is eating, drinking, flirting with girls and gambling11 
all the time every day! He has many mistresses.”  
With a timid grin, Old Shi dismisses his wife’s utterance, and 
continues.  
Then one day my relatives phoned me to tell me they could not 
run the business on their own, so I came here to help them. 
Another food vendor, JR Liu, recounts his story which is typical of his 
generation. JR Liu was born in 1991, thirteen years after Opening up and 
Reform, and has just started his business here. “Do you know how many 
cities I’ve lived in since leaving home at the age of fifteen?” He asked me, and 
answered himself, “Six”. 
I looked for short-term work in Hangzhou, Taizhou, Wuxi, 
Guangzhou, Jiangmen, Suzhou, before returning to my 
hometown S County in Shandong Province. After the spring 
festival in 2007, I moved out with my younger brother to 
                                                          
11
 Chihepiaodu(吃喝嫖赌), an idiom characterising amoral idling life, usually relates to man.  
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Suzhou where I worked as a salesman. Then I worked at an 
automobile beautification12 workshop. I was asked to clean 
vehicles with chemicals. The constant exposure to corrosive 
liquids damaged my hands which were left cracked and 
bleeding. So I quit the job for a while. In the 2010 spring festival, 
I couldn’t stand to stay at home until the fifteenth of the first 
Lunar Month,13 so I went out on the fifth day to an electronic 
factory in Wujiang city, Suzhou, and worked as a post-sale 
representative in Nanjing. [In my spare time] I set up a milk tea 
stand with my friend in front of a factory. However, the guard 
of the factory prevented us from selling our goods there.”  
I quit my job, and ran a business selling cold noodles from 
April to July 2011, but the business was not prosperous. So I 
decided to sell mutton soup using the equipment I used to 
make milk tea—you see, these aluminium buckets—according 
to Pebble Zhang’s (another vendor) suggestion. I help Pebble 
Zhang with his business and we eat together every day. 
Business is not very good! I still have half a bucket of mutton 
soup unsold. 
From the above two sketchy cases we can see that vendors are 
leading a highly mobile life. Many vendors have held several jobs before 
working in the night market—the younger the more so. For example, JR 
Liu has lived in six cities in the past seven years, working at various jobs 
                                                          
12
 An euphemism for car washing workshop. 
13
 In rural areas, the holiday of spring festival lasts until the 15
th
 of the first Lunar month. 
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including factory work, sales representative, automobile “beauty master”, 
and finally a milk tea and mutton soup vendor. The two generations also 
differ in that while the elder generation may have some agricultural 
experiences, the younger generation have not, but generally quit their jobs 
in factories before they run their own businesses. Why do both groups 
refuse to continue their original lives in their villages or in factories, and 
why do they choose to become private businessmen instead?   
Out of villages 
Several push and pull factors including political and economic 
changes, familial relations and personal willingness shape the working and 
life trajectories of migrant vendors. For the elder generation, their 
migratory lives in their earlier years have to be situated in the gradual 
breakdown of the commune system and work-points institution on the 
one hand, and bourgeoning commercial activities that outgrew the 
planned economy in towns and cities on the other hand. The incentives 
created by these trends were so great that some vendors have fond 
memories of their first earnings. Fat Man, a famous outdoor restaurant 
boss in the night market, recalls, 
When my cousin introduced me to work in that grain 
distribution centre14 in the town, hey, you couldn’t imagine 
                                                          
14
 Grain distribution centres are institutions of the socialist planned economy. Since 
November 1953 the state monopolised national grain purchasing and marketing, and totally 
controlled grain’s produce, purchase, transport and consumption. In 1985 the state monopoly 
of purchase and marketing was formally abolished, and the prices of grain were subject to 
market fluctuation since then. To buffer the impact of reform, a dual track system was 
adopted in which the grain stations can process the grain they purchased surplus to the 
production quota stipulated by the state, and sell them to customers at a higher market price 
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how energetic I was, could you? The hostess (of the distribution 
centre) prepared many delicious foods. They made snow-white 
steam buns like this big! They also provided pickled chicken 
claws and pork, but I just eat the buns and the pork because 
chewing chicken claws was so time-consuming. I operated the 
oil press machine for days and nights, and got my share. You 
know how much have I earned? I could press out 3.5 Chinese 
pounds (Jin, 500 grams) of oil in an hour, each Chinese kilo is 3 
yuan in the market, and the [fixed] oil price at that time was 
0.62 yuan per Chinese kilo!15  You didn’t know how exhausted 
was I after that—I fell asleep on my cousin’s shoulder when we 
were coming back to our village on the tractor. (“It was 
showering when you came back.” Aunt Zhang, Fat man’ wife 
reminds her husband) I was sleeping as if dead; nobody could 
wake me up for two days. So I got to know that money is easier 
to earn outside, which is why I went to cities.” 
He tried a variety of businesses afterwards. 
I then earned money by selling ginger and chilli peppers in 
Nanjing for four years. Then I came back home and married. 
When I was 26 (1993), I went out to the Giant Factory District, 
                                                                                                                                                                               
than the state purchase fixed price. The state employee could thus profit from such market-
oriented business, which also benefited Fat Man. Such activities were seen as illegal 
sometimes, depending on the unstable policies. The economic incentive was so significant 
that 40 million rural people flowed to cities in 1994 once the formal ration system was 
officially abolished. 
15
 To make sense of how much Fat Man earned, assuming 500 ml sesame oil is now worth 15 
AUD in Australia, so Fat Man’s hour rate would be the equivalent of AUD 52.5, five times what 
he could earn in the command economy system.  
40 
 
Nanjing, and shifted to other businesses. The business was not 
easy so I became a truck driver for many years. My lower back 
hurt badly due to long distance driving, so I moved to this 
district. I made and sold candied rice puffs in the beginning, 
and later shifted to barbeque fish. 
In addition to economic incentives, some migrants mention rebelling 
against or escaping from patriarchal institutions as another factor in their 
outmigration. Old Shi told me,  
 I graduated from high school in 1980. After graduation I 
worked as a maths teacher for two semesters. In 1982, I saw 
the movie Shaolin temple (one of the earliest commercial Hong 
Kong movies broadcast in mainland China), so I decided to 
learn some martial arts in that temple (in Henan province, 
central China). But I went to Yellow Mountain instead with my 
friend’s sister (implying a romantic affair with the latter). I 
didn’t say goodbye to my parents. They looked for me but 
didn’t find me for a while. 
Fat Zhao (b. 1968), another outdoor restaurant boss and friend of Fat 
Man, told me: 
When I was young I’d like to get by with my “brothers” in the 
“Society”.  At that time I kept my hair as long as this (long hair 
is a symbol of anti-conservatism). We fought in the street and 
my parents could not harness me. But my father beat me badly 
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when I came back home. I dared not to fight back. However, 
when he arranged a marriage for me, I smashed tens of sealed 
jars of yellow wine (part of bride price) and escaped my village.”  
He then started to run a restaurant in town, and returned to his 
parents with another fiancé. Later on, he made himself a “ten- thousand-
yuan household”16 (wanyuan hu) in the 1990s, but lost it all and moved to 
the cities again because of debt. The debt, according to him, resulted from 
another milestone reform: the 1998 rural fee-to-tax reform which had 
drained the financial resources of grassroots government. Consequently 
the IOUs used by the government to pay for services became worthless 
and Fat Zhao went bankrupt. He went to Nanjing and started from scratch 
by working at a garbage processing station. He demonstrated 
determination and endurance—which he was very proud of—when he 
“held his breath” and shovelled stinking garbage onto trucks for three 
months before he could accumulate the capital for his new outdoor 
restaurant business.  
Not all the siblings of a family are equally likely to out-migrate for a 
living. It depends on the birth order. According to many vendors, it is 
customary for the eldest son to stay with parents after his marriage and to 
assume major responsibility in taking care of the elders.17 Other sons are 
more likely to move out of their places of origin to earn a new living. 
                                                          
16
 Ten-thousand-yuan household is a term designating the first batch of rich self-employed 
getihu who emerged after land contract reform in the 1980s.    
17
 The pattern of endowment may differ from region to region; in some places this 
responsibility falls to the youngest son and wife or a daughter and son-in-law if the daughter 
is the only child. 
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Daughters normally marry out to places far away from their homes and 
are expected to have fewer economic ties with their natal families. But 
these dormant kinship ties can be reactivated when time is appropriate. 
 
Figure 2.2: A vendor’s extended family and its geographical distribution. Fat 
Man is the third Child among his six siblings. One of Fat Man’s aunts (the 
seventh child of Fat Man’s grandparents) married and went to Nanjing city 
decades ago. With the help of his aunt, Fat Man started his business in the city 
without a hukou in the 1990s. 
The geographically distributed kinship network resulting from 
marriage is utilised in migration across the urban-rural boundaries. For 
example, Fat Man, when he went out of his village at the age of sixteen, 
relied on his youngest aunt who had married out to Nanjing decades ago. 
Later on, he found a job and took care of one of his younger brothers 
(fourth brother, see Figure 2.2). Fat Man visits his aunt every spring 
festival, more frequently than he visits other relatives in his home village. 
Reliance on kinship in migration even extends to the next generation. 
When Fat Man’s eldest daughter graduated from high school, he came up 
with the idea to find a job for her in the company in Zhejiang province 
where his fifth brother worked. In general, kinship ties serve as a 
foundation for an “internal” job market which encompasses generations 
and space.  
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Out of factories 
Many young people in their twenties or thirties also employ 
themselves. Yet they follow a path different from the elder generation, first 
working in urban factories and then in the market. While their enrolment 
into urban factories is facilitated by the state and capital, their entrance 
into the market can be seen as deviance from such arrangements.  
The expanding vocational education system and zoning technologies 
typified by Economic Development zones in cities play vital roles in the 
rural-urban migration of young men. Many vendors are from nearby 
factories in the Economic Development zone after they graduated from 
vocational schools in counties and towns. Kipnis (2011) points out that 
students from vocational schools enjoy high employability, though 
choosing to study at vocational schools is the last choice for Chinese 
parents who desire academic excellence for their children. The Zoning 
technologies, to quote Aihwa Ong (2004), “provide the mechanisms for 
creating or accommodating islands of distinct governing regimes within 
the broader landscape of normalised rule”. The nearby Economic 
Development Zone exemplifies this very technology. It covers an area of 
100 square kilometres, hosting a workforce of more than one million 
migrant workers.  
Zoning technologies create exceptional space where socialist 
planning and neoliberal logic marry. Indeed, such technologies also 
harbour a post-Fordist employment system in which the term of contract 
44 
 
is dramatically minimised, resulting in a “fluid modernity” (Bauman 2000) 
in which 
capital has become exterritorial, light, disencumbered and 
disembeded to an unprecedented extent [and] a government 
dedicated to the well-being of its constituency has little choice 
but to implore and cajole. 
In the Economic Development Zone, the minimum contract terms in 
Korean and Japanese factories, for example, are only three months as 
stipulated by Chinese Labour Law. However, in practice, the term can be as 
short as one month as I learned from many job agencies and my 
informants. Furthermore, workers themselves voluntarily terminate their 
contracts and quit jobs, primarily because the chances of getting promoted 
are slim and the working hours are prolonged and monotonic. Such sterile 
factory lives often bore these young workers “in only three days”, as many 
vendors tell me about their previous working experiences. As a 
consequence, some of them move to other small but working-hour-flexible 
companies that are equally salaried, and start their own business after 
working hours. After all, casual, flexible jobs are not far from running a 
small business in terms of autonomy over time; the only difference is that 
the latter kind of employment entails more risk.   
These institutional factors explain JR Liu’s career history. However, 
this is not the whole story. To run one’s business requires some guts. 
Among his factory friends who were still discussing options of self-
employed businesses, JR Liu took the first step. He tells me that he was not 
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the type of person “who can endure being told to do everything every day”. 
Instead of finding another job in the city after the spring festival in 2011, 
he decided to run a private business. 
Women’s decisions 
Young women tell stories similar to those of young men. They feel 
similar boredom when they work in factories. Nonetheless, their 
movements often involve an additional factor: the life choices of their 
partners. For example, Rui, Brother Han’s young wife, told me, 
 I am from Ning Xia province (northwest China), when it was 
time to go out—you know it’s common for girls— out I went. 
First I went to Fujian Province to work in a shoe factory with 
my girlfriends from school, and then I went to Beijing where I 
met him (Han) when I was working in a meat processing 
company. You know the skewer mutton? I was stringing meat 
to bamboo skewers every day. I worked hard and was 
promoted to a position supervising other workers, but I was 
still like a machine.  You eat, sleep, and wake up to work, get 
tired and sleep. Your head is dizzy every day. It was absolutely 
a waste of time. 
Rui later married Han, a chef of Sichuan origin and who was in a 
Beijing suburb district then. After she gave birth to their second children 
at Han’s home village, Han moved to Nanjing city to start his own business 
with the help of his sister who married a Nanjing local. As it was hard to 
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run a restaurant with a single person, Rui joined Han’s business instead of 
working in nearby factories. This pattern of household economy, however, 
is largely confined to outdoor restaurants. For shoe or clothes sellers in 
the night market, a single woman or a man can manage the business, 
unless she or he makes more money than her or his partner does in 
factories.   
  
47 
 
From street to sidewalk: a spatio-political economy 
Originally, the street market was formed spontaneously, and the first 
vendors spread their stalls along No. 2 Road. But now the 800-metre night 
market has a clear boundary, occupying a 12-metre sidewalk that circles a 
relocated Community (the relocated Community A, see Figure 2.3) which 
is nested in an urbanising suburban district.  Though the shift from street 
to sidewalks was only a few steps, the process involved a convoluted 
spatio-politics that has shaped the contour of the night market. 
From a satellite view of the vicinity of the market (see Figure 2.3), 
the building blocks surrounding it are from different periods. There are 
work units from the 1960s, hospital and schools affiliated to these work 
units and farmer’s houses dating back to even earlier period, all of which 
formed a mixed landscape typical to a socialist suburban area. From 1990s 
and onwards, new commodity residences were developed on the state-
owned lands of these work units; mounds and hills were bulldozed for 
new residential projects. Existing residents and numerous migrant 
workers from the nearby Economic Development Zone have become local 
consumers of the night market. Besides, truck drivers find it easy to park 
their trucks on the straight and wide streets named after numbers from No. 
1 road to No. 9 road in this region. They often have dinner at outdoor 
restaurants, spending 20 yuan for a sauna bath in nearby bathhouses 
before they resume their long journeys the next early morning. Even late 
at night, taxi drivers, drunken men and prostitutes can still grab some food 
from these outdoor restaurants. 
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There are additional geographical advantages for vendors to run 
their business here. The L-shaped night market is not far from an “old 
street” where vendors buy cooking materials from a privatised fresh 
market (Figure 2.3). South of the night market, a compound of uniform 
apartment buildings host tens of thousands staff of a work unit. Westward, 
several blocks of residences of other smaller work units are dotted with 
peasants’ flat houses and verdant vegetable gardens. These places provide 
cheap residences for the vendors with a rate at only a few hundred yuan a 
month. The market is also not far from the political centre, the district 
government to its southwest and the public security bureau, which 
provide a minimum sense of security to the vendors in this sometimes 
vandalised venue. 
Figure 2.3: Tilted Google view of the region. The L-shaped night market was 
strategically located at the sidewalk of the relocated Community, and was 
surrounded by residential buildings from different periods.  
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Yet this is not the whole story. Over the past 10 years there have 
actually been three markets, each corresponding to a type of political 
economy: an earlier spontaneous one which was regulated by the city 
police, a planned one embedded in and regulated by the relocated 
community, and the current one which grows out of both spontaneity and 
planning.  
As I have stressed, the business spontaneity of the earliest market is 
based on the abovementioned geographic and demographic advantages. 
For the outdoor restaurants, these benefits include the population of 
potential consumers, ready accessibility to raw cooking materials, cheap 
accommodation and safe business environs. Where these elements are 
available, there is profit; the market is thus the spatial aggregate of people 
seeking such profit.  
But state and capital are important in shaping the space of the 
market in its later development. According to Harvey (2008), the creation 
of urban space is driven by the hegemonic command of capital and state to 
absorb surplus capital, which is implemented to the detriment of 
dispossessed farmers, debt-encumbered homeowners and marginalised 
rural migrants, continuously giving rise to new forms of oppositions 
across time and space instead of class struggle. In analysing China’s 
current urbanisation, Hsing (2010) highlights the struggle over 
territoriality, and argues that conflicts over physical and discursive space 
among various state and society actors underlie the grand power 
transformation. In what she calls the “urban fringe”, urban and rural 
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governments compete over land for conversion to industrial–commercial 
projects and commodity housing, and at what she calls the “rural fringe” 
the struggle is between the township government and villages. 
The relocated Communities and the EMO 
The theories of Harvey and Hsing illuminate the transformation of 
the area surrounding the market. The recent urbanisation, readily visible 
as high rise commodity buildings, Economic Development zones, 
university towns as well as newly bulldozed mounds and hills, is driven by 
the local state at the municipal and district levels. From 2000 onwards, 
about 100,000 farmers from a nearby region were relocated by the district 
government, and the residents were granted urban hukou by the 
government. In the meantime, a university town and real estate projects 
mushroomed in the vacated places. 
The prolonged relocation process has generated a wide array of 
social problems. The compensation from the district government for an 
average farmer included apartments in the relocated communities, social 
welfare, and working opportunities in nearby factories. In the beginning, 
each family member was allocated 20 square metres of residential space. 
The social welfare cash was 18,000 yuan for every woman and 30,000 for 
each man above 50 years old. And men and women under 50 were 
promised jobs by the government. However, the government played a 
sleight of hand by transferring the cash compensation in the form of 
reemployment funds to factories and companies in the development zones. 
The companies trained the land-losing farmers, charging them a training 
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fee by deducting it from the funds, but laid off these workers very soon 
and hired cheap migrant labours instead. Moreover, the compensation 
lump sum was eroded by inflation. As a result, many families even could 
not afford pork, a staple meat which symbolises a decent life. Suffering 
from unemployment, these newly transformed urbanites appealed to the 
government of the relocated Community or protested through official 
channels, and were then assigned low-paid jobs such as cleaners or guards 
in state-owned enterprises. However, many of them were sacked again. 
Learning from the pathetic lessons of their predecessors, groups that were 
later relocated often staged strong protests, bargaining for higher 
compensation or larger residences. Such protests have gradually subsided 
in the past years with the completion of the relocation, though there are 
still sporadic sit-ins by elders in front of the municipal government.18 
The relocated Communities found a way to earn money by leasing 
their property. But the most profitable business venues, the ground floors 
of the residential building facing the street, were allocated to state-owned 
banks, supermarkets, and pharmacies with state background, and the rest 
were subcontracted by the sub-district government to property realty 
companies (wuye guanli gongsi) in which the Community had no share. 
What was left to the Community was a planned business street situated on 
the ground floor of the second row of residential buildings that was hided 
from the No. 2 Road (the “back business street”, see Figure 2.4). An office, 
                                                          
18
 That the majority of sit-ins are elders is strategic. They become a headache of government 
because they have plenty of time, enjoy free transportation and would be easily injured 
during confrontation which is detrimental to government’s reputation. 
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the Entrepreneurship Management Office (EMO, see Figure 2.4), was set 
up by the community to regulate these stores.  
The name and the regulation scheme posted on the EMO wall bears a 
formal overtone that mixes market liberalism (entrepreneurship) and 
socialist ideology.  It stipulates that the office should 
Strictly implement laws, regulations and agreements with 
regards to reemployment; facilitate employment for those who 
are laid off but who seek self-employment and 
entrepreneurship. 
And the stores are leased out to Community residents.  
However, at the same time, the spontaneous night market was 
expanding. From 2003, several migrant vendors began to prepare and sell 
wontons, dumplings, and take-away lunch boxes on the sidewalks centring 
on the cross roads of No. 2 Road, the Old Street and Park East Road north 
of it (Figure 2.4). Fat Zhao and Master Jin were among the first batch of 
these vendors. Master Jin, even though he just ran a small wonton stand, 
could profit from hard work by staying open from dusk to dawn.  
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The CALE, city police 
The City Appearance and Law Enforcement department, division or 
section (hereby referred as CALE) is known in China by their short name 
city management police (cheng guan). The CALE was firstly introduced in 
April 1997 in Beijing. Later on, the institution was adopted by all major 
cities in mainland China to improve municipal governance, partly because 
cities had become more crowded with the inflow of migration, partly as an 
effort to reformulate redundant functional urban agencies. Institutionally, 
it integrates law enforcement functions from a number of government 
agencies including construction, gardening, transportation, public health 
and even demolition, with a focus on the maintenance of the tidy 
appearance of streets. As a law enforcement agency, it is often subordinate 
to public security (police), and the uniforms of CALE are often similar to 
the police.  
However, CALE officers often abuse their legal power by driving 
away migrants in brutal ways for the purpose of keeping streets “tidy”. 
Their unrestrained violence often provokes the sympathy of ordinary 
people. Meanwhile, CALE as an institution has to finance itself using its 
disciplinary power because it is a semi-formal state agency and 
underfunded. At the night market they charge vendors 50-100 yuan 
sanitary fees, and hire cleaners to clear the food waste. Individual CALE 
policeman often extort vendors by threatening to confiscate their cooking 
equipment.  
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In March 2008, the Nanjing municipal government issued a “red-
titled document”19 (hongtou wenjian) addressing business activities that 
obstruct traffic, pollute the environment of Communities and cause 
parking problems. In China, Red-titled documents are laws, rules, 
regulations and policies that are drafted, issued and implemented down 
the administrative hierarchy (Shaw 1996). According to this decree, the 
spontaneous night market which was then regulated by the CALE should 
be closed. However, the relocated Community A expressed its interest in 
the ever-expanding night market which had already hundreds of vendors 
and businessmen. The proposal by Community A was approved by the 
district government, probably as a way to ameliorate the tension between 
the district government and the Community since the relocation. 
Therefore, in October 2008, the CALE and the relocated Community A 
reached an agreement that Community A would take charge of the night 
market and move it to its own territory, the 12-metre sidewalk. The 
Regulatory Scheme of the night market stated that  
…according to regulations made by supervising government, 
[the night market] should be closed. However, upon 
comprehensive considerations and extended planning and 
negotiation, [we] won the support from sub-district and 
municipal governments....and drafted this regulation scheme 
                                                          
19
 According to Shaw (1996), the format features “a capitalised, red-inked document title 
underlined by thick red lines broken in the middle by five-pointed red stars”, hence its public 
nickname “red-titled document”.  
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The responsibility, particularly the maintaining of street tidiness, of 
the CALE was shifted to the Community. Nevertheless, on paper the CALE 
was in charge.  As part of the agreement, the night market should be 
hidden from supervision or examination by officials from higher levels so 
that the political performance of CALE would not be affected. The scheme 
stipulated: 
The opening hours will be from 17:30 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. In order 
to meet regulatory requirements stipulated by the Community 
and upper-level government divisions.  
The guiding principles were drafted in an elusive manner as if they 
were designed to improve the welfare of the residents of Community A:  
Guiding principles: addressing difficulties of unemployed 
residents concretely; increasing revenue of residents; 
promoting citizens’ consumption level, and supervising a legal 
and hygiene business operation… 
It seemed a win-win between CALE and the relocated Community. 
The monthly revenue of the latter in the form of sanitary fee collected 
from the four hundred households in this night market was around 80,000 
yuan per month, or a million yuan annually. The night market thus became 
a piece of “savvy meat” for Community A.  
CALE continued to fulfil their designed function to maintain city 
appearance by patrolling the night market around 5 p.m., making sure that 
the outdoor restaurants did not intrude too much space into the side lane 
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of the six-lane No. 2 Road. However, its staff could no longer benefit from 
the confiscation of the goods of vendors. Furthermore, CALE as a fiscal unit 
also suffered from the withdrawal because its political performance was 
getting worse without its forceful regulation over the night market. In 
2011, this region ranked last in city-wide hygiene and sanitary appraisal, 
and local CALE workers did not get the annual bonus based on the 
appraisal. To make up this loss, the CALE fined the relocated Community 
more than 100,000 yuan for the “illegal” use of a municipal fire hydrant by 
the latter to flush away smears on the pavement before a sanitation 
inspection.  
 In short, since 2000s business spontaneity, urban governance and 
the post-socialist urban transformation interacted to shape the contour of 
the night market. The creation and re-formation of the market was power-
laden. The power relations mentioned above continued to influence the 
future of the vendors who are the primary focus of this ethnography.  
Hukou and working rights 
As I have stressed, kinship bridges migration to cities for some 
migrants. But kinship itself is neither necessary nor sufficient to account 
for how a vendor establishes his/her business in this night market. For 
one thing, the majority of vendors don’t have any relatives in this region; 
for another, they have to sign up with the regulatory agency, the 
Entrepreneurship Management Office (EMO), in order to legitimately run 
their business in the night market. This pivotal process of registration 
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provides a window as to how vendors articulate their relations with the 
night market. In the following I will use a survey of 80 vendor households 
to set forth typologies of existing connections. I argue that the common 
factor underlying such articulation is the right to work, and vendors 
obtained their working rights using either their connections or 
monetarised gifts to circumvent the hukou barrier.  
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Table 2.1: Types of vendors’ connections to the night market 
Type Numbers Hukou status 
Relatives in this 
region 
Registered 
name 
A 14 
They obtained urban 
hukou after they moved to 
this region through 
relocation.  
Their kinship 
networks are strong 
in the relocated 
communities. 
Their own 
names 
B 5 
Non-locals. Two of them 
gained hukou after they 
purchased apartments in 
the city. 
They are relatives of 
the staff from nearby 
work units.  
Their own 
names 
C 2 Non-locals 
Their relatives have 
local influence. 
Their own 
names 
D 6 Non-locals 
Their relatives are 
from rural areas but 
later gained urban 
hukou. 
Their 
relatives’ 
names  
E 9 Non-locals No 
local 
residents’ 
names 
F 44 Non-locals No 
Their own 
names 
Total 80    
 
I sort these 80 households between those with local urban hukou 
and those without it in the third column, and list the hukou status of 
their relatives in the fourth column (Table 2.1). I also include a fifth 
column as to whether their names appeared in the register of EMO. 
There are six types. A) Fourteen households are residents of the 
relocated Communities. These former farmers automatically obtained 
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their urban hukou after the relocation; B) Five migrant households have 
relations with nearby work units’ employees, and two of them have 
gained residency / hukou of Nanjing by buying apartments; C) Two 
migrant households have relatives who are influential local figures, and 
they register in their own names; D) Six migrant households have rural 
relatives who bought apartments in the relocated Community, and they 
register in the names of their relatives; E) Nine households are 
registered by the EMO as local residents whom these households have 
never met; F) The majority of 44 households have no kinship relations 
with locals, and are registered using their own names. 
The acquisition of a place in the night market in many types (types A, 
B, C, D and E) is dependent on the hukou that can be gained legally by birth, 
through government-led relocation from rural to urban areas or through 
purchasing an apartment. Nonetheless, the de facto right to work is not 
directly associated with house ownership, but with one’s personal 
connections to those who have hukou in this region (types D and E). 
Among those whose rights to work rely upon their relations to local 
residents, type E is noteworthy in that the connections are very fragile, 
and such fragility originated from the local conditions as I will show below. 
With the passage of time, the connections become more transactable. Type 
F includes vendors who do not have any personal connections to local 
residents, so their entry into the market is a matter of money, yet the 
monetary transaction has to be glossed over by gift exchange or guanxi 
sentiments.  
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The importance of hukou in gaining a place in the night market 
derives from the policy designed to address the unemployment and 
poverty caused by the resettlement. The direct beneficiaries are some 
locals whose livelihoods have deteriorated. They fall into type A, and their 
working rights are actually a type of entitlement. A typical case is an old 
couple who lost land and suffered from capricious policies in the past 
decades. Type B is similar to Type A in that the five households are 
relatives of former or current nearby work unit staff who received state 
privilege to obtain a stand. They used their own names instead of their 
relatives’ names to register with the EMO, presumably because they can be 
easily regulated.  
With the passage of time, many local vendors withdrew from the 
night market because they found the work load unbearable. When asked 
about their impressions of “outsiders” (waidi ren), many elders from the 
relocated Community who had worked in farmland told me that outsiders 
can “eat more bitterness” (chi ku, endure hardship) than locals. The locals’ 
withdrawal was also because they could profit from transferring their 
stands to outsiders, and by so doing they became rentiers rather than 
labourers. The transfer fees varied from 4,000 to 12,000 yuan, depending 
on the size of the stand and mutual bargaining between locals and migrant 
vendors, and should be paid lump sum. 
Yet not all the transactions took place between local individuals and 
migrants. In many cases, the EMO mediated or monopolised the 
transactions by utilising its administrative power. For instance, as with 
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type C, the EMO allocated places to migrants who had connections with 
local influential figures, such as the two leading households Han and 
Pebble Zhang, because the former had his sister married to a local 
hooligan (huonaogui or living rowdy ghosts in local terms, see chapter 3), 
and the latter was backed by another hooligan JR Lee, a “disciple” of a 
formal village head of one of the resettled Communities. Though the two 
households did not have urban hukou, they used their real names on the 
register, and they had the premium business positions in the night market. 
Type E is actually an official fraud by the EMO. The registered names are 
titular ones of the officials’ friends and relatives so that EMO staff can 
profit from selling these positions to outsiders. For example, Fat Man 
registered under the name of an EMO official’s classmate, and five other 
households were registered as brother or uncle of Director Zhang, deputy 
director of the EMO. However, the concerned vendors may not even know 
of their fictitious patrons, nor did they care about the manipulations. As 
long as the EMO collected monthly fees from these vendors, they would 
perceive their rights to run businesses as secure and guaranteed.  
In type D, some migrants use the names of their relatives with urban 
hukou, because the policy was favourable for local residents who would 
not be charged extra transfer fees. Nevertheless, the relatives of these 
migrant vendors have to present gifts or “red envelopes” (hongbao, 
monetary bribes) to the EMO to obtain positions in the market. As a 
consequence, the two households would keep their transactions as secrets 
from other vendors, not only because disclosure of such connections 
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would cause unnecessary jealousy from others vendors, but also because 
they saw such connections as loopholes which had better be kept private. 
The importance of personal connections to the household institution 
in obtaining working rights is eroded by the use of money. This trend not 
only manifests in the form of transaction fee itself, but also in 
standardisation of gifts, which is typical to vendors who fall into type F. 
A Maussian concept of gift would have money and calculability set in 
opposition to solidarity, inalienability of human value and spiritual links 
between people and things (Mauss 1970). In guanxi practices, gifts and 
banquets symbolise personal connections and sentiments (Kipnis 1997). 
Nonetheless, in guanxi practices there are manipulations in which a gift is 
presented or favour is delivered in exchange for economic gains. In a 
similar vein, Webb Keane (2010) highlights the slippage of meanings 
between the two poles in Sumbanese society in Indonesia. He argues that 
symbolic tokens, though used in seemingly discrete social domain, can be 
gauged by the alternative value regimes of either exchange value or social 
status. Status is implicitly claimed in gift exchange, and the lower rank is 
associated with cleverness in calculation and lack of a sense of honour.  
Drawing upon from the abovementioned theories, I have noted that 
gifts presented to the staff of EMO have two features: they take standard 
forms, but at the same time are hierarchical in themselves. The typical gifts 
are luxury cigarettes. They are always presented along with the enveloped 
transfer fees. Cigarettes and the envelope which “seals” the money prevent 
the receiver from seeing them as merely instrumental, so that the gift giver 
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glosses the gifts with personal sentiments and he or she can legitimately 
expect the EMO to “look after” his or her business in the future. On the 
other hand, the gifts presented are universal rather than embodying a 
particular relationship in that, first, the gifts will no longer represent 
particular ties once they are received by the receiver; second, before he 
gives the gift, a vendor may ask other people what is the appropriate form 
of the gifts so the gifts can be presented by the receiver to other people. 
The luxury cigarettes fit the requirement, because they can be used as gifts 
by the receivers in other ceremonies (for instance, birthday party of elders) 
or be presented to officials and other VIPs. Therefore, the gift cigarettes 
become a particular type of currency or a universal equivalent. As a 
consequence, in China’s cities, industries have been created when their 
products such as luxury cigarettes, tonic medicines, luxury goods and 
state-sponsored medical insurance cards became universal gifts “recycled” 
in the cities. According to a cigarette and wine shopkeeper, she “recycles” 
cigarettes at 70% of their retail prices, and resells them at original price to 
customers or to KTVs, bars, and hotels.  
But there is another layer of meanings to these cigarettes: different 
brands function as status markers, and such status is stamped with a state 
imprint. In my field site, there were three major brands corresponding to 
the administrative hierarchy. They were a “Chinese” (national) brand 
priced at 68 yuan per pack, a “Jiangsu” (province) brand priced at 48 yuan 
per pack and a “Nanjing” (capital city of Jiangsu) brand priced at 12 yuan 
per pack. It was considered appropriate to present “Chinese” brand to 
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officials, “Jiangsu” brand on important occasions such as weddings, and 
the Nanjing brand when vendors and ordinary people exchanged 
cigarettes.   
The monetization in obtaining working rights is also contingent on 
the growth of the market. As said, the transferring of stands from locals to 
vendors was mediated by EMO. However, with the expansion of the night 
market, the management was overloaded by the growing number of 
vendors and particularly by the fact that small merchandise vendors were 
hard to register because of their high mobility. Vendors themselves began 
to transfer their stands. A vendor may notify his friends or relatives of a 
vacancy he discovered in the market and mediate between the prospective 
leaser and the tenant, thereby creating a secondary market in which locals 
and vendors sublet their positions to newcomers. Therefore, it becomes 
more practical for the EMO office to collect fees based on place than on 
people. The place-based tax also applied to some vendors whose stands 
were situated beyond the formal territory demarcated by both the 
community and CALE. In 2011, some vendors obtained their positions in 
the night market, but were squeezed out during the rearrangement of the 
night market. A few of them appealed to the local bureau of Letters and 
Visits, but their requests were turned back to the Community, who then 
compromised with these vendors by reducing the monthly rent from 400 
yuan to 200 yuan. In other words, while personal connections, sentiments 
and status performance are necessary for the gift exchange or the 
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presentation of enveloped money, initiating such guanxi connection or not 
follows market principles.   
The extent to which the connections are monetised also depends on 
business modes.  Not all the vendors stay put in the night market. Rather, 
some vendors whom I call “peddlers” have to move frequently from 
market to market. A typical peddler may have a wide network or a yellow-
page-like brochure through which he is able to follow fairs held in certain 
places or during certain periods, such as spring festival fair, temple fair 
and other fairs organised by county or township governments elsewhere. 
For instance, a vendor was running an amusement park (with rides for 
children) based in an area even further from downtown. He came to this 
night market before National Holiday (October 1st–7th), asking many 
vendors whether they had any connections with the Community. He 
offered to pay whoever made such connections two packs of luxury 
cigarettes. Some pettier peddlers come from nearby factories and occupy 
empty spaces in the market. They often hide for a few days when EMO 
staff collect fees and return to the market afterwards. 
Those who sell quick foods such as cold rice noodles are also more 
likely to adopt a mobile life to increase their revenues. In contrast, outdoor 
restaurant bosses are less likely to travel because of their cumbersome 
cooking equipment. However, some outdoor restaurant bosses speculate 
about where they can earn even more money. For example, Brother Xu 
theorises the profitability of a place in terms of “consumer level” (xiaofei 
shuiping) or “consumer capability” (Xiaofei nengli). According to him, high 
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dish prices and brands of cars parking in front of restaurants and KTVs are 
good indicators of “consumer level”.   
Note some of the connections in type E prove to be fragile. The 
fragility is latent in the tenancy between locals and non-locals in type E is 
bound by strong ties such as kinship. In type E, vendors are registered in 
the name of some local residents without knowing who their nominal 
leasers are. In type F, vendors contact their leasers via the EMO and 
register in the EMO’s book with their own names. Such tenancy contracts 
are always oral, and they are made in a way as if the EMO is doing a favour 
for vendors. The leasers are either friends or kin of EMO staff, or they are 
poor residents from the relocated Community. However, some nominal 
leasers turn out to be social bandits. In other cases, leasers who are local 
poor residents use social bandits to extort their tenants. In other words, 
the misery caused by poverty and social decay amongst the unjustly 
resettled is transferred to the migrant vendors through the exploitation of 
informal tenancy. 
For example, Vision Barbeque (the stall’s name is often used to refer 
to its operator) was run by a young couple who arrived in this region 
around March 2011 when there was not so much space in the night 
market. The husband looked for a local household from whom he might 
obtain a post in the market. With the “guidance” of the EMO office, he 
found a leaser, a local resident who did not actually ran the business. 
Vision Barbeque gave the resident several thousand yuan as lump sum 
transfer fee, treated him to a meal and presented him with several packs of 
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luxury cigarettes. Throughout the first year, the patron and his relatives 
and friends ate many times in Vision Barbecue’s stand. Out of gratitude, 
Vision Barbeque did not charge them. However, the patron borrowed 
several thousand yuan from Vision Barbeque without returning the money 
to him, which, according to Vision Barbeque, was “taking a yard when you 
already gave him an inch” (decun jinchi). Even worse, at the end of that 
lunar year, the leaser asked Vision Barbeque for another 10,000 yuan to 
renew the “contract”. In another words, the lump sum transfer fee was 
regarded by the leaser as the annual rent only. The son of the leaser, a 
gambler in big debt, even threatened Vision Barbeque with his pals in 
public that they would smash the stand. Vision Barbeque and wife were 
helpless; the wife told the husband to stay at the stand, and she walked 
into the dark back street, looking for the former staff of EMO for 
arbitration. As a result of the “arbitration”, the amount reduced to 5,000 
yuan but it should be paid in a month; otherwise the term of the contract 
should end. Disgruntled at the injustice, Vision Barbeque and wife stopped 
their business for a while, hoping that they would obtain a new post in the 
new market20 and therefore get rid of the leaser. They were lucky in the 
end. 
Another example was the Zhuge barbeque, an outdoor restaurant 
that is said to have the “highest attendance rate”. The owners registered in 
the name of the uncle of Director Zhang. Thanks to their industrious work 
for many years, they bought an apartment for 170,000 yuan in a nearby 
                                                          
20
 It was in May 2012 and there had been gossip that the night market would probably be 
relocated to a new place. See chapter 4. 
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suburb and gained urban household identity. However, this registration 
was not in the local district so they had to pay a sponsor. One midnight 
(after business hours) when the husband was away, an intoxicated patron 
extorted the wife by threatening to reclaim the stand immediately. The 
wife could only bend over the table sobbing. To settle the issue, Zhuge’s 
family had to treat the nominal patron to a banquet afterwards to pacify 
his anger. However, capricious as such connections are, such pitiful 
experience seems to reinforce a belief that making more money is 
everything, because only money can settle the disputes. According to 
several business neighbours, the Zhuge family and her relatives are a bit 
eccentric or selfish; they never reach out a hand to others but only work 
for themselves. 
Fat Zhao has a story of different kind. As far as I know, he is 
registered in the name of Director Zhang’s uncle. But he wasn’t hampered 
by the informality of his registration since he gets along well with the EMO, 
and he understands well the internal relations of the EMO and the political 
structure in which they are embedded. Such understanding owes to his 
past experience dealing with officialdom in his home. He even managed to 
avoid his monthly stand fee, and obtained an indoor space in the back 
street for his son’s dental clinic. His successful appropriation of power 
made him an exception in type E21 and in the night market.  
  
                                                          
21
 Fat Zhao stands out in that he assimilated himself into the political structure because of his 
educational background, life trajectory, as well as his cunning and bold character. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I elaborated on the origin of the vendors at the night 
market, the creation of the market, and ways in which vendors connect to 
the market. Old and young generations enter into the night market from 
villages and factories owing to various institutional factors as well as 
personal motivations.  
I went on to analyse the spatio-political economy of the night market. 
I argued that the creation of the night market be contextualised in the 
contemporary urban transformation. Starting to meet the demands of the 
growing population that comprised urban residents and migrant workers, 
the night market was soon controlled and regulated by urban grassroots 
government and then by the resettled Community as a tax base. The 
consequences of the power structure will be discussed in following 
chapters (particularly in chapters 3 and 4).   
Vendors adopted a number of ways to enter the night market. 
Although monetization of the connections has become trendy, the 
importance of hukou remained, because the night market was created as a 
social remedy for the resettled, jobless farmers. In order to obtain the 
rights to work, non-local vendors built up connections to the regulatory 
office by presenting cash and gifts in standardised and universal forms. 
However, such connections embodied risks for vendors, just because of 
the contradiction between policy and reality. I argued that the risks are 
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from the informality of the tenancy and can be viewed as a side effect of 
current urban transformation that has impacted the migrant population.  
Besides the abovementioned risks, the night market was also 
vandalised by other social bandits or “ghosts” in local terms. I will discuss 
the ways vendors cope with those ghosts to ensure their business and 
personal safety in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Trapping ghosts 
 
In the previous chapter I mentioned Fat Zhao, a self-made outdoor 
restaurant boss in his forties. Fat Zhao seems to know everything. I recall 
at the end of my first interview with him, an old customer of his walked 
into his stand and asked candidly if Fat Zhao used “ditch oil“ (digouyou, 
recycled cooking oil) which is often associated with outdoor restaurants. 
Fat Zhao did not answer the insolent question directly, but shrugged off it. 
“It’s Communists’ oil anyway”, he said.  
Another assertion of his was about the transfer of power from CALE 
to the resettled Community. “Communists need dark society (criminal world 
or hooligans), as they want to keep their own hands clean”. And as far as the 
consequences of the transfer were concerned, “policemen (city police) take 
charge during the day time, and ghosts (local hooligans) during the night 
time”, said Fat Zhao. 
Despite being cynical about many other issues, Fat Zhao’s comments 
were often realistic. The dual-domination by policemen and ghosts makes 
a lot of sense. This chapter will elucidate the logic of these statements. 
Who are the ghosts? Why are they dominating the night market? This 
issue is not only of research interest, but also matters for most vendors, 
for one would “lose his life in vain before he could spend his earnings (you 
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qian zheng, mei ming hua)” without a local knowledge of the ghosts.  
“Ghost” is a local term which is borrowed by vendors to refer to 
those who harass vendors’ businesses or who commit street crimes. 
Ghosts have been rampant in recent years, and are an indispensable part 
of the Society, the interstitial, mobile and chaotic realm where migrants 
earn their living. In this chapter, following the thread provided by Fat Zhao, 
I investigate the origin of various kinds of ghosts in this increasingly 
urbanised region as well their impact on the night market. Furthermore, I 
look at how vendors take countermeasures against these ghosts to avoid 
financial losses or personal hazards.  
Migration, criminality and urban context 
In accounting for the rise of crimes in modern societies, classic 
modernisation theorists from Durkheim (1951) onward suggest 
widespread anomie caused by social disintegration during 
industrialisation is likely to lead to crime and deviance. In a cross-national 
study in the Third World and socialist countries, modernisation was found 
to be predictable and have relatively uniform effects on the patterns of 
crime (Shelley 1981). On the other hand, rational choice theory suggests 
that crime takes place when opportunities are appropriate or when the 
benefit of theft and crime outweighs the risks (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). 
Combining the two lines of thought, LaFree and Kick (1985) point out that 
the opportunities brought forward by urbanisation are two-fold: 
urbanisation reduces inter-familial violence as these ties become less 
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important, and the development accompanying urbanisation also paves 
the way for theft and other property crimes. These illegal activities are 
further compounded by the process of migration. Louis Shelley (1981) 
argues that property crimes caused by social inequality can lead to 
violence when newly arrived migrants bring with them the traditions of 
violence, followed by a decline as rural migrants become adjusted to urban 
life.   
As modernisation theories would suggest, with the dissolution of 
socialism and the embrace of a vibrant market economy in China, the total 
crime rate rose dramatically from 56 crimes per 100,000 people in 1978 
to 163 in 1998 (Liu and Messner 2001) and around 360 in 2005 (Bakken 
2005). As far as migration is concerned, offenses committed by migrants 
are said to be four times more than offences committed by urban 
populations (Ma 2001) from 1990-95 in Beijing city.  
These data, though informative, sometimes contradict ethnographies 
of migrant communities. For instance, in a recent work based on large-
scale surveys, Roderic Broadhurst et al. (2011) compares crimes against 
businessmen in four cities (HK, Shenzhen, Xi’an, and Shanghai) and 
examines the crimes businessmen face. They find that the migrants are 
often the victims, and note that many cases involving migrants as victims 
are dismissed as “internal affairs” rather than matters for police 
investigation. Li Zhang (2001) discovered that migrants in Wenzhou 
village in Beijing are similarly the primary targets of theft and robbery. 
Furthermore, although migrants in Wenzhou village use a measurable 
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amount of wealth accumulated to survive a punitive political and social 
environment, they are at the same time victimised by city governments for 
being a perceived drain on local resources and the primary cause of 
criminality (Zhang 2001). Since both Broadhurst and Zhang focus on 
businessman or migrant entrepreneurs, their observations have more 
comparative values than general migrant studies.  
Indeed, I have witnessed intoxication, gang-fighting, vandalism, 
injury, racketeering, extortion and the beating of others in the night 
market, most of which are carried out by local hooligans—the “ghosts”; the 
selling of obscene books, gambling on a relatively large sum of stakes and 
bribery have involved some vendors. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that in 
most cases it is migrants who are victimised by crime.  
Resorting to police assistance is an option to address the market 
evils that threaten vendors’ safety and property, but is less effective. The 
criminals are often nocturnal, and the night market which runs from dusk 
to dawn has become their front stage, simply because transgressors can 
flee into the night before policemen arrive at the scene. The most severe 
case before my arrival was a young man chased by a group of his enemies. 
He tried to hide in the bottom of a truck across the street, but was pulled 
out, mutilated, and left half-dead in a remote suburb north of the Yangtze 
River. Another example was a customer who was pushed to the ground at 
Master Jin’s stand and was struck by twenty beer bottles on his head by 
another customer, who then fled. There are also fierce turf wars. The 
overall situation is aggravated by insufficient police numbers in the area. 
76 
 
According to a policeman, the numbers of police lags far behind the 
increasingly mobile population in this urbanising region.   
Thus the challenge of coping with ghosts is left to vendors 
themselves. Severe crimes like those mentioned above, are out of the 
control of vendors, but they have agency in dealing with other less severe 
situations. To explore such agency, it is necessary to expand the meanings 
of law and criminality from being merely about codified laws, 
transgressions and punishment. Indeed, in legal anthropology, law is seen 
as a mechanism through which conflicts are solved and orders are 
maintained (Roberts 1979). Norms and world views are often involved. 
Clifford Geertz (1973) notes that while the legal practices in western 
societies are ways of rendering facts so that “lawyers can plead it, judges 
can hear it, and juries can settle it”, they essentially follow an “if-then” 
grammar where law sees things, and a “therefore” grammar where law 
solves disputes in a larger frame of signification. In this regard, he argues 
that ḥaqq, dharma and adat are such significations in Islamic, Indic and 
Indonesian societies, respectively (Geertz 1973). 
Building upon these theoretical insights, my approach in analysing 
how vendors tackle ghosts is eclectic. I examine processes whereby 
disputes get solved and violence occurs, but my emphasis is to 
contextualise the processes in large-scale social changes which have 
caused a variety of vices. The Society is arguably seen as the pretext for 
these conflicts and malfeasant behaviours. Nonetheless, I do not see social 
norms as pre-given or long lasting; nor do I see order as resulting from 
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negotiations between parties of equal power. On the contrary, consensus 
or equilibrium is reached on an unequal basis. Furthermore, while I 
highlight the precepts through which conflicts and wrongdoings make 
sense culturally, I see the vendor’s perception of crime in Society as 
pragmatic and a learned experience through a process of adaptation. 
In the following, I present a typology of criminal activities, 
individuals and groups. I also explore their association with the formative 
Society. Given the complexity of the so-called ghosts, I provide a simplified 
scheme though which ghosts are recognised by vendors. Lastly, I try to 
identify strategies used by vendors to avoid property loss and personal 
hazard. 
The Rise of “Shameless Rowdy Ghosts” 
The local term for people who are disposed to crimes is shameless 
rowdy ghosts (huo nao gui),22  and these groups or individuals are 
potentially or practically harmful to vendors and their businesses and to 
the public. Sometimes they are referred to as ‘dark way’ (heidao) or 
members of ‘dark society’ 23 (hei she hui) by informants.  
‘Dark way’ and ‘white way’ are terms widely used in Chinese 
societies whereas “ghost” is local. White ways and dark ways refer to 
                                                          
22
 The compound word shameless rowdy ghost is only found in Nanjing vicinity. Huo (活) in 
Nanjing dialect means something unexpected, particularly in expressing one’s shame for his 
own or others’ misbehaviours, for example Huo Chou (活丑) means unexpected (morally) 
ugliness.  
23
 Since I begin with the local term ”shamelessly rowdy ghosts”, I tend not to use synonymous 
terms such as dark society members. 
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“gangsters and government staff, or illegal and legal activities respectively” 
(Boretz 2011), both of which relate to the notion of the Rivers and Lakes 
Society. The Rivers and Lakes Society is well known throughout China 
through the classic novel Water Margin, a compilation of folkloric stories 
dating back to the 12th century when a prosperous urban economy and 
urbanisation provided conditions for the circulation of legendary, heroic 
stories amongst a large population which had moved away from rural 
communities and drifted around cities and towns, trying to make a living 
(Wang 1999). Other historical sources for the concept of “ways” include 
the White Lotus, Triad, and other secret societies that were organised 
religiously, fraternally, or patriarchally in the form of sworn brotherhood 
(hui) , cults (dao) and fractions (men)(Low, Koh, and Lim 2002).  
These societies, however, were extinguished by Communists after 
1949 in consecutive political movements, as they were seen as having 
supported the defeated Nationalists who fled to Taiwan. However, the 
reform era has witnessed a revival of secret societies and organised 
criminal groups. Since the 1980s, the terms white way and dark way were 
brought back from HongKong and Taiwan to the mainland and revived not 
only culturally through movies and popular errant-knight novels, but also 
organisationally (Paoli 2002). Shenzhen, a southern China city which 
neighbours Hong Kong, has become a new base for Triad activities since 
the 1990s. Taiwanese influence (Li 2005) is also mentioned. According to 
Boretz (2011), who did research on underground societies in both 
mainland and Taiwan in the 1990s, a black way or “dark path” existed in 
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both sites, meaning “a hard-core underworld of professional criminals, 
organised rackets, shady businesses and crooked politicians”. Huang Hai 
(2010) describes the rise of hunhun, or street loiterers and hooligans, in a 
township setting where hunhun as a new social identity is arguably 
fostered by village and township government after the withdrawal of the 
totalitarian state. These local governments wanted violent young men to 
help them enforce local government rule. He also points out that while 
hunhun are inimical to society, they nonetheless share values with wider 
society. 
An examination of the etymology of the term ‘ghost’ shows that 
shameless rowdy ghost has become widely known in this region since 
recent urbanisation. From 1993 to 1995, I attended a junior high school 
affiliated with a work unit not far from the night market. People used “evil 
heads” (xie tou) or “street loiterers” (hunhun) to refer to juvenile 
delinquents or unemployed adults who were involved or related to 
criminal activities such as racketeering and bullying. Shameless rowdy 
ghosts, on the other hand, had a different connotation. A veteran 
policeman told me that the term developed in rural areas surrounding 
Nanjing city. In Chinese, ghost (gui) not only means hideous spirit, but also 
refers to unfilial children in the eyes of their parents. For instance, 
‘creditor ghost’ (tao zhai gui) is a term used to describe a child who 
constantly exhorts money from his parents. If a child dies young he is also 
thought of as a reincarnation of a creditor. In fact, shameless rowdy ghost 
has both connotations: they are seen as delinquents within the family or 
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community to which they belong, and are hideous to the public. 
Generally, ghosts have become more active in this urbanising region. 
The term has moved from family usage into common usage in the wider 
public sphere. Their presence in street fights, extortion, and racketeering 
is only the tip of the iceberg. Facing vandalism and violence, some outdoor 
restaurant bosses have even developed a type of stoic attitude towards 
them; yet an air of terror does exist and it is intimidating, especially for 
women. 
Ghosts are more scattered than a single, unified criminal group. They 
cannot easily be defined as a “criminal organisation” according to the 
criminal code. Indeed, most scholars are sceptical about the existence of 
organised crime or "mafia-style organisations" defined in Chinese Laws 
(Xia 2008). In the field, members of small gangs generally know each other, 
but their relationships seem to be founded more on separation or 
competition rather than collusion.  
In this regard, Society (shehui) where ghosts are found is better 
viewed as multi-centric rather than uni-centric. I borrow the notion of 
multi-centric society from Barkun (1968, pp. 14-35) in his study of new 
African states established on top of tribes. He uses the term to refer to 
acephalous or segmental societies which differ from hierarchically 
constructed institutions such as the state. In these societies, when disputes 
arise between members of different lineage groups, each party may resort 
to their closet members to settle the dispute, and conflict can potentially 
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escalate into feuds and wars. Barkun argues that the dynamic of conflict 
resolution and order establishment in segmental societies somewhat 
resembles the dynamic in the international arena where no effective law 
enforcement institutions exist. His points of view ring true with regard to 
the Society. This is probably why novels such as Romance of the Three 
Kingdoms—a classic full of plots, personal and military battles, intrigues, 
and struggles between the states—have a wider audience in Chinese 
societies.  
I argue that this multi-centric nature of Chinese Society results from 
post-socialist transformation and segmentation. In the past, Society in 
socialist China was only a residual space outside of the communes and 
work units, and was considered as unfavourable because it hosted 
unemployed or idling people. Nonetheless, over the past three decades 
Society has been dramatically expanded. Rapid urbanisation has not only 
witnessed a large migrant population, but also the continual shattering 
and remoulding of the social and political landscapes in which the stiff 
boundaries between rural communes and urban work units have been 
largely dissolved, resulting in new types of connections among the people. 
As I have indicated in chapter 2, Society absorbs a wide array of urbanising 
yet marginalised groups consists of former peasants and danwei (work 
unit) workers, migrants, sojourners, and petty vendors from different 
parts of China. It is often described as chaotic (luan) or unsafe, partly 
because of the lack of an effective police force as I have stressed. However, 
people in this Society haven’t yet been thoroughly disembedded from the 
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institutions to which they were affiliated. As far as the ghosts are 
concerned, they can be analysed in terms of their different origins and 
modi operandi. I classify them as parasitic landlords, local tax farmers, 
business patrons and street loiterers. All of the “ghosts” are indexed in the 
end of this chapter. 
Ghosts from resettled Community: Parasitic landlords and 
Tax farmers 
As I have already indicated in chapter 2, the majority of ghosts who 
bully vendors are from the recently urbanised resettled Communities. The 
tensions between migrants and locals cannot be understood in a simple 
rural-urban divide. Rather, they take place between people of similar 
background, and the major difference is their respective trajectories of 
urbanisation. On the one hand there are land-losing farmers who are 
resettled as a group to relatively nearby new Communities (shequ); on the 
other hand there are migrants who leave their homelands and villages. For 
the former group, the terrestrial closeness and the remaining village 
administrative body holds kinship networks intact despite the vagaries of 
their livelihood, whereas the kinship and political cohesiveness are absent 
among the migrants. This difference between outsiders and locals helps us 
to understand their interpersonal encounters.  
The leasing of stands by locals to outsiders is one such encounter. 
For example, when a local resident transferred his stand to Vision 
Barbeque, he extorted another 10,000 yuan on top of the upfront payment; 
another night, he had his nephew, a gambler, threaten to smash the 
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vendor’s stand. In the same token, some local fruit vendors used force to 
gradually push out several non-locals from the night market area.  The 
exclusion was not an overnight change, but was carried out step by step. 
Among the four local stands, two of them were brothers with their father 
setting up an air gun balloon shooting stand, and the other two were from 
another two families. The father set up his stand first, and then introduced 
his sons setting up stands next to the non-locals’ fruit stands which were 
in front of a supermarket. The locals learned business skills from those 
non-locals, but then used their authority to officially ban the businesses of 
non-locals during the market rearrangement in 2011. In the meantime, 
they also introduced two more friends including Mr “Big Wave” (Mohegan 
hairstyle), a delinquent gambler of their community, to set up a stand next 
to theirs. With large debts and no “proper” way of making a living, Big 
Wave took over the non-locals’ original space and forced them out even 
further from the centre of the night market. The space Big Wave took over 
was close to a supermarket and could attract more customers. The non-
locals thus could only sell their fruits on the roadside, and were subject to 
the regulation of the city police so they could only begin their business 
after 5:30 in the afternoon.  
The second type of ghost from the resettled Community are tax 
farmers, who are recruited as management functionaries in the EMO. For 
example, Brother Strong, who was convicted of negligent homicide when 
he was a teenager, assists in collecting monthly sanitary fees from the 
vendors. “Tax farmer” ghosts are institutionally indispensable to the fee 
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collection apparatus, because they can effectively address fee evasion 
practices by vendors through violence. The formal head of the 
entrepreneurship office, Guang, was said to never restrain himself from 
using force when even slight resistance was met. In contrast, Brother 
Strong enjoys a good reputation among some vendors, for he sometimes is 
more lenient. But his good reputation is still based on his potential to use 
force.   
I call both the parasitic landlords and tax farmers “social bandits” 
because these men only act as ghosts when they are out of their 
community, and their harshness towards outsiders serves to fulfil their 
obligations to their own communal ties. In other words, there are not 
individualistic crimes as some modernisation theories suggest. One day I 
encountered Brother Strong, his mistress and Brother Guang in an outdoor 
restaurant. They were planning a birthday banquet (which are important 
occasions for kin to get together) for village elders, and they discussed 
how to pool the brand cigarettes (predominately China®, a brand typically 
consumed by government officials) they collected from vendors as 
presents for the elders. Such behaviour is rewarded by their community. 
Brother Strong receives government subsidiaries entitled only to laid-off 
workers in their forties to fifties. Brother Guang, though sacked by the sub-
district after the 2011 resistance (see chapter 4), secured a position as a 
staff member in the political consultation office to the Community Party 
committee. He participates in endless banquets to build business liaisons 
on behalf of the community; he is so busy with banquets that I could 
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hardly make an appointment with him. When I met him incidentally in his 
office, he was showing off his luxurious watch and immaculate suits to his 
fellow colleagues, indicating that his well-being hadn’t been affected by his 
removal from office. 
Ghosts from work units 
Ghosts of this type are young men who graduated from junior high 
schools that are affiliated to nearby work units. These schools, though not 
ranking high in the municipal ranking system, are considered elite locally. 
They provide some academically qualified students to key high schools in 
the city, but the majority of students go to technical high schools and 
become the labour force of those work units. However, since the 1990s, 
reforms of these work units cut off many employees, and the students are 
less likely to be employed. A small group of boys, particularly those with 
poor academic performance, are thus gradually marginalised by the 
educational system, and became street loiterers. A few of them commit 
felonies so the chances are even less likely for them to find “proper” jobs in 
the work units or other companies. But such denial of chances has opened 
a new window for them. In comparison to their peers who might seek 
stable career development in work units or in private companies after 
graduation, they start their own businesses at earlier ages and accumulate 
experience in market competition. 
The association or fraternity among these young men since their 
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school time are strong. For example, Brother Hua,24 Little Yi (as in yiqi) 
and Brother Courage are informally sworn brothers, though they engage in 
different businesses. Brother Hua collects fees from amusement arcades 
and other shady businesses, while Little Yi and his fellows collect debts. 
Brother Courage and his followers have recently set up a company leasing 
minibuses and cars in addition to their supplying wine and beer to the 
night market.  He even has a plan to set up an old persons’ home as he sees 
opportunities in entering this industry due to favourable state policies.  
These businessmen-cum-ghosts, particularly Brother Courage, do 
not apply direct violence to vendors, mainly because their stable business 
renders violence unnecessary. They also learned from their past. Brother 
Courage was hidden by his father after he committed a felony, and he felt 
deeply guilty when he had to leave his father to go to prison. He also has 
an eye on the behaviour of his little brothers, and has a specific managerial 
style. When he is drinking with his little brothers, Brother Courage 
behaves like an authoritative yet lenient patriarch. He drinks penalty 
drinks for his little brothers so they do not get too drunk. At the same time, 
he warns his little brothers to stay away from street brawls.  
  
                                                          
24
 His nickname is Hua zai in which zai (仔) is from Cantonese and it means boy(s). Other 
compound words using zai are ma zai (goons, 马仔) and dagong zai (working boys, 打工
仔).  
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Patron ghost: Brother Dragon 
Brother Dragon, another beer supplier, is neither from the resettled 
communities nor has any ties with the work units. But according to Fat 
Man, he has ties with a more organised syndicate based somewhere else, 
and has participated in forceful housing demolition and relocation.  He 
graduated from an institute of physical education and has been “getting by” 
(hun, 混) in this area for more than ten years. He used to be a hired thug of 
a nearby fresh market, and got a foothold in the wine business in the night 
market as it grew bigger. He now monopolises two thirds of the beer 
businesses and also controls fish supply in the night market, 
“commissioning” two yuan per kilo, roughly one sixth of the fish purchase 
price. Every day he loads beer onto a truck with an employee and 
distributes them when the night market starts. Afterwards, he returns to 
his beer warehouse, has his dinner, and then patrols the night market on 
his motor bike checking if the quantity of fish reported by fish wholesalers 
agrees with the total sum reported by outdoor restaurant bosses. Later, he 
goes with his friends to play mah-jong or to drink.   
Ghosts with government background  
In contrast to the locals whose powers stem from their kinship ties to 
the local community, the third type of ghosts has direct connections to 
grassroots officials. They typically function as informal law enforcement in 
construction projects. For example, Little Lee, Pebble Zhang’s (an outdoor 
restaurant boss) brother-in-law, is an apprentice of General Manager 
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Wang, who was the former village head of a nearby resettled Community 
(Community B). With a formal title of construction supervisor printed on 
his name card, Little Lee actually acts as a head of thugs, threatening or 
beating migrant construction workers who dare to claim their delayed 
salaries. He was put in prison for one year (reason unknown). Another 
example is the legendary ghost, Brother Bright, who was said to be first-
tier ghost in this region. According to an ex-official of the district 
government, Bright managed to organise a battle against a hundred 
policemen when he was wanted for arrest in the 2000s. He lost the battle 
and was finally imprisoned. Later, he was released and recruited by the 
sub-district government as deputy director of the Demolition Office (chai 
qian ban), and is said to be one of the three major stakeholders of the road 
expansion project that led to the relocation of the night market (see 
chapter 4). Both Little Lee and Bright’s cases show how ghosts have 
become an essential part of governance at different levels. I will get back 
to them later. 
Perceptions of ghosts: shili and beijing 
Given the presence of ghosts and their diversified origins and 
activities in the night market, it would be oversimplified to set vendors as 
antagonists with ghosts. In fact, a vendor is not an abstract natural person 
enjoying a bundle of rights, but a person in a web of connections. Not all 
vendors are against the ghosts, particularly those who have kinship ties 
with ghosts, like Han and Pebble Zhang: Han is the brother-in-law of 
Brother Hua, head of a gang; and Pebble Zhang is the brother-in-law of 
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Little Lee, a ghost of government background. Since it was through their 
ties that the two vendors secured the premium positions in the night 
market, there is no reason that Han and Zhang would take sides with the 
majority of vendors when their interests were violated such as during the 
relocation in 2012. On the contrary, other vendors see the two as powerful 
and cultivate connections with them. Eighty Thousand, after being raided 
by a mob, gave his cooking material to Han. This gift was an effort by an 
ordinary vendor such as Eighty Thousand to consolidate his ties with Han, 
and use Han to connect to a third person.  
In this regard, vendors see others through the lens of their networks 
rather than as individuals, and they take actions based on this perception. 
I argue that people’s connections are categorised as having shili (influence) 
or beijing (background), which are social capital of different kinds. Both 
Han and Pebble Zhang are said to have shili (influence), and the brother-
in-law of Pebble Zhang and Bright is said to have beijing25 (background). 
The nature of shili and beijing will be discussed as below.  
Shili, scope of influence 
Shili (势力) means a localised group which uses violence to defend or 
secure its members’ interests. It can also mean the personal possession of 
ties to such a group. A gang can be said to be shili or having shili. A local 
resident has shili because his kinship network can be readily turned into a 
force to defend his interests. In rural areas, families that have several male 
                                                          
25
 A word play would have beijing as the capital city of PRC. Indeed, people from Beijing are 
often seen as having background.  
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adults naturally bear shili. So does a fraternal group. Moreover, shili is 
measurable simply by the number of people a group can amass. It follows 
that members of the resettled Community have more shili than non-locals 
because of the geographical accessibility of their ties once conflict take 
place. The non-locals, with less kinship network readily accessible, have 
less or no shili. Fraternal groups or gangs also have more or less shili, 
depending on their size, though they differ from kinship networks in that 
the yiqi (see chapter 5) among its members has replaced blood ties in 
binding brothers together. As shi means potential, the violence that 
endorses the power does not have to be applied, but only needs to be seen 
or performed. For instance, hosting a banquet for many guests in public 
contributes to such a perception by others. Shili can also be feigned by 
claiming connections to influential people or group who might not exist.  
Shili also connotes a meaning of being local, and there can be many 
shili groups in a region. As I have previously noted, the field is multi-
centred. But such multi-centric nature does not enter the language of 
vendors. They only see Society as chaotic (luan) or complex. In this regard, 
shili, as it is derived from rural lives, serves as a useful conceptual tool to 
make sense of the chaotic world.  By comparing shili and how much shili 
the self and the other possess, one is able to gauge the potential for action. 
In this regard, migrants are always less powerful than the ghosts—that’s 
why they refer themselves as “no money and no shili” (mei qian mei shi) —
unless they form strong ties or their own shili. Indeed, there was once a 
“Fuyang gang” named after the place of origin of vendors who had 
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monopolised fresh market business. But this gang was shut down in 1990s 
“hard strike” (yanda) movement by the police.  
However, shili or shili groups do not endure. The instability of shili 
can be explained by at least four reasons. First, when violence or threats 
are used in profit-making activities, resistance or cunning negligence by 
vendors often occurs. Brother Xu, an outdoor restaurant vendor, tells me 
that he buys only one gas cylinder provided by a group of young 
delinquents, but he actually uses another one in the cooking cartridge, and 
justifies not purchasing them on a regular basis by stating that his 
business is not good enough. Second, some ghosts get caught in gambling 
or other illegal activities, and are subject to violence from other ghosts, 
thus they cannot ensure their regular presence in the night market. Third, 
monopolising a business line, particularly profitable ones such as beer 
distribution, may attract sniffing noses of other street loiters or shili 
groups. Thus turf wars are inevitable especially in times when a new 
market is established or relocated. The following case shows the caprice of 
shili.  
June 8th, 2011 was the date 
on which the night market should 
have been relocated. Only three 
days in advance did the local 
government notify vendors. But 
ghosts seemed so sensitive to Figure 3.1: Yang, a new patron in 
the newly relocated market.  
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market signals that they stepped in even before government took action. A 
month prior to the relocation, a young man with a bandage wrapped 
around his hands as if he had just had a fight was followed by several of his 
men. They walked the street from one end to another, telling all the 
outdoor restaurant bosses that they should use the gas tanks provided by 
them. Shortly after the relocation, the gang members showed up again one 
night in the newly relocated night market, this time led by their head Yang, 
a young man aged about twenty (Figure 3.1). They rushed out from a 
minibus, each with a knife used for cutting watermelons,26 and fought with 
another group led by Brother Dragon, the old beer distributor. According 
to Fat Zhao, both parties had agreed on not calling police for rescue 
beforehand, for imprisonment was the least desired result for both gangs. 
The fight lasted only several minutes, ending up with a young man’s wrist 
tendon cut, and Brother Dragon’s gang was defeated. In the following days, 
the winners began their promotion of a new brand of beer. The defeated 
Brother Dragon could only stand next to heaps of his beer boxes stacked at 
the corner of the new night market, cursing the new patron.  
The vendors then had to remake their connections with the new 
patron. But the outcomes were dependent on the shili one has. Knowing 
nothing about the quality of the new beer, the wife of a boss refused the 
offer (her husband was away home then). So she was publicly reviled as 
dumbass by the half-drunk Yang and one of his fellows. The two young 
men also smashed a box of beer in the wife’s stand, forcing her to accept 
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 They chose watermelon knives because the knives are not prohibited by law.  
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the offer.  
Yang also met resistance from several other bosses such as Han 
and Fat Man, so he smashed their beers as well. Fat Man told me in 
private that he was not scared of the “kids” as he would be able to claim 
what had been damaged, “you will see”, he said. But his remarks seemed 
to be at best a boost of his ego since he did not specify how.  
Unlike Fat Man, Brother Han managed to settle the issue by 
resorting to his brother-in-law Brother Hua. In a reconciliation banquet 
I witnessed, it turned out that Yang was the sworn son (gan erzi) of 
Director27 Zhang, the one who had lost his grip of the night market 
because of the relocation, so Yang’s gaining a foothold was very likely to 
be supported by Director Zhang. Since Brother Hua and Director Zhang 
were equally influential in this region, they were able to reach a 
compromise, and Yang was persuaded by Director Zhang to make an 
apology to Han in the banquet. “Now you are elder brother, and I am the 
younger one”. Yang and Han toasted each other, symbolising an 
agreement that Yang should not forcibly promote his beers to Han. Han 
was thus able to continue to purchase beers from Brother Courage, the 
man of Brother Hua, as he did before.  
Later on, I heard Brother Dragon’s followers were also disbanded 
because he could no longer provide “salary” for them. When I rang him, 
he told me he was busy with a new business elsewhere, but he did not 
                                                          
27
 Director here does not mean he is staff of the government. It is only the way vendors 
address the head of the entrepreneurship office. Depending on the closeness to him, he can 
be addressed as director Zhang, Old Zhang or Brother Ming (Ming is his first name).  
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specify whereabouts.  The only thing I could validate was that his beer 
warehouse was situated in a dilapidated factory that had been locked up 
since the relocation. 
Beijing (背景): legitimate and endurable background 
The beijing of a ghost (or a person in general) is also a type of 
connection but it differs with shili in that it entails the endorsement of 
government. Little Lee is said to have Beijing; so does Bright, the 
appointed deputy director of the Demolition Office. Simply put, their 
businesses are ratified by government papers, regulations etc., and they 
profit directly from government-initiated projects. In comparison to shili 
groups, people with beijing use force or threaten to use force, but the force 
is semi-legitimatised (though rarely technically legal) as an integral part of 
the administrative power. This means that any appeal against their 
misconduct to government will be futile.  
  
Figure 3.2: A small merchandise vendor complains that her 
canopy was cut by a ghost who forcefully promotes his 
canopies to all vendors after the relocation.  
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After the relocation of the night market in 2012, vendors suffered 
from dramatic downturns in their businesses. However, Little Lee seized 
the opportunity to promote his canvases (used by stall holders to make 
stall canopies) to more than 200 households. The shrinkage of the 
business area, a factor contributing to the business losses, meant that 
vendors needed to replace their canopies with new ones. There was also 
aesthetics—an aesthetics being uniform and trim that is appreciated by 
officials 28 —that rendered the program necessary. According to a 
government official who inspected the new market, the new market 
should take on a brand new and uniform look. He added that “We will also 
introduce appraisal system, and the tidiest stands will be accredited five 
stars just like the hotel system!” But what Little Lee cared about was the 
money. The canopies he promoted were priced at CNY 350 each, far 
exceeding the online purchase price of only CNY 180, so the difference was 
enough to “stuff his own pocket”. Several vendors were reluctant to 
purchase new canvases, but they found the old ones had already been cut 
by scissors when they started their businesses one afternoon (Figure 3.2), 
so the purchase became urgent because the broken ones could no longer 
provide shelter from the rain.  Everyone knew that it must have been done 
by Little Lee and his buddies, but there was nowhere to lodge their 
complaint, because Little Lee had an “official” position in the managerial 
body of the new night market. 
                                                          
28
 Such tastes, however, contradict vendors’ practical thinking. It is the food and quality that 
hold old customers, rather than the brand new look. Customers are also searching for the 
signs of good food, and messiness can be an indicator of good business, so vendors would not 
encourage me to sweep the ground from time to time when I worked as a waiter for them.   
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Officials also rely on ghosts for their own interests. General Manager 
Wang is a case in point. He was the village head of Community B before the 
relocation, and was then appointed as the general manager of the Realty 
Management Company of all the relocated Communities. Little Lee, his 
disciple, told me impudently that all the officials are “stuffing their pockets 
with public funds” (Zhongbao si’nang) in contract construction projects, 
such as Wang did with the infrastructure projects of the business street. 
Wang also had several other disciples. The second one, Little Six, did some 
auxiliary work in exchange for business banquet meals. Like Little Lee, he 
also helped his relatives to secure a stand in the night market. He even 
snitched on my research and seemed to have disclosed that to his superior. 
The third one, Ling, who has good interpersonal skills, was appointed as a 
member of the fee-collecting team before the relocation, and later as the de 
facto manager of the new night market on behalf of General Wang.  As he 
once complained to me, he could only earn a salary of 1,400 yuan a month 
from Wang, but he had to talk to vendors, design the new night market, 
and handle disputes. However, what he did not tell me was that once he 
took control of the post-2012 night market, he would be able to profit 
from subcontracting the transferring of opening stands to new business 
households29 (for details about the relocation see chapter 4).  
Incorporating ghosts into the formal administration benefits both the 
                                                          
29
 After the relocation, nearly one third of vendors left the night market. But it is expected 
that the market will thrive in a short time. Then the managing body can lease out the 
openings to new vendors at a higher price. Considering the overall construction costs are 
200,000 yuan (according to Ling), the overall revenue of leasing out of 100 stands each with 
2,000 yuan to 4,000 yuan would amount to 200,000 to 400,000 yuan, excluding monthly fees 
from vendors.  
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officials and ghosts. The relationship is reciprocal for them but unethical 
for outsiders. The officials decentralise their law enforcement power to 
hooligans in order to facilitate their lucrative projects, while the hooligans 
get a share from the projects. Acting as if a law enforcement apparatus, 
ghosts function more effectively than formal police whose actions are 
more limited by the law. Brother Bright’s recruitment by the district 
government is an example. But these ghosts are best kept at an arm’s 
length by officials. They can be easily sacked so their supervisors can be 
exonerated from any blame. This echoes the statement of Fat Zhao quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter that even though Communists need ghosts, 
they would like to keep their hands clean. 
Despite the fact that ghosts with beijing can be easily sacked by their 
supervisors or masters, beijing refers to the government, which is a 
mystical, estranged and endurable existence in the eyes of vendors. A 
person having beijing is believed to be powerful. There are several reasons 
underpinning such a perception. For the elder generation who have 
experienced political movements, the government appears to apply 
violence to safeguard its interests. Old Wang would have it as “a territory 
(Jiangshan, literally river and mountain) as firm as an iron bucket 
surrounded by the iron hoop” where the jiangshan is tinged with a colour of 
dynastical or heavenly mandate. Master Chow, another vendor in his 
forties, told me that “Even if you can move earth and heaven, never fight 
with Communists”. Second, in terms of its administrative level, the local 
district government is comparable to a county government, which is 
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beyond the everyday experience of vendors who come from villages and 
towns. Third, staff members of government are often reckoned as literate, 
while most of the vendors are illiterate or less-educated. Lacking ability to 
read and write, vendors could not even sign contracts or understand 
regulations properly. “We have eyes, but we are blind”, one vendor told me, 
when he categorised government staff as “literati” who “sit in the air-
conditioned office”.  
Crime prevention:  
Streetwise, Sympathy or Symbiosis? 
This section discusses how vendors avoid losses or personal hazard 
in coping with ghosts. Though violence is an indispensable means for 
ghosts’ livelihood, in the eyes of vendors, it is often characterised as 
“unreasonable” (bujiang daoli), for ghosts can be easily provoked and are 
hard to pacify. For instance, two ghosts—God knows where they were 
from—struck a barbecue vendor Bald Man on his head when he asked 
them to pay 350 yuan for a meal. Bald Man had originally cut the price by 
50 yuan according to their initial request, but then they proposed paying 
only 200 yuan and threatened to leave without any payment. Bald Man 
tried to argue with them, but one of them grabbed a beer bottle and hit 
him on the back of his head, causing cerebral concussion of the 
unfortunate boss.  
Similar cases are many. While erratic violence substantiates ghosts’ 
power, the unreasonableness of their offending can be partially redressed 
99 
 
if one has local knowledge. In this regard, knowing ghosts in person and 
whether they have beijing or shili is crucial for self-protection for vendors. 
Cultural logics, like those of yiqi and family relatedness can also be used to 
negotiate with ghosts.  
Familiarising with local situations 
An awareness of local malicious power is a prioritised form of 
knowledge for a vendor, so that one will not “lose his life in vain before he 
could spend his earnings (you qian zheng, mei ming hua)”. Such knowledge 
includes recognition of big and small, visible and invisible shili groups in 
the host society, their ties to particular people and ghosts’ personal 
biographies and characters. The occasions for circulating such information 
include business intervals, casual talks when men exchange cigarettes, as 
well as when they dine together or hold private banquets. Some vendors 
are less adroit in socialising and are prone to isolate themselves from a 
larger community. The more isolated they are, the more likely to get 
bullied. In contrast, some vendors are more active. For instance, by 
inviting Master Hu for dinner several times either at his stand or at his 
apartment, Brother Xu the younger quickly made it clear who had the 
most shili in this region.  Another vendor, Brother Fei, took the initiative to 
invite several “big households” (dahu) to his stand for a dinner as soon as 
he started his business, and he asked his neighbours to “take care” of his 
business in the banquet.  According to Brother Fei, the banquet is a routine 
for him whenever he starts his business in a new place. Through all of this 
socialising, vendors gradually make sense of the big picture, getting to 
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know who cannot be offended because of their shili, and who has less shili 
and can be fended off.   
Knowledge is power. Not all ghosts are intimidating if vendors know 
well about them. Tang, a 22 year-old street loiterer from the resettled 
Community is said to have caused a fatal car accident and was jailed for a 
year or two. After he was released, he engaged in shady businesses such as 
selling fake cigarettes, as well as racketeering; but he had a quite limited 
repertoire of tricks. He would implore new vendors to lend him 100 yuan 
by pawning his feather jacket, his mobile phone, his identity card or 
whatever he could take out of his pocket, and promised that he would 
redeem the pawns very soon after he won some money from an 
amusement arcade. He would also mention other famous ghosts’ names to 
boost his bargaining power. Perplexed by the shili he claimed to possess, 
vendors often “lent” him the money without taking his items.  However, 
his manoeuvrings were circulated among vendors, and one of them said 
that Tang was once chased by his creditor along the street. Tang managed 
to get rid of the debtor like a slippery eel, thanks to his familiarity with the 
local geography. But his running away indicated that he was merely a 
coward. Besides, he also seemed untrustworthy to other ghosts so he did 
not really have any shili. Later on, a tough vendor threatened Tang that he 
will “make a roof window” on Tang’s head when the latter threatened to 
smash the vendor’s stand for money. After gazing with anger at the vendor 
for a few seconds, Tang walked away.  
 Given the fickleness of shili in the night market and beyond, 
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particularly during times of power reshuffling, vendors worry more about 
who will be taking charge rather than expecting an unrealistic removal of 
all ghosts. “After all, this is their territory”, said one vendor. Before the 
relocation in 2012 (see chapter 4), Thin Zhao told me that he does not care 
about whether the night market will be relocated or not; his concern is 
whether General Wang or Director Zhang will take charge of the new night 
market, so he can present “red envelopes” (bribery) to the right person to 
secure a premium stand in the new market.  Otherwise his money will be 
wasted. 
Streetwise: Coping with street loiterers 
As one will never be able to know every ghost in this region, one has 
to rely on judgment to dodge through many instant risks, particularly 
those idling ghosts who want to have a free meal (known as hegemonic 
meal, bawangcan) at vendors’ stands. Old Wang, a veteran outdoor 
restaurant boss (who also organised the resistance in 2011), would 
identify the head of a small group of people who don’t look like “good 
people” at first sight. According to Old Wang, it is quite often that the free 
meal is a process of initiation by which the head of the gang tests the guts 
of his “little brothers”. As a pre-emptive countermeasure, Old Wang would 
initiate a polite yet confident greeting to the head of the gang. He would 
behave as if they are normal customers, lighting a cigarette for the head, 
and encouraging him visit his stand in the future, even though old Wang 
would not assume that they would pay this time. Once the head feels he is 
respected, he and his followers will be less aggressive and will probably 
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pay for the meal according to their real purchasing capacity. In addition, 
pleasing the little brothers is less important because they are eager to 
show their braveness in front of their big brother, according to Old Wang. 
Reasoning with yiqi can also work. Old Wang explained once to me. 
“Don’t you know—if you treat ghosts well, they will treat you well in return; 
they are all yiqi men.” Contextually, the yiqi in their encounters means the 
boss would assume that the ghosts are not that malicious, and that they 
would not harass nor harm the boss once they are fed and treated well. 
Such an assumption entails a subtle de-stigmatisation or restoration of 
personhood to these men; they are not ghosts but are likely to be 
reasonable men. The ghosts, in return, would reckon the boss as having 
yiqi because they are respected as men so they are likely to pay as men 
should do. In a word, the appropriate question here is not something 
factual—whether the malicious customers are ghosts or not, but faith— 
whether you believe they are ghosts or not. By engaging the ghosts as if an 
encounter between two yiqi men, Old Wang successfully alters the 
definition of the situation and reduces the risk.   
Familial Sympathy: Story of Little Three  
The story between Fat Man and one of his hooligan customers, Little 
Three, shows a matrix of relationships in which meanings are slipped 
towards a positive end. The relationships discussed here are three-layered, 
namely the vendor–customer relationship, the familial relationship and 
victim–ghost relationship. The shifting involves what I call the familial 
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sympathy or an affectual agency. 
Normally the vendors are called bosses by customers. The 
relationship between bosses and customers are not only contractual or 
monetary, but also include reciprocity (or guanxi) which nurtures 
sentiments: bosses provide food and make discounts for customers, and 
customers “take care” of their bosses’ businesses by revisiting the same 
stand. The first encounter between a boss and a customer may be random, 
but such bonding intensifies with the passage of time. The boss will know 
the exact need of the customer, and adjust his way of cooking a bit to 
satisfy the customers’ palate; customers invite the boss to have a beer or a 
glass of wine to express their recognition of such bonding. And both 
parties will have a tacit agreement on how to make a discount in a decent 
and generous manner—the boss is likely to give discounts to the customer, 
but is met by the customer’s generosity of not taking the discount. In this 
regard the boss-vendor relationship resembles that between family 
members: one cooks for the other, and both parties play down the 
monetary dimension of their relationship. But how does such slippage of 
meaning apply to the victim-ghost relationship? 
I met Little Three on a drizzling night around 11.p.m. when he was 
urged by Fat Man to finish his solo banquet by drinking a last cup of beer 
or by eating a bowl of rice. He had already ordered a smoked fish and 
twelve bottles of beer. He tried to order a chicken pot but was turned away 
by the wife as he seemed not be able to pay for all of them. I approached 
and seated myself next to him so that I could have a closer observation.  
104 
 
Some customers at the next table had just finished their dinner. They 
asked Fat Man to settle the bill; otherwise they would leave without 
paying. Upon hearing their joke, however, Little Three menaced that he 
would knock off the heads of those customers with the beer bottle in his 
hand, since he is a "younger brother" of Fat Man.  
This was harassment to Fat Man’s customers. In response, Fat Man 
moved another bench, sat his body squarely on it and hugged Little Three 
on his back so that his stout body could block Little Three from other 
customers, and continued persuading Little Three to go home.  Little Three 
then shifted his attention to me and asked who I was. Fat Man explained 
that I was the tutor of his son. The young man then threatened again that 
he would beat me if his "brother", Fat Man, left the table, and he reached 
his hand to another beer bottle. Fat Man continued coaxing Little Three for 
another half an hour, and finally succeeded by hugging him firmly and 
dragging him away across the street for a pee. At that time, the wife and 
her daughters who were assisting the business looked angry and helpless, 
yet they had to wear a smile to serve the remaining customers.  
I watched as the two silhouettes of Fat Man and Little Three united, 
hugged, and pushed back and forth under the dim light of the road lamp. 
Then both of them peed on a pile of rubbish before they moved back to 
this side of the street, walking into Pebble Zhang's restaurant where 
several men were collecting. Through the curtain of the rain I saw many 
more silhouettes of men and women joined to push Little Three back and 
forth as though he was a ball on a billiard table.  
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When I revisited Fat Man the next day and discussed the unhappy 
encounter, it turns out that Fat Man had known Litter Three for quite a 
while, and he was sympathetic to him even though the latter did not pay 
for the meal.  
Take it easy, he will return the money to me sooner or later. 
He’s been here for a while, and we have gotten to know each 
other for almost three years. He did not borrow money except 
once when he was also drunk. ‘Fat Man, lend me some money, I 
will pay you back soon. I don’t have money now and I can’t lose 
face. Ok, then how much do you need? [said Fat Man] ‘Two 
hundred yuan’ [said Little Three]. Then he sent the money back 
in person in some twenty days.  
But in fact Little Three was a real ghost according to several other 
vendors. When I asked why Little Three was said to be among several men 
who had chopped another young man half-dead, Fat Man remarked, 
He is just that kind of person; you can’t reformulate his 
character, can you? If you ask him whether he knows the 
consequence or why did he did so, he knows, but…  
 And Fat Man even denied that Little Three was a real ghost.   
…No he is not a ghost; he is only a KID.  Suppose you offend me 
today, and you say that you will make me sorry in a couple of 
days, and someone else does the job, then you are a GHOST. If 
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you revenge me by yourself, then you are not a ghost—but only 
someone without capability [of putting someone up]. If you 
smile at me after we fight each other, then I know that I will be 
unlucky in three days, [in that case] you are a ghost. I have seen 
heaps of people like that!  
The assumption of fatherly role, which Fei (1992) would call 
paternalism, manifests in Fat Man’s sympathy. While paternalism derives 
its authority from seniority and experience, Fat Man’s sympathy seems to 
derive from a sense of common fate by which he identifies his earlier life 
to that of Little Three, and from a wish to rectify his wrong doing. Fat Man 
has alluded that he was taken care of by his “big brother” when he was 
young and poor. But when the “big brother” asked him to do something 
which risked imprisonment, he refused and left, and began to live on his 
own. He told me on another occasion, 
Frankly speaking, my big brother is now ‘getting by’ pretty well 
(hun, meaning economically better off via one’s wide 
connections). Those whom I used to look down upon also get 
by well. But can I rely on them? My big brother wouldn’t have 
treated me well if I hadn’t done something for him, would he?  
My big brother would take care of me and give me money, but 
what if I go without his money? What should I do if he asks me 
to be a soldier for him? 
Even though Little Three did harm to others, his wrong doing is seen 
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as having yiqi for his brothers, therefore somewhat forgivable and 
rectifiable if he becomes mature. In a word, Fat Man’s sympathy is based 
on an imagination of familism through which the crimes are seen as 
youthful errors which can be rectified by the restoration of family values.  
The sympathy was also mixed with an elder-brother-cum-younger-brother 
relationship or a sense of common fate in final analysis. Furthermore, 
getting back to the three-layered relationships between Fat Man and Little 
Three, the redefining of their relationships arguably maintains the 
customer-boss relationship in that the owed money can be returned one 
day, a condition to sustain their ongoing interactions. In the meantime, the 
ghost-victim relationship almost vanished, and so has the negative 
consequence that stems from such a relationship. 
Symbiosis: Fat Man’s secret patrons 
As I mentioned earlier, Brother Dragon monopolised the beer supply 
as well as fish supply business. However, he did not necessarily use 
violence directly on vendors. Rather, his battlefield was somewhere else 
where he fights with other ghosts to defend his territory just as he did 
with Yang after the relocation in 2012. Nonetheless, some vendors were 
not content with his monopoly. Egged on by some vendors in a banquet, 
Brother Dragon got drunk and peed in public. Nobody stopped him from 
such misbehaviour; on the contrary, they circulated the story and stressed 
that he peed before women customers, which was socially awkward for a 
man. But Fat Man befriended him and escorted him home to avoid further 
sabotage of his public image.  
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Interestingly, it was also Fat Man who introduced him to the 
profitable fish monopoly business, though Fat Man warned me not to tell 
anybody else about the deal, because it would apparently cause discontent 
from the other vendors as well as the fish supplier. By so doing Fat Man 
could always ensure a fish supply on time, which is crucial for his business 
success. Gift exchange also consolidates their friendship. Fat Man later got 
a semi-wolf (dog) "little tiger" from Brother Dragon because the latter saw 
the dog as cowardly, a spirit that dampens the spirit of a valorous ghost. 
But Fat Man liked the dog very much, fed it well with rice and chicken, and 
walked it every night along the street. 
 
 
The case of Ning shows how a non-local vendor assimilates a local to 
be his own shili. Ning is a local who set up a stand selling beverages and 
Figure 3.3 Brother Dragon, a “ghost” who monopolises the 
beer and fish business, is having a conversation with Fat Man, 
with the dog he presented to Fat Man sitting between them.  
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cigarettes in the night market. He also ran a restaurant nearby. However, 
due to his carelessness in management, his restaurant was soon closed. 
Ning also hangs out with many other ghosts, and he brags about his 
conduct as a violent and reckless man.  
Fat Man befriended him. Sometimes he even rejects payment when 
Ning has dinners at his stand. He even advised Ning on how to run his 
business more properly. In exchange, Fat Man asked Ning to hold his place 
during the market rearrangement in 2011. Though Fat Man lost his 
premium place to Pebble Zhang, he managed to secure a second-rate place 
with a sizable business area where he got by with his business at break-
even level throughout 2011.  
Conclusion 
Crimes by ghosts are largely due to the dislocation of people and 
disintegration of socialist institutions in the past decades. They pose many 
uncontrollable risks for vendors. Contrary to modernisation theory, 
crimes are not individualised behaviours, but are interwoven in the social 
and political networks of an urbanising site. Local ghosts are utilised by 
the resettled Community and its residents for their economic gains.  
Patrons take market opportunities and use violence as means to secure 
their market share. Ghosts with government background also get a 
foothold in the political economy which has co-opted them as an essential 
part of governance at different administrative levels.  
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I elaborated on two types of connections, beijing and shili, in 
designating how vendors perceive the powers of ghosts. The ways to 
prevent crimes are registered in such perceptions. As shili entails violence, 
kinship or brotherhood, the crimes pertaining to shili can be reduced by 
vendors who tackle or sympathise with ghosts with shared cultural 
reasoning. A few vendors even transform ghosts to their own shili. In 
comparison, vendors are often helpless when the wrongdoings are made 
by ghosts with beijing.  
Whatever the cultural tools used by vendors, migrants as a whole are 
victims of violence and crimes. I have also encountered a few cases where 
vendors considered hiring ghosts to solve business conflicts among them. 
In this regard, placing hope on either vendors themselves or the police 
would be insufficient to cope with the deterioration of public security. The 
remedy must be somewhere else.  
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Appendix 3-1 local shameless rowdy ghosts known to vendors 
N Name 
Place of 
Origin 
Relationship 
to vendors 
Contact 
When they use 
violence 
Nature of 
power 
Derive power 
from 
Influence 
1 
Brother 
Dragon 
Nearby 
rural area 
Supply beer 
and fish 
Direct 
Turf war with 
other gangs 
Informal 
His own force and 
affiliation to mafia 
organisation 
Small 
2 
Brother 
Hua 
Work units 
Patron of a 
vendor 
Indirect 
In other illegal 
activities 
Informal-
formal 
  Medium 
3 
Brother 
Bright 
Work units   Indirect 
Forceful 
demolition; 
Stakeholder of 
relocation 
program 
Formal-
informal 
His own influence 
and legal power 
from sub-district 
Big  
4 
Guang and 
Brother 
Strong 
Resettled 
Community 
Collect fees Direct 
On vendors who 
evade fees 
Formal-
informal 
Staff of resettled 
Community 
Medium 
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5 
Unknown 
local 
resident 
Resettled 
Community 
Landlord  Direct 
Threaten to use 
violence to 
extort money 
Informal 
Residents of 
resettled 
Community; 
kinship 
Small 
6 Yang  
Resettled 
Community 
Supply beer Direct 
On those who 
refuse to buy his 
beers 
Informal 
His own force and 
personal affiliation 
to resettled 
Community 
Small 
7 Big Wave 
Resettled 
Community 
Business 
competitor 
Direct 
To encroach 
premium 
positions in the 
market 
Informal 
His own force and 
personal affiliation 
to resettled 
Community 
Small 
8 Little Lee 
Other 
province 
Patron of a 
vendor 
Indirect 
On migrant 
construction 
workers 
Informal-
formal 
His own force and 
personal 
connection to head 
of resettled 
Community 
Small 
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9 
Little 
Three 
Other 
province 
Patron     Informal   Small 
10 Tang Bo 
Resettled 
Community 
Petty 
extortion 
Direct 
Verbal 
threatening 
Informal 
Himself and fake 
connection with 
local ghosts 
Very 
small 
11 Ning 
Resettled 
Community 
Patron of a 
vendor 
— 
Flaunting his 
strength 
Informal 
Himself and his 
“brothers” 
Very 
small 
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"Hence his victories bring him neither reputation  
for wisdom nor credit for courage" 
-- Sun Tzu 
Chapter 4 
To protest or to comply 
In the spotlessly clean office building of City Appearance & Law 
Enforcement department (CALE hereafter), a CALE official said that the 
night market is notoriously “dirty, disorderly and bad”, blaming vendors 
for occupying the roadside and jamming traffic. He grumbled that it was 
next to impossible to maintain the “city appearance”, citing another 
example of a nearby fresh market on the pavements of which local farmers 
amassed and sold their farm products. It had been forcefully closed down 
by CALE, but farmers had flocked in again. The cat-and-mouse game 
between the regulator and the regulated, according to the official, was a 
paradox. “Once regulations are implemented, the market will die; however, if 
[we] let it go, things will get messy quickly,”30 he said.    
Given the government’s distaste for disorder, vendors in the night 
market had plenty of reasons to worry about market removal or relocation. 
They staged a protest against an attempt by CALE to close part of the 
market in March, 2011. Hundreds of migrants raised banners with slogans 
such as “We need to eat! We (our kids) need to go to school!” CALE and 
                                                          
30
 The phrase（ yi fang jiu luan, yi guan jiu si）was first proposed by Chen Yun, a major party 
leader and conservative economic planner against Dengist marketization in 1980s. 
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public security policemen led by the deputy head of the district Public 
Security Bureau came to the scene. The deputy head then convened a 
meeting with five vendor representatives. Fortunately, vendors were 
allowed to continue their businesses in place.  
But the night market was still a pain in the neck of CALE. In 
September 2011, shortly after I arrived at the night market, I heard 
rumours that the market was about to be relocated because of the Youth 
Olympics 2014 that required the widening and greening of the main 
streets for foreign athletes and guests. The exact date of relocation 
remained undecided, and vendors’ anxieties perpetuated until June of 
2012, when the official relocation order finally reached the market. No 
open resistance by vendors was staged this time, except for an 
unsuccessful demonstration by several local fruit vendors. As a 
consequence, the night market was relocated to a place 2.5 kilometres 
away from the original one. One third of the vendors left after the 
relocation. The rest suffered sharp falls in business volumes. 
How did most vendors survive the eviction? Why did vendors resist 
and succeed in the first case but seemed to be passive in the second one, 
given that their livelihood and businesses were put at risk in both cases? 
How do they make connections in response to grassroots policies? 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which vendors connected in 
response to government decisions that affect them. I divide it into two 
parts. Each part begins with an analysis of the government decision, 
followed by vendors’ responses to the decision in question. I analyse the 
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factors that led to the success of the open resistance against the first 
government decision in 2011, then go on to present a different mode of 
action of vendors in response to the second government decision in 2012.  
 Market rearrangement in 2011 
China is by no means a unitary state and its policy-making 
institutions are diversified. A useful perspective to understand this 
diversity is the “fragmented authoritarianism” framework in which “policy 
made at the centre becomes increasingly malleable to the parochial 
organisational and political goals of the various agencies and regions 
charged with enforcing that policy” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). My 
research scope is low, seated at grassroots levels that encompass two 
types of formal institutions, each with its own administrative history. The 
first type includes two administrative levels of Sunglow suburb district, 
and the other type includes the sub-district government (jiedao) and the 
community (shequ) that have recently been integrated into the district 
administration since the 2000s because of the quick urbanisation of this 
region. As described in Chapter two, management of the night market was 
divided.  
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Figure 4.1: The administrative structure above the night market. 
The above figure shows the administration structure above the night 
market. Under the district government, the administrative hierarchy was 
structured in a way that mixed territory-based governance and 
government compartmentalisation to absorb the relocated rural 
population since the 2000s (for a brief history see chapter 2). On the one 
hand, the sub-district government was established in the early 2000s by 
the district government to regulate five relocated communities who were 
formerly five brigades (dadui, or rural communes). Of the five relocated 
communities, Community A set up the EMO office to regulate the night 
market and to collect the managerial fees as its own off-the-book fiscal 
revenue.31 On the other hand, the district division of CALE, originally 
                                                          
31
 When I interviewed the head of the sub-district government, he said that the EMO has nothing 
to do with the sub-district government, meaning that Community A is economically autonomous. 
The budget and expenditure of the sub-district published on its website shows that it only 
receives a subsidy from district government but does not have any income from its own 
businesses, so it looks like a government agency. However, it has many businesses such as the 
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supervised by the District Public Security division, has gradually gained 
independence and finally separated from the Public Security division as 
both its tasks and jurisdiction expanded in pace with the urbanisation. 
CALE has even constructed its own new office building. The CALE section 
under the CALE division covers the territories of the five relocated 
communities in its jurisdiction but is not limited to them.  
The government decision discussed here features a kind of 
contemporary urban politics. Hsing (2010) argues that a power 
transformation is substantiated by conflicts over physical and discursive 
space among various state and society actors in China’s cities. Lin et al. 
(2015) highlight space-related policy as a feature of governance in urban 
context, particularly in the development and reconstruction of urban 
villages where “social, economic and spatial dynamics as well as financial 
resources influence government arrangements” (Chung and Zhou 2011). 
As far as this government decision is concerned, it involved interests input 
from three institutions, namely CALE, the relocated Community A and 
another commercial residence Community. 
The CALE section (ke) was a quasi-legal enforcement unit 
established mainly to maintain the tidy appearance of the emergent 
urbanised area, and its jurisdiction covered the streets and roads that 
surrounded work units and residential compounds. While CALE officials 
loved to blame the market for the pollution and noises vendors made at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
management of parking places on the roads of its jurisdiction, which does not appear on the 
website.  The monthly fiscal statement of the sub-district see:  
 http://qx.njygcj.gov.cn/www/jwxm/1007/100710/cwgk2_mb_a39120714259175.htm, access 
date: 24/07/2015. 
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night, low-rank associate staff (casual employees) worried more about 
their incomes, and blamed the vendors for the cancellation of their annual 
bonuses which hinged on the sanitary conditions of the region they inspect. 
But noise and pollution were not the reasons for moving the night market.  
The more proximate cause of the decision was that the night market 
had expanded beyond its delineated boundary into an adjacent 
commercial residence community (shangpinfang xiaoqu), an expansion 
which was opposed by CALE. The map (see Figure 4.2) shows the west 
boundary of the market “proper” demarcated by the district government 
in 2008. The extension of the night market, where some fifty stalls were 
established, invaded the public space that surrounded the commercial 
residence Community. The expansion was initially tolerated by the realty 
management company of the commercial residence Community, on the 
condition that the groundskeeping was outsourced to another realty 
management company (which I shall discuss later). However, an 
increasing number of residents complained about pollution and noise and 
reported to CALE. Judging from messages from an online community 
where these residents could lodge complaints, they were company 
employees who were less dependent on the night market for meals, and 
they despised the low quality of the commodities in the market. In 
addition, these residents seemed to have strong bargaining power vis-à-
vis government agencies, and they were able to make their voices heard 
through newspapers, the citizen hotline to CALE and the Internet (they 
even established their own online community). The moderator of the 
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online community was a resident who worked in the sub-district 
government, so these online opinions could easily reach CALE. Indeed 
CALE staff mentioned these online complaints when I interviewed them. 
 
Figure 4.2: Market extension (west to the arc) and “market proper”. 
The closure of the market extension, however, had an unexpected 
effect on the whole night market. The decision was actually comprised of 
two coordinated tasks, namely “cleaning up” (qingli) the illegal part of the 
market by CALE; and “rearrangement” (zhengdun) by the EMO within the 
legal territory. While CALE was mainly responsible for the “cleaning” of 
the west part and inspection after the cleaning, thereby fulfilling their 
duties of maintaining the tidy look of the city, the EMO managed the east 
part, and demanded that all the vendors to stop their businesses so that 
they could more easily be allocated new places. In addition, the EMO 
planned to squeeze stall size from 3⨉6 square metres to 3⨉3 square 
metres to create more vacancies for lease in the future. However, instead 
of allocating these vacancies to households (mostly non-local ones) from 
the truncated section, the EMO staff granted them to a new batch of local 
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residents, their relatives and friends, allowing the latter groups to sublet 
these stands at their own discretion. Thus, the shrinkage of the area of the 
night market did not harm the interests of EMO and residents of 
Community A; it rather allowed them to make a fast buck, because a 
dispossessed vendor from the west part of the market had to pay not only 
an equal amount of monthly fee and sanitary fee as before (for only a half-
sized place), but an extra lump sum transfer fee to the new landlords.  
The EMO discriminated against migrant vendors in many ways. First, 
the head of the EMO claimed that all the non-locals, regardless of whether 
they held a place in the original market, would not be allowed to continue 
their businesses in the market. The measure would not be taken against 
the non-locals. According to Fat Zhao, a vendor who befriended staff 
members of the EMO, the purpose was to reduce the supply of places and 
thus be more likely to be able to demand bribe. Similarly, many new stall 
landlords (locals) hoarded their places for profiteering, or demanded very 
high transfer fees. Second, the rearrangement policy further complicated 
the situation. In the east market, non-local vendors and local residents 
(often poor and unemployed) competed and even fought with each other. 
They were eager to occupy a premium terra nullius in the period of power 
vacuum during market rearrangement, waiting for post hoc recognition by 
the EMO (because the EMO collected monthly fees per stall rather than per 
capita, so the names on the roster often did not match the persons who 
were actually running their businesses). In a word, the anarchic situation 
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made it even harder for those who were evicted to get a foothold in the 
area east of the arc.  
On the whole, CALE’s action to “clean up and rearrange the night 
market” led to even more problems. The exploitative measures of the EMO 
further victimised vendors in the market extension, most of whom were 
non-locals.  
Resistance by non-locals in 2011 
How did the non-locals effectively organise a protest against a 
decision made by local grassroots government? Migrants are often 
marginalised in urban settings. In the case of Wenzhou migrants in Beijing, 
even though they shared economic interests with grassroots government 
staff, it was hard for them to organise formal protest against local 
grassroots government when they were banished from their working and 
residential compounds in the city (Zhang 2001). Then, how could vendors 
act together, protest in public and even succeed in this case? How did they 
organise the protest?  
My analysis relies mainly on the recollection of the main organiser, 
Old Wang, an outdoor restaurant boss who ran his business with his 
family on the west end of the night market. He is referred to by other 
vendors as an awesome and cool-minded man. His story not only 
articulates his choice and action but also provides a window as to how 
other vendors behaved. After I present his accounts, I will use two 
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complementary frameworks, namely the resource mobilisation and 
consensus mobilisation to address the above questions.  
It was hard to get hold of Old Wang, though. My difficulties in 
contacting him reflect the oppressive aura under which talking about the 
protest was a taboo, even though it had taken place long ago. The first 
protestor I met was Fat Man, who inadvertently mentioned to me the 
protest but suddenly changed the subject when his wife nudged him with 
her elbow. Upon my persistent request, Fat Man did not elaborate on the 
story, but suggested that I interview Old Wang, the organiser. Fat Man also 
requested that I don’t mention his name. The next day, I found Old Wang’s 
stand in the night market. Unfortunately, Old Wang was away in his home 
village, and his son politely declined my request to contact his father. Then 
I told his son that I was planning a journey to a university in their home 
province, and I would be very happy if I could drop by his father at his 
convenience. A few days after, I jumped onto a train, arrived in the capital 
city of Old Wang’s home province, and rang his son to try my luck. This 
time I managed to get Old Wang’s phone number, and Old Wang kindly 
invited me to pay a visit to his house as I rang him.  
His home village was another one-day bus journey from the capital 
city and only ten kilometres from the birth places of several founding 
fathers of the PRC including Mao Tze Tung. People here have a reputation 
for inheriting the rebellious spirits of the revolutionaries. I was welcomed 
by Old Wang in his three-storied house. After I handed Old Wang my gift of 
a bottle of rice wine, he treated me to lunch. Then we started an interview 
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upstairs in his guest room. He spoke very little in the beginning, allowing 
me to go as far as I could in introducing myself until he felt safe to talk 
about his story. “Let us get it straight, and I will give you a satisfactory 
reply,” He paused. “But first of all, let us NOT talk about politics.” 
His accounts of the “cleaning up and rearrangement” by CALE and 
EMO’s manoeuvre were similar to other vendors. To my surprise, he 
mentioned that Fat Man himself had bribed the EMO office with 10,000 
yuan, which Fat Man had not told me. Old Wang went on to described the 
situation caused by the decision,  
So we [vendors] just had spent spring festival [in our home 
villages], and many people were in debt. Some had their 
children enrolled at school, while others had taken their two-
or-three year old kids to the night market. Besides, we had just 
paid our rents for six months term or for a year. If [the EMO] 
prevent us from doing business, could we have our rents 
refunded? Of course the landlords would say ‘no’ as the 
contracts have already been signed. The tuition fee [school 
transfer fee for migrants’ children] which amounted to tens of 
thousands yuan [per student] was also a problem. We were not 
happy [about the decision], because it mattered to the survival 
of hundreds of people.  
When others stopped their businesses [according to the 
notice], I did not because I started my business late at six in the 
afternoon [so I did not receive the notice]. Many bosses had 
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nothing to do at all, so they came to my stall, watching me doing 
business. They were just like kids without parents. 
Sympathetic to other vendors, Old Wang decided to take some action. 
His initial plan was to assemble a multitude to protest on the street, which 
he had witnessed in many other places. However, he had worries. 
If I were to do something, the first thing I thought of was that 
the protest should not be political. Of course, under the 
leadership of the Communist Party, not everything is perfect. 
However, since the Opening up and the Reform of China, I am 
very happy about the economic development of our country. 
Therefore, I have nothing to complain about our country. After 
all, I had nothing in the past, now I have [my business]. As long 
as you work hard, you can earn some money, even if it is not big 
money. Then, why should I involve myself in this issue? I was 
very reluctant and had considered it for several days. I realised 
that it could be raised as an issue for those who had just paid 
tuition fee and rents. It could be even harder for them to find a 
new place in such short notice. [However,] I consulted a few 
people, but they were reluctant to take any action. 
Then he visited Zhu the Second, another vendor whose advice helped 
in shaping Old Wang’s action plan. 
[Zhu the Second] is in his forties and has two sons, and had 
served as village head [deputy village head as I found later] in 
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his home village. I thought he should have known the Party’s 
policy better than me. So I placed my hope in him. Do you know 
what his reply was? He said ‘no way’. He said that it is 
absolutely impossible to rebel [against the government]. He 
said that the Yao Gate [the vernacular name of the place] is 
almost a county; The Yao gate district government [Sunglow 
district government actually] is a county government.32 He said 
that you are an outsider. Whatever you try, they [the 
government] won’t buy it. Their words count, not yours. You’d 
better not do it.  
Secondly, Zhu also asked me how to control the mass if 
they were agitated? Thirdly, what if the government arrests 
some vendors? The consequence could be serious if protestors 
were "GIVEN A CAP" (dai maozi, a political metaphor used to 
frame those who challenge political authority with a rebellious 
label) by the government. 
 I was rather disappointed with Zhu the Second, because 
he had served as the village head but refused to get involved. I 
involved myself not for my own sake, but for the sake of 
everyone, didn’t I? After all, he had served as party secretary of 
his village. But when I thought about it twice, I realised that Zhu 
the Second was smart. You can’t make it, because GIVEN A CAP 
                                                          
32
 According to the administrative division of China, provincial level is above prefectural level, 
followed by county level, followed by township (xiang or zhen) level, and followed by village 
level. In Chinese cities, the district level is on par with the county level, followed by sub-
district (jiedao) at township level, and followed by community (shequ) at the village level. 
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of whatever kind is so easy for the Communists. Then I came up 
some ideas. I went to the publishing house and printed out 
thirty leaflets titled “Yao Gate night market CONSULTATIVE 
MEETING”.  
And I asked several acquaintances to distribute the 
leaflets to each household. I spent my own money to print these 
leaflets. When I distributed them to each household, I weighed 
the outcomes once more: Even if I succeed, I still won’t 
personally benefit. [After all,]I can go anywhere else and set up 
my business — you know I am accustomed more to being 
outside than staying put. If I cannot stay at Yao Gate, I can 
choose to live anywhere else. But those people are outside of 
their homes. They don’t have much power. What if I screw it up 
and get involved in politics? Then nobody would bear the 
pressure of the [political] cap.  
Upon my request, Old Wang explained the consequences of amassing 
people, how to control the protest and to protect himself. 
Once you assemble people and give them voice, whichever 
dynasty you were in and whichever administration party is 
governing, you will displease the government. It’s ok if you go 
against the government on your own. But now we are a group. 
We have two hundred people. And many more would be 
involved if it is covered by the media. Think about a couple 
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fighting on the street. They will be crowded by many onlookers. 
But we have several hundreds! 
I had a lot of pressure because it would be my 
responsibility if anything goes wrong. Even if I leave aside my 
own worries, I have to consider many things. First, the more 
people, the harder it is to control. Some of them have low 
cultural qualities [meaning some vendors are crude]. What if 
they abuse or fight with others? What if they block the traffic? 
What if you lose control of them? You have to think about the 
consequences. It is not a small village but a city. It won’t do 
anyone good if the upper level government know this. The 
event itself is a small issue, but it can easily get out of hand. It is 
not a very big issue, but its impact can also be minimised. Given 
that the news can spread very fast, what if the International 
press report the event? Would it be reported as a riot in 
Nanjing? Then how would you wind up everything? 
I am not taking a side [for or against the Communist 
Party]. The territory (Jiangshan, literally river and mountain) 
controlled by the Communist Party is as strong as an iron 
bucket surrounded by an iron hoop. Can Mr Wang overthrow it? 
Impossible. But I have to consider all the consequences, which 
must NOT go beyond the scope of Nanjing city. Besides, for 
instance, what if you are arrested by police? And your utensils 
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are confiscated by CALE? If you protest without any restraints, I 
would arrest you if I were the local authority.  
As far as I am concerned, they [the authority] will 
definitely find the leader or the commander behind the protest. 
So I have to take care of myself. I had prepared myself when I 
distributed the leaflets. I would not say that my life currently is 
unsustainable — after all, I have been outside of home [and 
earning a living] for decades.  If I could solve the problem for 
them [other vendors], then it may or equally may not be 
recognised as a good deed (shanshi33) [by the other vendors]. 
Anyway, I also have personal interests, because I am a member 
of the group, am not I? Speaking of yiqi (honour of spirit), I am 
doing things for other people’s sake. Therefore, as long as I can 
solve the problem, I am ready for it [to be identified as the 
leader]. But I will keep clear of politics. Therefore, we wrote 
“discrimination against outsiders is not allowed” and “we want 
a bowl of rice, we want to go to school” on the banners. We are 
outsiders, we want a bowl of rice, and we want to go to school, 
we are pitiful.  
Then, Old Wang convened a meeting at his residence. According to 
his recollection, after all the participants expressed their various 
difficulties, he said, 
                                                          
33
 The “good deeds” can be understood as out of good heart. It also have a Buddhist 
connotation. If someone does some good deeds for others, according to Buddhist theory, 
they will be rewarded after this life. 
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Now that you have expressed your opinions, you have to be 
ready and make an estimate [of your risks] if you really want to 
continue [your business here]. Let me give you a suggestion—
and the only viable one—is that you unite collectively and 
make a semblance of multitude but keep clear of politics. This is 
point one. Point two: each stall shall give me two hundred yuan. 
Point three: you have to pledge never to abuse or fight with 
others. We each have a mobile phone. If you are abused, you 
can record it; if you are beaten, you can videotape it. But we 
should never fight back. Whoever breaks this rule will account 
for his own behaviour. This is my last point.  
I asked: why did you collect 200 yuan from each stall?  
Why do I have to collect two hundred yuan from each stall? If 
anyone is caught by police, he will need to eat and drink [in a 
detention centre]. We’re going to dispatch someone to send 
him food and drink. If anyone is beaten and injured, we have to 
treat him. If anyone’s utensils are confiscated, we will send a 
comrade to redeem them, and the redemption is two hundred 
yuan. If the funds are not enough, we will collect more money. 
However, if we can spare the money, then I will return to you 
every cent that I collected from you.  
We are…COMRADES, BROTHERS and SISTERS, how can 
you just run away, leaving others imprisoned? How can we 
leave anyone alone? But if you have considered all the 
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possibilities and let them know beforehand, they will feel rest 
assured. It is just like battle or playing chess. You should be 
able not only to advance but also to withdraw. You have to 
solve the problems in the rear [future problems]. If you just 
charge the enemy without any back-up, you will be unable to 
succeed.  
So far I have presented Old Wang’s accounts for his planning of the 
protest. In the following I will analyse the protest through two 
complementary frameworks, namely the resource mobilisation and 
consensus mobilisation frameworks. I will demonstrate that though Old 
Wang was in a precarious position and that he had to make quick 
decisions, the way he mobilised his followers and his strategies were 
highly contingent on the political context and the features of the 
constituency.  
The first framework is resource mobilisation which stresses “the 
process of creating movement structures and preparing and carrying out 
protest activities which are visible movement ‘products’ addressed to 
actors and publics outside the movement” (Rucht 1996, 188). Not only 
people and money but knowledge, frames, skills, and technical tools are all 
required to process and distribute information and to influence people 
(Rucht 1996, 186). The key categories include context structure, 
movement structure, strategies, mobilisation, protest activities and 
outcome (Rucht 1996, 202-04). As I will demonstrate, the organiser’s 
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grasp of context structure was vital for his designing effective strategies 
that led to the success of the protest.  
Context structure: Put on a cap 
The questions raised by Zhu the Second provide a window as to the 
“context structure”. According to Rucht (1996), it is the access to the 
decision-making system, the policy implementation capacity,34 the alliance 
from the local setting, and the conflict structure. By conflict structure 
Rucht means "the capacity (of the opponents) to limit, undermine, or 
repress social movement mobilisation" (Rucht 1996). It is clear that as 
“outsiders”, vendors had less access to local government decision-making 
bodies. Furthermore, the politically alienated outsiders perceived 
themselves as vulnerable to risks of being labelled with a political cap and 
subsequent oppression by local authorities such as imprisonment.  
“Putting on a cap” as a way of political labelling and persecution 
originated during the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942-1944) when 
Mao Tze Tung categorised his rivals ad hominem to break up the alliance 
of his opponents so as to monopolise political power (Gao 2000). After the 
founding of the PRC 1949, Mao repeatedly used this method, for instance 
during the 1957 anti-rightist movement (Schurmann 1971) and in the 
Cultural Revolution (Lu 2004). Although CCP governance through political 
movement and purging has given way to the maintenance of social 
stability (weihu shehui wending or weiwen) by local governments using 
                                                          
34
 It is defined as “the power of authorities to implement adopted policies, regardless of 
internal or external resistance.” (Rucht, 1996) 
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police to repress disruptive unrests since the 2000s (Cai 2009, 178, Li 
2014, 220), “putting on a cap” as a way to discipline citizens continues to 
occur and fear of a cap reflects an ingrained fear of the capriciousness of 
government rule. In fact, I was also labelled as “anti-revolutionary” and 
“agitating the mass” when I spoke on behalf of vendors in the meeting held 
by CALE in 2012.  
Furthermore, given that Old Wang is an “outsider”, the context 
structure he perceived has less to do with specific, local conditions than 
CCP rule in general. Upon scrutiny, Old Wang’s understanding of power is 
based on three popularly accepted elements of CCP rule: the CCP’s rule is 
strong and consolidated; it is historically justified and violent; and 
legitimised by its economic performance. He sees the power of the 
Communist rulers as a monolithic force rather than a fragmented and 
multilayered one. He told me once that “the territory (Jiangshan, literally 
river and mountain) controlled by the Communist Party is as strong as an 
iron bucket surrounded by the iron hoop.” Such perception was shared by 
other vendors. Big Brother, another participant, told me that “even if you 
can challenge Heaven and Earth, you’d never challenge the Communist 
Party”, indicating that the Communists were in the same breath with 
Heaven (tian),35 and were perhaps a formidable and omnipotent mandate 
                                                          
35
 The cosmological notion of tian (天), the Chinese Heaven, is associated to the Communists 
and government. The ambivalence of tian lies in that while it legitimates the ruling, it can also 
justify resistance. The association of government to the notion of tian is close to what Perry 
describes as “rule consciousness” brought about by the idea of Mandate of Heaven (Perry 
2010). In criticising a recently developed theory of contemporary Chinese contentious politics, 
namely the rightful resistance paradigm, she observes that that participants “usually go to 
great lengths to demonstrate their loyalty to central policies and leaders” with “breathless 
enthusiasm”, and Chinese protesters have shown a consistent tendency to “play by the rules” 
from pre-PRC to post-reform times (ibid.). In my view, the rule consciousness or “tian” in 
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of Heaven. Second, it is historically justified, which is why Old Wang drew 
an association between the “administration party” and dynastic rule. Third, 
CCP power is inseparable from enormous violence in its history. Old Wang 
told me his family history in a casual talk. Despite the fact that his father, a 
Nationalist Major, was executed by the Communists in the 1950s, Old 
Wang had no hatred for the Communists. His attitude was explained by his 
reference to the fourth element of CCP rule: as long as the sustenance is 
guaranteed and even bettered since the Opening and Reform, there is no 
point to run against the rule of the Communists. 
Movement Structure and consensus mobilisation 
Given the CCP’s capacity to repress public protest and few chances 
for an outsider to influence decision-making through forming alliance, 
how was the movement structure modelled? A movement structure, 
according to Rucht, is “the organizational base and the mechanisms 
serving to collect and use the movement's resources” (Rucht 1996). He 
suggests that the movement structure is highly dependent on or is the 
function of the structure of the context (ibid.). A “weak alliance” context 
structure forces a movement to compensate by developing its own 
organisational base to support quick political intervention; and a strong 
structure of conflict encourages the building of strong movement 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
question are in line with the Confucian notion (or that of Mencius) of the “Mandate of 
Heaven” (tian ming). 
On the other hand, there is a tradition in which charismatic leaders create cosmologies to 
justify revolutions, for instance Taiping Heavenly Kingdom leaders mixed eschatological 
Christianity and indigenous folk religions (Spence 1998). Millenarianism cosmologies, 
exemplified by White Lotus cults and contemporary Fa Lun Gong, can instigate resurrections 
against secular authorities if followers are made to foresee the advent of Maitreya Buddha at 
hand (Penny 2002, Haar 1992). Secret societies such as the Triads also culturally legitimise 
their rebellion using tian (Haar 1998).  
135 
 
organizations, which allows for immediate and strategically oriented 
responses (ibid.). In this case, since the evicted vendors were newcomers 
to the market, they were less likely to have strong patrons in the local 
setting, let alone anyone from the district government. In fact, Old Wang 
told me that another vendor had tried to contact the municipal television 
station. A journalist showed up at the site during the protest, but he did 
not report the event. Nonetheless, the boundary of potential followers 
seemed clear-cut because the vendors affected by the government’s 
decision were mainly non-locals. Without strong alliance, in Rucht’s theory, 
the organisational base is likely to become a self-help group that supplies 
resources on its own. This was indeed the case. For instance, the funds 
were collected from vendors themselves.  
But unlike Rucht predicted, in spite of the strong conflict structure, it 
was clear that there was no point for the protesters to form a strong, long-
term movement organisation, because their aim was immediate and 
simple—to be allowed to continue their businesses. More importantly, any 
formation of formal organisation is prohibited in an authoritarian context. 
This explains why Old Wang used “consultative” (xieshang) to denote the 
meeting, which meant only to exchange ideas among participants. 
I use a second framework, consensus mobilisation, to analyse the 
way Old Wang mobilised his followers in the meeting. Bert Klandermans 
(1992, 77) asserts that "the resource mobilisation approach did not take 
into account mediating processes through which people attribute meaning 
to events and interpret situations”. He proposes that consensus 
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mobilisation, defined as a “deliberate attempt by a social actor to create 
consensus among a subset of the population”, is key to understanding the 
constructed meaning of protest (ibid.). In fact, unlike what its title 
suggested, the “consultative meeting” held at Old Wang’s place was a 
typical process of consensus mobilisation rather than merely pooling 
minds. It is also the process by which meanings are attached to the protest. 
Then, what kind of consensus was achieved? How was it achieved? 
Clearly, the ultimate aim of the mobilisation was to encourage 
participation in the protest against eviction while avoiding retribution by 
the local government. It was a dilemma, because vendors’ unwillingness to 
participate was just because of their fear of punishment by government. In 
other words, they had low expectations of success or “political efficacy” in 
Klandermans’ terms (Klandermans 1992). But Old Wang successfully 
transformed the consciousness of his potential followers.  
First, he defined the protest as a safer one so that was “clear of 
politics”. He did so through three ways. 1) The protest was framed as 
discrimination towards outsiders and an economic demand for education 
and livelihood. 2) By applying disciplines to participants, insisting they 
were not allowed to abuse or fight back, participants would be less likely 
to be imprisoned as threatening the public order. 3) Although the risks of 
being punished by the government could not be totally eliminated, these 
risks were moderated and spread. Vendors as a group were revamped by 
Old Wang as if it was a joint-venture, which was able to share the danger 
of imprisonment, injury and monetary loss. In a second interview with Old 
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Wang, he told me that he actually held a run-up meeting with four vendors 
he trusted (which seems to me that he was cautious not to disclose other 
key members to me in my first interview of him), and he reckoned the 
third measure as the most crucial step to mobilise participation.  
Second, Old Wang seemed to have successfully raised a collective 
consciousness. He used yiqi (spirit of honour), brothers and sisters and 
comrades to refer to the group. Klandermans (1992, 83-90) argues that 
collective beliefs tend to be stable and durable but that the 
transformations of collective beliefs requisite for social protest are 
difficult to achieve. The success of a persuasive communication thus 
depends on the extent to which an actor can appeal to the collective beliefs 
of target groups in a given timespan. From Old Wang’s recollection we can 
see that he used three types of existing collective identities. Of the three 
appellations, while the “comrade” seemed obsolete for vendors, the 
expressions of yiqi and brothers and sisters are quite regularly used by 
vendors. Particularly, having yiqi means to rescue others in times of 
emergency, as I will cover when I discuss the relationships among men 
(chapter 5).  
Besides, Old Wang repeatedly referred to “Heavenly time, Earthly 
advantages and the solidarity of the People (tianshi, dili and renhe)” to 
account for the success in 2011 and to analyse situations before the 
relocation of the market in 2012. Old Wang borrowed the formula from 
The Water Margin and The Romance of Three Kingdoms, two Chinese 
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vernacular novels with wide influence in Chinese and East Asian folklore.36 
The formula can also be found in Sun Tzu’s Art of War which requires one 
to take action only when three conditions are ready, namely the timing 
(Heaven), the geographical advantages or circumstances (Earth), and the 
solidarity and discipline of the army (solidarity). I am not suggesting that 
Old Wang took the formula and strategies literarily from these novels and 
texts; rather, he seemed to fit his strategies into the three categories, 
which in turn reinforced his belief in them.  
In particular, he used the notion of heavenly time (tianshi) to 
enhance the political efficacy of vendors. He set the time of the protest at 
13:00 on Sunday when the traffic was busiest in order to attract spectators. 
More importantly, he chose the second day of the second lunar month 
because according to the Chinese lunar calendar, “the dragon will raise its 
head on that day".37  The dragon, essentially a rain deity in Chinese 
tradition, wakes up from hibernation when worshipped and provides 
appropriate rainfall for a future harvest. Thus, the date when dragon 
                                                          
36
 The anti-Confucian, rebellious nature of these novels and their influence in the folk society 
are perhaps best exemplified by the comments of Mao Tze Tung when he was interviewed by 
Edgar Snow, 
“I knew the [Confucian] Classics, but disliked them. What I enjoyed were the romances of 
old China, and especially stories of rebellions. I read the Yue Fei Zhuan (the Yue Fei 
Chronicles), Shui Hu Zhuan (The Water Margin), Fan Tang (Revolt Against the Tang Dynasty), 
San Guo (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), and Xi You (Journey to the West, aka Monkey), 
while still very young, and despite the vigilance of my old teacher, who hated these outlawed 
books and called them wicked... We [Mao and his schoolmates] learned many of the stories 
almost by heart, and discussed and re-discussed them many times. We knew more of them 
than the old men of the village, who also loved them and used to exchange stories with us. I 
believe that the perhaps I was much influenced by such books, read at an impressionable age.” 
See Introduction to Water of Margin by Edwin Lowe in Water of Margin translated by J. H. 
Jackson (Shi 2008).  
37
 That day was actually Jingzhe (awakening insects), the third solar term in the Chinese lunar 
calendar. Traditional Chinese folklore has it that during Jingzhe, thunderstorms will wake up 
hibernating insects as the weather is getting warmer. The awakening of the dragon is another 
version of the symbolism.  
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raises it head symbolises a masculine, conquering spirit and leadership, 
which could have boosted the morale of vendors. 
Furthermore, Old Wang appeared to be doing something for 
everyone, while at the same time did not want to be seen as altruistic. In 
his recollection, Old Wang referred to the outdoor restaurant bosses as 
kids without parents. By so doing he metaphorically extended the ethical 
scope to those who were essentially strangers. He also repeatedly 
expressed that he did not expect rewards through organising the protest. 
However, even though altruism or compassion could have been a trigger 
for action, it was not a normative principle, because a self-interested 
person (other vendors) would interpret altruism as either hot-headed or 
hypocritical.  
Last, the way he mobilised vendors had an element of manipulation, 
albeit harmlessly executed. It was a “tactic”—to adopt Michael de 
Certeau’s (1984) terms—by which minimal force can generate maximum 
effect. Old Wang explained the vendors’ situation with a warfare analogy: 
if an army is in a position where there is no escape, desperate soldiers will 
lose the sense of fear, stand firm and fight harder.38 The vendors were in a 
similar situation: they were abruptly prohibited from running their 
businesses and having no chances to obtain a stand in the market 
rearrangement. In this situation they could be led into “battle”. If they had 
not been starved and still had maintained some hope, the protest would 
probably fail (this was why Old Wang did not protest in 2012 when the 
                                                          
38
 Perry shows how a similar strategy was used by the Communists in mobilising miners in the 
revolutionary era (Perry 2013, 65). 
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new policy appeared less disastrous as I show in the second section). 
Again, Old Wang categorises this tactic into the notion of “heavenly time”.  
Strategic framing and action strategies 
In resource mobilisation theory, frames are the specific metaphors, 
symbolic representations and cognitive cues used to render or cast 
behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative 
modes of action (Zald 1996). According to scholars writing about “rightful 
resistance” in contemporary China, aggrieved citizens not only actively 
seek allies from within the state, but also use state laws, policies or 
political rhetoric when framing their protests and legitimising their causes 
(O'Brien, J, and Li 2003). Through appropriate framing, resisters can 
strategically reduce risks than protest through entirely unauthorised 
uprisings, and achieve more positive results than everyday resistance 
(O'Brien, J, and Li 2003). 
Following John Kingdom, Mertha (2008) suggests that “policy 
entrepreneurs” are masters of framings in the policy process in his 
discussion of anti-hydropower protests. By policy entrepreneurs he means 
“advocates for proposals or for the prominence of an idea”. They include 
disgruntled officials, NGO members and media, who can interpret events 
using existing ideas in a new way to convince potential supporters through 
“articulation” and “amplification” (Mertha 2008, 6-7). Through articulation 
the policy entrepreneur “links up and assembles events in order to 
establish a natural and persuasive narrative”, and through “amplification” 
he “boils down the core component of the narrative in order to carry the 
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frame from one set of individuals to another” in the form of catchphrases 
or slogans. I show that Old Wang and his followers used similar skills, 
though he was not a policy entrepreneur in strict sense.39 
Vendors shouted two main slogans: “give non-locals a mouthful of 
cooked rice” and “we want to go to school; we want to read books”. Each 
connected to existing government narratives. The first referred to the way 
the Chinese government legitimatises itself by prioritising socio-economic 
rights over political rights, a prioritisation which Perry suggests (2008) as 
having a “moral economy” flavour. By demanding “cooked rice”, protesters 
were calling for a condescending rescue by the government as much as a 
beggar would do to elicit public sympathy. By being humble, vendors 
prescribed their problems as “remediable” and reasonable.  
In addition, the emphatic “non-locals” was articulated in a way that it 
was less an identity of its own right vis-à-vis the local people, but a 
willingness to be incorporated into the local economy. In fact, the 
expression was made in line with state rhetoric of economic development 
in which the “non-locals” were an indispensable component. As Old Wang 
articulated,  
Under the leadership of the Communist Party and since the 
open and reform, non-locals have been investing in and 
constructing the cities. Migrant workers are needed 
everywhere and in every walk of life. Whatever they do, they 
                                                          
39
 Mertha argues that the absence of policy entrepreneurs explains the failure of the protest 
against Pudukou dam. He seems to have excluded protest leaders as policy entrepreneurs in 
that case (Mertha 2008, 88-93). 
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have contributed much to the local economy and development.  
It would be only lip service for officials to say so, if they then 
don’t take into consideration our requests. 
The second framed issue was the schooling of migrant children. Old 
Wang was inspired to underscore the issue by two university students, 
and vendors later agreed to use this slogan. Lack of schooling was a 
problem for both the vendors who had children with them 40 and those 
who left their children behind in their home villages and towns. Though 
only one of many problems for the vendors, the education issue was 
highlighted because by so doing vendors could win the sympathy of a 
wider society and connect the protest with existing government rhetoric.   
Old Wang also used an implicit frame to disarm the local government. 
After the protest, he included a Uyghur barbeque operator in the 
delegation of five representatives of vendors to meet officially with the 
head of the public security division (district level). According to Cai (2010, 
9-10), in collective resistance, an alternative to seeking alliance from 
within the administrative hierarchy is to apply “issue connection” to pin 
down local officials’ misconducts which are not acceptable by upper-level 
authorities. According to Old Wang, the tactic was inspired by his 
                                                          
40
 There were two public schools near the night market. The transfer fee for a child who was 
not in the schooling precinct was about 9,000 yuan per six years, though such transfer fee was 
forbidden by regulations issued by the municipal bureau of education. There was another 
school for migrant children and they did not require a transfer fee, but its educational quality 
was inferior to the two public schools. To attend the two schools required guanxi, because 
the transaction must be carried out under the table and through an intermediary trusted by 
the school and the parents so that the transaction would not be disclosed. Anyhow, vendors 
with their children enrolled in these primary schools had to pay a similar amount of transfer 
fee again through new connections, should they move to another place to run their 
businesses.  
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experience from other provinces where he saw local policemen dare not to 
use force on ethnic vendors than on the majority Han ethnicity. In fact, the 
issue raised therein has less to do with any official’s misconduct than 
administrative agency slack, and Old Wang’s experience was echoed in my 
interview with some supervisors of CALE division from another city on my 
way to Old Wang’s home. According to them, civil disputes that arise 
between the Han majority and minorities or religious people—Muslims, 
Tibetans and Uyghurs in particular—will be arbitrated by ethnic affairs 
commissions (minzu weiyuanhui) stationed at municipal or even 
provincial levels, if these conflicts are not properly solved at grassroots 
levels. In this regard, Old Wang’s inclusion of the Uyghur vendor proved to 
be effective political leverage. It added complexity to the issue for the local 
government, for there was no point in dragging the issue further for the 
local police. Interestingly, Old Wang justified his action by Three 
Principles41 of the People which he held as creed, presumably because his 
father was a Nationalist.42  
As said, lacking support from within the administrative hierarchy 
had made the commitment or solidarity among vendors themselves an 
even more compelling issue. The mobilised participants, including vendors’ 
families, already totalled some two hundred. However, a pitfall of 
amassing many people was that the crowd can be perceived by the 
                                                          
41
 The Three Principles of the People are nationalism (minzu), democracy (minquan) and 
people’s livelihood (minsheng). According to the China-nationalism, the first principle (minzu) 
advocates that all of the ethnicities of China, mainly the five major groups of Han, Mongols, 
Tibetans, Manchus, and the Muslims (including the Uyghur) should be united. 
42
 In a second telephone interview of Old Wang, he denied that he had mentioned the Three 
Principles of the People, stressing that we should be “clear of politics”.  
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government as threatening or disruptive (Cai 2010). Therefore, Old Wang 
reminded everyone to avoid any physical confrontation with CALE officials 
or policemen. “You either record or videotape everything with your mobiles, 
but altercation and fights are not allowed”. Furthermore, women should 
encircle men to shield the latter from the police, and they can “lay into the 
ground” and cry if confrontations occur, for such behaviours can easily 
elicit sympathy from passers-by.  
Outcome of the protest 
Vendors staged the protest on March 3rd. CALE staff were caught 
unprepared, and so was the EMO office. Brother Strong, a staff member of 
the EMO, tore off a banner hanging between two trees by vendors as 
requested by the sub-district government. The CALE staff arrived at the 
scene, but they quickly withdrew to a nearby square, waiting for a decision 
from their supervisors. The deputy district governor and head of public 
security division soon arrived and suggested a negotiation with vendors in 
the late afternoon. According to Old Wang, during the negotiation the head 
of public security admitted that the policy against non-locals was not 
appropriate. The five representatives spoke after him, and Old Wang 
provided a summary. The head of public security made some concluding 
remarks. A day later, all the non-locals were allowed to continue their 
business in place. But the district government needed a scapegoat for what 
had happened. Therefore, the head of the EMO, Guang, was removed from 
his post. 
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To sum up, in terms of resources these migrants had limited capacity 
to mobilise locals, and could not rely on alliances with local government. 
They are also mostly uneducated and have limited knowledge of laws, 
regulations and local political circumstances. They mobilised because of 
the growing pressure on their livelihood. Yet their framing of the 
movement considered carefully what language to use so as not to upset 
local officials, and their staging of the protest was forceful and controlled. 
The organiser, Old Wang mobilised others with his experience, charisma 
and the use of cultural references that were easily understandable.  
  
146 
 
Market relocation in 2012 
The local government, however, succeeded in a second attempt to 
relocate the night market in June, 2012. Although vendors had expected 
substantial losses from the relocation, they did not openly resist the policy 
this time. What were the differences between the two incidents? Why 
wasn’t there any protest? How did vendors cope with the government’s 
decision this time? 
I witnessed the 2012 relocation and thus use on-site observations 
and interviews / interactions with many more informants, including not 
only vendors but also other stakeholders of the night market. Such 
interactions allow me to draw a broader picture of the power relations 
and guanxi network. There are two major differences between the two 
incidents. First, since relocation this time targeted the whole market, it 
involved some 200 stalls of both non-locals and local vendors. Second, 
authorities and institutions that were officially involved had moved 
upward to sub-district and district levels. Third, vendors reacted to 
rumours rather than to publicised government decision, which was 
announced only three days before the so-called “mobilisation assembly” 
(dongyuan hui) held by the district government on 9 June and five days 
before the forceful relocation in 11 June, 2012. Nonetheless, rumours and 
gossip had been circulating in the night market since at least September 
2011 when I first arrived there. As I will demonstrate, these rumours and 
the spread of gossip are important elements of the political culture of the 
vendors.  
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In the following I will first introduce the background of the new 
decision and stakeholders. Then I will describe how vendors developed 
connections with powerful people in their everyday businesses. 
Afterwards, I will show how vendors circulated and responded to rumours 
and gossip before and during the market relocation. 
The new decision: background, stakeholders and scheme 
The 2011 protest achieved three immediate consequences. First, 
vendors were allowed to continue their businesses. Second, Guang, the 
head of the EMO and who made the discriminate policy against the non-
locals was removed from office. Third, as the political stakes became much 
higher, decision-making on the night market moved to district level 
institutions and involved many more actors, though such upgrading and 
the decision-making process were unclear to most of the vendors.  
The protest had a profound impact in shaping the 2012 decision. 
After all, district government represented by the head of the Public 
Security division learned their lesson that a forceful closure of the night 
market was not viable. But how to dispose of the market had become a 
political impasse for the district government and its CALE division. A local 
powerful man, General Manager Wang, head of a local realty management 
company, showed some interest and coordinated with district government 
to offer a solution (for his position see Figure 4.4). 
The realty management company (wuye guanli gongsi, RMC hereafter) 
was a new institution deriving from the housing marketization and urban 
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reconstruction. In the field, five former brigades (dadui or commune) 
formed the sub-district government after these brigades were resettled in 
this region during the 2000s (see chapter 2). The RMC was set up to 
operate closely with the sub-district government as if a built-in enterprise, 
managing the environment of the public spaces as well as fulfilling other 
municipal functions of the sub-district government43. I heard from a local 
vendor that Manager Wang was the former village head of one of the five 
resettled communities (Community B hereafter, see Figure 2.3, chapter 2). 
He then served as a subordinate of a vice deputy district governor who 
was in charge of the establishment of a nearby development zone 
(industrial park), and perhaps had developed his expertise in projects as 
well as his personal ties to the district government. According to the 
vendor from Wang’s brigade, Wang was not very successful in his official 
path since he did not get promoted after he served as deputy district head. 
Rather, he was relegated to the head of the property management 
company instead. However, such a position is considered as a gravy train 
(in Chinese youshui zu, full of fat and oil) because the incumbent official 
can easily subcontract urban infrastructure projects from local 
government. 
                                                          
43
 According to the law promulgated by State Council in 2007, each residential community 
ought to have an owner’s congress (yezhu weiyuanhui), and the businesses of a RMC are 
entrusted on contractual basis by the owner’s congress. Since the owner’s congresses of the 
relocated communities had been subsumed by the sub-district government, the RMC was 
affiliated with sub-district government in this case. 
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Figure 4.3: The scheme of the relocation of the night market and layout of the 
new site. ① Outlook of outdoor restaurants (including BBQ) with water and 
electrical supply; note the overhead power line; ② Google satellite map: the 
market was relocated from centrally located area to a relatively remote region with 
less customer base; ③ layout of the new site. Note the new, rectangular market 
has only one entrance. 
The site Manager Wang wanted to relocate the night market to was 
an “idle land” (xianzhi tudi) 2.5 kilometres away from the old site. It was 
just between Community B and the Industrial Park (Figure 4.3). In many 
Chinese cities, it has become common for construction to be delayed on 
land that has been granted for construction and thereby let the land lie 
"idle". Labelled formally as “national land reserve”, this inconspicuous 
(and of low land value) piece of land was leased to the RMC with the term 
of use of only three years. Besides, Manager Wang originally planned to 
build a multi-storeyed “gourmet city”, but was not allowed to have multi-
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storeyed buildings on “idle land” according to urban planning regulations. 
Given that the rental agreement was said to be a contract without an 
official seal 44  and that the formal name of the new market was 
“resettlement of street stalls”,45 the acquisition of the land by Manager 
Wang seemed to leverage a policy loophole.46 But from a purely economic 
view, three years seemed enough to recoup the total investment, even if 
twelve months had already been spent in paving the cement ground and 
installing facilities before the relocation and another six months would be 
free of charge for existing vendors from the night market.47  
The relocation, however, was only a concerted move of a grander 
project—the expansion and greening of No. 2 Road which was undertaken 
in the name of the Youth Olympic 2014. The Olympic Games were at best a 
justification of the road project, for it turned out that none of the sports 
events took place in this area. The road project had three stakeholders 
(see Figure 4.4) including General Manager Wang, a manager of a nearby 
                                                          
44
 This piece of news was from a non-local vendor whose uncle was a subcontractor of the 
infrastructure of the new market. The vendor knew the details from his uncle when the latter 
had dinner with General Manager Wang.  
45
 The fact that the relocation was implemented by CALE, and that the relocation was termed 
as “resettling of street stalls” indicated that the relocation was an administrative conduct, 
thereby obfuscating its commercial purposes. 
46
 This piece of land was assigned (xieyi churang) to the RMC and its de facto commerce use 
contradicted the article 4.3 of  the Notice of the Ministry of Land and Resources on Issuing the 
Rules on the Assignment of State-owned Land Use Right by Bidding, Auction and Quotation 
(for Trial Implementation) and the Rules on the Assignment of State-owned Land Use Right by 
Agreement, which stipulated that “scope of the assignment of the State-owned land use right 
by means of bid tendering, auction and quotation(zhao pai gua)” applies to the “operational 
land for commerce, tourism, entertainment and commercial residence as well as the 
industrial land requiring competition.” Yet the practices of assigning idle land to companies by 
local governments are common, even though the transfer fee is much lower than that 
through bid tendering, auction and quotation.  
47
 According to Lin, disciple of General Manager Wang, the initial investment on infrastructure 
was about CNY 2 million. There were about 300 stall places, and the total revenue for 18 
months (three years deducted by one year and a six-month exemption of rents) was 
estimated to be CNY 21.6 million (300 stalls ⨉ CNY 400 per stalls on average ⨉ 18 months). 
Interestingly, the investment was announced to the public at only CNY 3.5 million.  
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food market, and a deputy head of the Demolition Office of the district 
government, according to an ex-official from district government and Mr 
Wu, the cousin of the food market manager. The third stakeholder, Brother 
Bright, was known as the most “prestigious” ghost (local hooligan) in this 
region (see chapter 3).  According to the ex-official, with an initial bidding 
price at 200 million yuan, these contractors finally increased the fiscal 
budget to 450 million using so-called “fishing” technique.48 Inasmuch as 
such huge capital was involved, the official said, it was understandable 
that it involved not only CALE section but also the division of Public 
Security at district level to ensure the smooth relocation of the night 
market. The third stakeholder Brother Bright probably functioned as an 
auxiliary, quasi-legal enforce.  
 
Figure 4.4: The power structure behind the relocation in 2012. 
                                                          
48
 “Fishing” (diaoyu) technique has long been practiced in the Chinese bureaucracy. A fishing 
project (diaoyu Gongcheng) is used to describe a project based on a low bidding price by a 
low-level government, which then demands additional investment from upper level 
government (contractee) by stressing the sunk cost. Hsing (2010) and Zhou (2005) discuss 
“fishing projects” in the new wave of urban sprawl. Zhou depicts it as a widespread 
government behavior (particularly after decentralisation in 1990s) of low level government to 
disregard the fixed budget constraint imposed from above by mobilising and extracting 
resources from its subordinate agencies, firms and individuals within its precincts for political 
achievement. 
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EMO staff disliked the relocation scheme. The night market had been 
a cash cow of EMO and Community A. The PMC and sub-district 
government which endorsed the scheme thus became contenders with 
EMO. As a result of the power struggle between the two institutions, EMO 
was restructured and given an even less advantageous position. After the 
protest in 2011, Guang, the former head of EMO, was removed from office. 
Though there was no indication as to whether the decision was made by 
sub-district government or by the district government, he obtained 
another job in the political consultative office in the sub-district 
government and his work was mainly to attract investments on behalf of 
the sub-district. Zhang, a former quarry manager of Community A who lost 
his job after the resettlement of his community, was appointed as the new 
deputy head of the EMO, and the way he treated vendors was much more 
lenient than Guang, according to some vendors. However, though Zhang 
held the substantial power in regulating the night market, he was formally 
led by Mr Zhu, the director of the office, who was appointed by the district 
government. Later, the powers of both Mr Zhu and Zhang were 
undermined by a third person, Lin, a disciple of Manager Wang (see Figure 
4.4). Lin became quite active in the night market in early 2012 in 
preparation for the relocation. He not only collected household 
information from vendors but also help design the layout of the new site.  
On June 5th, EMO staff notified the relocation scheme to all the 
vendors. According to the notice, all the vendors should participate in the 
“mobilisation assembly” presided over by the district government on June 
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8 and 9. They each should draw a lot to decide their places in the new site. 
On the morning of the first day, I was allowed to enter the meeting by Mr 
Zhang, and seated myself in the first row. On the podium were seated 
Director Zhu, head of EMO; head of Yao Gate Public security section; 
directors of CALE section and a staff member from the notary public office 
whose job was to authenticate the fairness and transparency of the lot-
drawing procedure. Manager Wang and his disciples were also present, 
seating themselves at the back row. Two lawyers and journalists also 
joined the meeting.  
With the presence of all the restauranteurs and barbeque operators, 
Director Zhu announced the procedure and asked if there were any 
questions from the audience.  I presented two issues that vendors worried 
about most. The first point was about the reduction of the size from 6x6 to 
only 3x6 per each stand, and the second question was how much deposit 
should one pay to the office. Unfortunately, I was brutally stopped by Little 
Lee, the disciple of Manager Wang, and two other CALE staff. They dragged 
me out of the meeting room and escorted me to the public security office. 
Later, a director of CALE conducted an investigation on me. He suspected 
me of “agitating the masses” (Shandong qunzhong), but released me later 
with a warning. I heard from some vendors that I was labelled as “anti-
revolutionary” by one of the lawyers, and in the days to follow, I was 
harassed and threatened by a few people whom I didn’t know in the new 
market.    
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I have so far examined people and institutions involved in the 
decision-making and execution of the relocation of the night market. Then, 
how do we understand the new decision? To adopt the terms of Lin, Hao, 
and Geertman (2015), I argue that a public-collective-private governance 
was formed in this urbanising area. By public-collective-private 
governance Lin et al. mean the cooperation between private companies, 
collective urban villages and government in the redevelopment of urban 
villages. The urban villages are those villages in the urban vicinity that are 
swallowed by rapid urban developments. The public-collective-private 
governance is formed when the redevelopment of urban villages requires 
financial resources. External developers are attracted by potential profits, 
but they are confronted with uncertainty and the difficulties associated 
with negotiations and site clearance (ibid.).  
In the same vein, driven by the profits from the night market, the 
PMC resorted to the power of government, particularly the legal 
enforcement function of the latter to relocate the night market to the place 
where it can exercise direct control.  On the part of CALE and public 
security, they could also benefit from considerable revenue streams from 
above board and under the table. For instance, I heard two CALE staff 
discussing their own participation in drawing the lots before they walked 
into the assembly hall, which means that they would become the rentiers 
of the stalls in the new site using their administrative power. Another 
immediate benefit was that CALE would improve its performance for good 
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without the presence of the night market along the street and the pollution 
it produced.   
The patronage network 
Vendors’ attitudes towards the new policy and their respective 
actions were at least homogeneous. Their behaviours were quite 
dependent on their positions in what I call the patronage network, which 
was developed around the local powerful people and institutions. In this 
section I take a detour to map out the network vendors developed around 
the centre of power, then I analyse how rumours and gossip have 
mediated vendors’ responses. 
Figure 4.5 (below) shows that some vendors’ networks developed 
around the hierarchy laid out in Figure 4.4. I categorise these connections 
as “ascribed” ones and “made” ones. Vendors with ascribed connections 
are those who had powerful connections prior to their acquisition of 
stands in the night market. In comparison, the made connections are ties 
strengthened between vendors and powerful people after the former 
obtained stands in the market. These two types of network extended to 
include not only vendors, but also residents, local influential people, and 
even local hooligans. The connections are made through kinship ties, 
claimed brotherhood, master-disciple ties, and landlord-tenant ties and so 
on. Besides, being connected to those with powerful connections can be 
advantageous as well. Furthermore, vendors were not only nodes in such 
guanxi network; they also tended to postulate each other as being more or 
less embedded in such patronage. We can imagine that vendors in the 
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market are connected vertically to powerful people and horizontally to 
each other through more egalitarian ties such as business partners, 
neighbours or competitors.  
At best, the linkages reaching from night market vendors to officials, 
and the stakeholders of the road projects, have two levels above vendors. 
For example, Pebble Zhang’s brother-in-law, Little Lee, was a disciple of 
General Manager Wang, head of the realty management company.49 Han’s 
brother-in-law, Brother Hua, had wide connections with many 
construction contractors of government-led projects; Brother Hua himself 
was a local “ghost” and he was further connected to the legendary “ghost” 
Brother Bright. Though the two vendors (Han and Pebble Zhang) were 
non-locals, their connections were considered strong because of the 
presence of the kinship. 
  
                                                          
49
 According to Fat Man and several other vendors, Little Lee was a thug of General Manger 
Wang who used force on migrant construction workers if they protested for their delayed 
salaries. According to Lee, he was involved in the building of the arcs of the night market as 
early as 2008. But he was put in prison for one year afterwards for unknown reasons. See 
chapter 3 for more of his stories. 
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Master Jin and Master Zhou’s connections to powerful people were 
mediated through their connecting to Brother Wu, who transferred his 
stand to Master Zhou and who was the nephew of the boss of the food 
market, another stakeholder in the road project. The four people swore 
brotherhood in a playful manner, addressing each other from Master Zhou 
as the Big brother, followed by Brother Ai as the second brother and  then 
Master Jin as the third and Brother Wu as the fourth. Han and Pebble 
Zhang joined this group later, and the six people used to play mah-jong 
and drink together. For the non-locals, the connections to locals helped, for 
example when Master Jin’s cart was confiscated by CALE, Brother Wu gave 
Master Jin a name card of a CALE staff member and asked Master Jin to 
ring the officer to retrieve the cart for no penalty. Of course, such 
connections are asymmetrical. It seemed to me that Master Jin and Master 
Zhou depended more on the circle than the other brothers depended on 
them. And the stakes of mah-jong prevented them from reaching more 
local circles. Brother Ai and Brother Wu sometimes invite Master Jin and 
Master Chow to play with other locals at a 2 yuan/tile stake, but the latter 
would rather play with Pebble Zhang and Han with a lower stake (1 yuan 
or 0.5 yuan / tile).  
Other patronage ties bridged only one level, such as the connections 
between the EMO office staff and several vendors including Fat Zhao, Thin 
Zhao and JR Cui. These vendors’ access to powerful people has economic 
benefits as can be readily judged by their premium or spacious places: 
they are hence known as “big households” (dahu). Conversely, those with 
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weaker connections or no connections were called “small households” 
(xiaohu). 
There are a number of ways in which vendors produce and 
consolidate their connections with powerful people. One of the crucial 
ingredients is gifts, or money in the form of gifts, and the money is often 
presented in disguise (for forms of gifts see discussion in chapter 2). For 
instance, purposefully losing money while gambling is said to be very 
common between project contractors and officials who hold discretionary 
power to subcontract government projects. Pebble Zhang often plays mah-
jong with General Manager Wang upon the invitation of Little Lee (his 
brother-in-law), and he always loses money.  
Another key ingredient is sentiment. As Kipnis (1997) notes, 
sentiment legitimises  connections. “Naked” instrumentality never works; 
it must be glossed over with sentiment. To the extent that the losing 
money was termed by Pebble Zhang as “filial piety” (xiaojing) to his 
brother-in-law’s patron, the spiritual kinship was introduced to this 
patronage. In addition, it follows that the more sentiment and less 
instrumentality is involved in guanxi, the more solid the relation appears 
to be. For instance, a young small commodities vendor, JR Cui, treated 
Director Zhang when he was looking for a position in the already crowded 
night market and presented the latter with a “red envelope” (enveloped 
money). Having secured a premium position, he continued to treat 
Director Zhang many more times to maintain their relationship so that the 
initial instrumentality became glazed with sentiment.  
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Compassion towards the weak was another form of sympathy 
sometimes expressed in these relationships. Mrs Lee ran a fried chicken 
stand with her husband and one of her legs was crippled. Her husband was 
over sixty. Out of sympathy for the husband’s old age and Mrs Lee’s 
disability, the EMO arranged a place for her for free and charged her less 
for the monthly sanitary fee. But the patronage by definition requires 
loyalty of the patronised. In exchange for the provision of favour by the 
EMO, Mrs Lee constantly expressed her gratitude to Director Zhang to 
others to build his good reputation.  
Banquets are seen as important occasions to construct guanxi 
efficiently (Osburg 2013, Kipnis 1997). An anecdote of my own experience 
is illustrative to show how banquets work. During my fieldwork, I built 
connections with EMO members so as to reduce unwanted suspicion from 
them. After I retrieved a draft document of the original plan of the night 
market from the Community office from Guang, the former head, with the 
help of Mr Strong, a subordinate of Director Zhang, I invited both Zhang 
and Mr Strong for a meal. Considering me as a poor “university student”, 
Director Zhang suggested a cheaper restaurant or a dinner at an outdoor 
restaurant. But I insisted on the restaurant Mr Strong mentioned earlier as 
I reckoned it as more formal and proper. They agreed. To my surprise, Mr 
Strong invited his mistress, and Director Zhang invited an escort who then 
invited her girlfriend, another escort, to the banquet. Thanks to the 
endless mutual toasts among us as well as skilful toasts from the two 
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escorts that enlivened our spirits, Director Zhang promised that I could 
rely on him in this region should any difficulty occur to me.  
However, my guests ordered more brand rice wine, the price of 
which was beyond my budget. I slipped out of the banquet room and told 
the hostess that I would fetch more money after the banquet, and she had 
better not tell it to my guests. I did so after the banquet. But when I was 
about to have a rest in my apartment I received many phone calls from one 
of the escorts, who coquettishly and persistently “invited” me to a karaoke 
bar. I realised that I was being treated as an ATM, but still I went. Later, 
when I shared my experience with JR Cui, he told me that the prices of the 
dishes in the banquet were set higher than elsewhere, and that the 
surcharges would be shared between the hostess and the EMO. In short, 
like purposefully losing at gambling, the banquet became an opportunity 
to give cash to my patrons, though I did not initially want to do so.  
The banquet and the unwanted expenditure worked, though. Mr 
Strong, in his forties and two generations higher than director Zhang (they 
are far relatives), asked me to address him as Brother Strong. He also told 
me to refer to his name when I ring CALE for an appointment for an 
interview with its head. His name turned out to be a valid passport to 
CALE, much more effective than the official channels which had rejected 
me many times.  
As I have demonstrated, no matter how such relations are 
established—be they based on kinship, bribery, sympathy or business 
favour—these connections serve as conduits for the powerful to extract 
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resources. As Aafke Komter (2005) describes, gift exchange can exacerbate 
inequality as those at the bottom of the hierarchy rarely receive gifts. The 
“rule of reciprocity” tends to “disadvantage those who are already in the 
weakest social position” (Komter 2005). I have also observed that not 
everyone inclines to produce such guanxi, owning to the expenses that are 
involved in maintaining relations with powerful people. For instance, 
many vendors avoid interactions with EMO members once they have 
obtained their stands, so that the weight of sentiment does not grow. It 
follows that the guanxi network manifested here is less a kind of agency 
against the power than a manifestation of power relations, and vendors’ 
dependency on this institution denies genuine resistance against it, though 
a certain amount of discontent and complaints exist. According to my 
observation, compared to those with “ascribed” connections or the “big 
households”, the antagonism was stronger among those whose requests 
for premium places were denied because of the meagre size of their gifts.  
Rumours and “path-like” messages 
Along with gifts, information also flows through patronage ties. In 
this case orally transmitted information related to the relocation took the 
form of rumours and gossip. Rumours and gossip had it that the night 
market would definitely be relocated because of the Youth Olympics. Some 
others said that the relocation, even if carried out successfully, would not 
be effective in the long run because any policy of the government was 
perceived to be like pissing in the wind. It was also rumoured that the 
market would be relocated at the end of 2011, but then the date was said 
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to be after the Spring Festival of 2012, then in March, and finally in April. I 
even heard a rumour that I was affiliated with the provincial government 
and my research report was the real cause of the relocation.  
While rumours are “unsubstantiated information, true or untrue, 
that passes by word of mouth” (Stewart & Strathern2004), gossip “takes 
place mutually among people in networks or groups” (ibid.). I argue that 
such networks and groups involved the spread of rumours and gossip can 
be hierarchical. In the following I distinguish “insiders” from those with 
moderate connections and those with weaker or no connections to the 
powerful people. I then show how different types of rumours and gossip 
transmitted among vendors, and I argue that such transmission reflects 
the power relations embedded in the existing patronage network.  
The term for rumours and gossip in Chinese is “small path messages” 
(xiaodao xiaoxi). Such messages are opposed to official announcements. 
The term implies that people who are not on the right path will not get the 
message and so it is important to have access to the right paths for 
information. If the scale of transmission is bigger, then it is called “avenue-
like message” (dalu xiaoxi), which refers to well-known yet unverified 
news, for example the news that the Youth Olympics is the cause of the 
relocation. If the information is from the decision-making agency and is 
too esoteric to be known to others, it is called “insider news” (neibu xiaoxi); 
and a piece of insider news can become hearsay or path-like message if it 
is heard inadvertently by a third person and proceeds to a wider circuit. 
The last type of rumour or gossip includes smear, slander or vilification of 
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others. All of these path-like messages constitute the communicative space 
of vendors. Building upon the patronage network I have outlined, I show 
how the details of the new project seemed to have permeated down 
through the gradient of power relations, starting from bureaucratic 
decision-making bodies and personnel, to those who have connections 
with them in the night market, and finally to ordinary, anxious vendors 
who in turn develop more reliance on their patrons. 
Among the vendors, Pebble Zhang and Han were the ones with 
ascribed connections and were also the earliest non-local vendors to know 
the details of the cause of the relocation and most importantly, who was in 
charge. Pebble Zhang knew it from his brother-in-law, the disciple of 
Manger Wang. Han knew it from his brother-in-law, who befriended many 
local construction contractors and Brother Bright, the stakeholder. The 
news was spread and pooled within a small circle of the six people, the 
boundary of which overlapped by the membership of the mah-jong game. 
But Han wasn’t worried about the relocation even when his wife urged 
him to have their brother-in-law talk to Director Zhang. The wife was 
refuted by Han as ignorant, because Zhang would not be the right person 
to be connected to acquire a premium place. In fact, with the help of his 
brother-in-law, Han managed to get a premium place six months after the 
relocation. Pebble Zhang had another plan. While he was pessimistic for 
the business in the new site, he settled on indoor shops of a nearby 
commercial residence community which was developed by Brother Wu’s 
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uncle, and he encouraged Master Jin and Zhou to pool money to rent shops 
for future speculation.  
 To be connected to the people who are connected to powerful 
people, or connections by a second order, does not guarantee more 
benefits unless one takes action in advance. Master Jin and Master Zhou, 
for example, did not have much capital to invest in the indoor shops but 
still took action. Master Jin managed to sublet half an indoor breakfast 
shop in the old street, hoping that he could continue his business 
immediately after the relocation. He even had his brand-new sign set up in 
May. But his sublet contract was overturned by the landlord, another 
powerful patron in this area. Han voluntarily mediated the issue, thinking 
highly of himself as somebody on par with the patron. But the mediation 
turned out to be unsuccessful, and Master Jin had to unload the brand-new 
shop sign and abandon his plan. Master Zhou handed over his stand to his 
brother-in-law and left for Beijing, seeking business opportunities there. 
He returned two months after the relocation, because everything was even 
harder in Beijing. It is worth noting that the “insiders” involved only a few 
vendors, and the news they shared did not reach other vendors. To some 
extent their circle is closed to others.  
Of many other vendors with “made” connections to the EMO office, 
some were vigilant to take measures. Their reliance on patronage ties was 
less than people like Master Jin. Patronage should not be understood as 
static or unchanging. Niobe Thompson has discussed how patrons “seal off” 
their defensive territories by excluding competitors or foreigners so that it 
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is possible to maintain monopoly positions (Thompson 2009, 100-102). 
Conversely, there are always other choices available outside of a given 
territory, which allows some freedom for the patronised(Mintz and Bois 
2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002)(Mintz and Bois 
2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002)(Mintz and Bois 
2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002)(Mintz and Bois 2002) (ibid.). For instance, 
having known from EMO that the market would possibly be relocated, JR 
Cui searched out the place and estimated the customer base around the 
new market by consulting security guards nearby residential communities. 
He also reasoned that Director Zhang might give up resistance to the 
relocation, because the latter had other businesses in Community A. In 
other word, JR Cui saw Director Zhang less as an absolute patron than as a 
broker in multi-layered local politics. Indeed, it turned out that Director 
Zhang managed to extend his power in the new market through his 
brother-in-law in the new office and his godson Yang, who then 
monopolised the beer business after the relocation (for details see chapter 
3). Another example was Zhu the Second, an ex-village head. He planned to 
find an indoor place somewhere else to continue his business. He reasoned 
that the political performance of CALE and the district government 
mattered more than the Youth Olympics, because the night market was 
close to the district government and therefore very visible to superior 
government officials if they came to inspect the region. Thin Zhao, another 
outdoor restaurant boss, did not know much of the powers in contests at 
community, sub-district or district levels, nor did he have any interest in 
them. What he was interested in was who would take charge in the new 
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market so that he could obtain a premium position without paying the 
“red envelope” twice. The three cases show how wider webs of connection 
and thus more knowledge enable vendors to escape the traps.  
However, a lot more vendors either ignored signs that foretold the 
change of power or had a wishful belief in the endurance of existing 
patronage ties; they spread rumours that the market would not be 
relocated. When Lin, the disciple of General Wang, carried out the 
registration and took pictures of vendors, most vendors were 
unenthusiastic, despite the fact that some vendors already knew the new 
site was under construction. According to Old Shi,  
This market won’t be relocated unless they finish the project. If 
they haven’t finished it, the night market cannot be relocated. I 
don’t know when. They did not say about it. And no one asked 
about it. [Why you didn’t ask?] Who knows their plan exactly? 
No one asked, neither did I. According to my knowledge, this 
market had been closed down twice, but it is still here.  
These vendors passivity can be explained by two reasons. First, the 
two contesting fractions in EMO withheld information. Stewart and 
Strathern propose that gossip can be manipulated by the powerful (2004). 
Drawing upon Thompson’s theory of the “sealing off” technique adopted 
by patrons (2009), I suggest that the manipulation derives from a need of 
patrons to compete for their clients. A few vendors asked why Lin took 
photos of them, and the latter replied simply that it was good for them 
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without telling the vendors the time and procedure of relocation as well as 
the short-term use of the “idle land”. In the meantime, Director Zhang and 
his fellows disseminated the news that the new site was quite dangerous, 
because there were high voltage lines hanging above the site which might 
cause casualties when it rained.  
Second, the signs of relocation were taken as another false alarm, 
because attempts by government had failed twice, once in 2008 (see 
chapter 2) and another in 2011. Therefore, there was a blind hope that the 
EMO wouldn’t let the night market go.  Even if the relocation took place, 
these vendors said the EMO should “take care” of them because the EMO 
had charged them monthly fees for several years. Such rumours reflected 
the dependency of vendors on the EMO.  
Some participants of the 2011 protest ironically felt indebted to the 
government. They tended to see the prolonged life of the night market less 
as a result of their own resistance than as a favour given by the 
government. Their feelings of anxiety and hope damped rebellious spirits. 
Mr Chang, a fruit vendor, claimed that the ordinary people would have the 
final say in the market relocation. “Even if one is beheaded, it's nothing but 
a scar as big as a bowl”, he quoted the famous heroic utterance usually said 
by those sentenced to death in knight-errant novels and communist 
propaganda literature, showing that he had no fear of repression. He then 
invited several vendors to his house for a consultation. But none of the 
vendors he invited showed up the next day.  
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In May 2012, the cement floor at the new market site was paved, the 
numbers painted in each place and the facilities and toilet installed, 
indicating that the relocation was inevitable. At this point scapegoating 
and scandal emerged, targeting at “the other” vendors, the outsider, the 
single woman and the “big household” with made connections. Mr Du, a 
bookseller, blamed the outdoor restaurant bosses for the relocation 
because they polluted the environment, calling for strict regulation from 
the government. I also became a threat to the already alerted EMO. I heard 
from JR Cui that Brother Strong told him that I was actually affiliated with 
provincial government, and my research report was the cause of the 
relocation. No wonder that when I interviewed a non-local vendor that I 
knew for the first time, I was warned by the latter that there were “hidden 
dragons and crouching tigers” in “the mass”, so I better not do something 
against their interests.  
Women could be scandalised during their participation in the 
patronage process. In the karaoke bar, when I was half-drunk and lying on 
the sofa, I overheard that Director Zhang promise the escort that he would 
grant a place for her husband if she treated him “nicely”. JR Cui told me 
that his neighbour, Mr Chicken Leg (a vendor who fried chicken legs and 
thighs), had a good-looking wife who had affairs with a member from the 
EMO. Therefore, Mr Chicken Leg put on a mouth mask, excusing himself by 
saying that he had rhinitis and thereby sending a sign of “no comment”. 
After the relocation, Ms Snow, a single, good-looking woman, set up a 
stand selling cigarettes and beverage, and was also believed to have affairs 
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with the staff of the new office. Regardless of the genuineness of these 
scandals, they reflect a common anxiety of men in the lower stratum of 
society where both wealth and women were monopolised by the powerful 
people. 
Stewart and Strathern (2004, 198) write,  
In all of these contexts, again, it is in the interpretations of 
situations and events that people most influenced outcomes. 
Rumour and gossip are prime vehicles of interpretation. It is 
not at all that they simply pass on news. Rather, they give it 
narrative shape and meaning, stimulating action. It is this, 
rather than the question of whether the rumour exactly 
reproduces “facts,” that gives rumour and gossip their power. 
Rumours define and create worlds just as much as “facts” do. 
They constitute realities pro tempore, until they are themselves 
superseded.  
I suggest that rumours and gossip not only “constitute realities pro 
tempore” but also stimulate action. For example, a few vendors gossiped 
that Thin Zhao, a “big household”, had already given tens of thousands of 
yuan to the EMO to secure the best position at the new site. I asked the 
gossipers whether Thin Zhao’s action was fair play. The wife of his 
neighbour’s stand, who was investigating the new site under torch light 
after her work, told me that “it is because you don’t have such capability”, 
meaning she would do the same as Thin Zhao if she had the money and 
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good connections with the EMO or the right person. Another vendor drew 
an analogy to show that one can earn money regardless of means: suppose 
there was a big fish in the pond, then who catches the fish will be the hero 
and the rest would suffer.  
Patronage as legitimised by violence 
The schemata of patronage internalised by vendors was also 
projected onto other social relationships at the peak time of the relocation. 
I suggest that violence was an indispensable, or even a defining feature of 
the patronage schemata. Since “might makes right”, the mightier become 
legitimate patrons. The logic manifests when vendors commented on the 
conflict between CALE and some local fruit vendors during the forceful 
relocation.   
In April, EMO increased the rent collected from vendors arbitrarily 
by 30%, which was a strong signal to all the vendors that the market 
would be relocated. According to a vendor, the EMO wanted to harvest the 
last batch of crops before rain. On June 5th, a notice of the closing night 
market from CALE finally arrived at the night market. According to the 
notice, all of the vendors had to draw a lot for their places in the new site 
on June 8th and 9th. Some vendors saw the decision as capricious and 
interpreted it as another inspection by the upper level of government, 
expecting that the night market would finally return to the original place 
afterwards. They could also stealthily go back to the original site at night 
time and “fight like a guerrilla” (dayouji) when the CALE was not on duty. 
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By so doing other vendors may follow suit and the night market would 
reappear in the original place in the long run.  
A touchstone of all the future possibilities was a few local fruit 
vendors backed by EMO and community A. On June 11th, an open 
resistance took place between the relocated community on one hand, and 
CALE, public security and armed police on the other. Two days before, 
vendors had already drawn the lot for their location on 8th June, but most 
of them adopted a wait-and-see attitude and did not start their businesses 
at once. Many of them became the audience of the resistance.  
 
Figure 4.6: Demolition of the last fruit stand. 
Left: in the afternoon, many vendors crowded around a few local fruit stands 
which were surrounded by CALE, and the night market had already been 
blocked from the main road by an iron plate wall.  Right: Escorted by armed 
police, CALE tears down the last fruit stand at midnight.     
In the sultry afternoon of June 11th, red banners with white 
inscriptions reading “stalls in the night market will be relocated to place 
xxx on 12th June” were hanging up along the No. 2 Road. A series of tin 
plates had already been erected to block the long sidewalk from the main 
street so that vendors could not continue businesses in place. It was only 
several hours before the deadline of relocation announced by CALE, but 
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there were still three fruit stalls. They were encircled by CALE staff and 
surrounded by vendors sitting on the stages in front of indoor shops and 
many passers-by (Figure 4.6, left).  
The whole scenario was a drama, and various tactics were deployed 
by the two contending parties, Community A and CALE. In the beginning, 
CALE found an elder had set up his stand to sell sleeping sheets. It was 
very likely to be an improvisation plotted by Community A, because the 
old man had never run a business in the night market. When he was 
implored to go home by a CALE senior staff, he asked the latter to pity his 
hard life which was caused by the resettlement years ago. His speech 
seemed to win the sympathy of many spectators including many local 
residents. The CALE senior official then rang the head of the sub-district 
government. Pressed by the head of the sub-district over the phone, the 
elder rolled up his sheets and left.  
Then CALE tightened the encirclement, and pressed onto the three 
fruit stands to prevent them from running their businesses. Time whittled 
away people’s composure, and a wife of a vendor sprinkled some water 
onto the fruits, spilling as if carelessly over a young CALE staff member. 
The latter got angry, but a senior officer stopped him from arguing with 
the wife. In the meantime, all of the scenarios were videotaped by CALE in 
order to vindicate that they “enforce the law in a civilised way” (wenming 
zhifa).  
Later, many policemen of public security arrived, blocking a segment 
of No.2 road with two police cars. A van full of armed police with helmets 
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and glass shields also arrived, pulling over on the other side of the road. 
Two fruit vendors were then convinced to go home by a Community 
worker (who was said to be Director Zhang’s brother-in-law). They loaded 
their fruits onto their own trucks, leaving only the last fruit stand run by 
the local hooligan “Big Wave”.  
Spectator vendors derogated the contests between the fruit vendors 
and the police as “a big dog fucking a small dog”. Dogs are looked down 
upon by ordinary Chinese for their servitude towards their rich masters 
and snobbishness towards the poor. The CALE in the eyes of several 
vendors was thus rendered as a dog of the Communist Party. Big Wave 
was another dog but a smaller one. According to a local fruit vendor, Big 
Wave recently beat a woman customer when the latter argued with him on 
his fraudulent scaling of fruits. I also know that two years ago, he 
forcefully took the place of a few non-locals’ fruit stands. But many 
vendors placed their last hope on his foolhardiness and bravery.  
Big Wave walked around his stand restlessly, using crass words, and 
none of the CALE policemen dared to approach him. His mother joined him, 
seated herself squarely in a rattan chair, condemning all CALEs and 
policemen as Kuomintang50 members who were said to rob ordinary 
people’s assets as they wished. Still, all the scenes were recorded by CALE. 
Later, another local hooligan arrived, and he was identified by several 
vendors as a more powerful hooligan. With his black purse under his 
armpit (which is a characteristic of hooligans), he strutted along the 
                                                          
50
 The Chinese Nationalist Party had dominated China prior to 1949 but withdrew to 
Taiwan after China’s civil war from 1945-49. 
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stands and cursed loudly, giving moral support to Big Wave. An officer of 
the public security then rang another hooligan to implore the former to 
“go home”.  
Fat Zhao was among the audience, and he whispered to me that the 
confrontation had yet to end, because Brother Bright had not shown up. 
According to Fat Zhao, whether Brother Bright took sides with the Public 
Security or with the relocated Community would be decisive to the fate of 
the night market. In other words, he believed that the contending forces on 
the street were merely a veneer of “real” politics; they were only pawns 
used by even more powerful people. 
Unfortunately for him, Big Wave was ruthlessly pressed down by 
CALE. It was late at night when the site became less crowded. The 
neighbourhood was dark except for the light bulb of the fruit stand, 
flashing lights of police cars and reflections from the helmets of a phalanx 
of armed policemen. Many outdoor restaurant bosses had already started 
their businesses at the new market and returned home at that time. They 
pulled over their trikes, observing from far away. Then, in a sudden burst, 
a few locals (perhaps Big Wave’s relatives) began to fight with CALE staff 
and policemen. They tussled and tackled each other and formed a crowd. A 
scream by a woman came out of the crowd because CALE grabbed her 
mobile phone when she tried to videotape everything. “CALE are beating 
citizens!” cried the remaining local people, and they quickly flocked 
towards the ring. In an instant, several men were handcuffed by the public 
security, and CALE responded swiftly by establishing a police guide line, 
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warning away the crowd with a loudspeaker. A dozen CALE officers joined 
hands, circling the last fruit stand, while other CALE staff removed the 
fruits onto a truck and then collectively tore down Big Wave’s canopies. A 
truck drove onto the scene in time, carrying away the torn down canopies 
and rubbish.   
Several days after, these torn canopy canvases and the bent iron 
tubes were dumped by CALE to a corner of the new night market. Mr Big 
Wave moved to the new market. He still took a premium position. But he 
put on a cap that covered his macho hairstyle as if a frustrated dog had its 
tail tucked between its legs. At that time, about two thirds of the vendors 
had already moved to the new site. 
To sum up, rumours and gossip that concerned the relocation took 
various forms before the relocation. We can see that “insider news”, “path-
like message”, “avenue-like message” and scandals have different scales 
and contents. Furthermore, they were the products of the patronage 
network. While those with connections with the stakeholders of the new 
project gossiped within their small circles and took action earlier, the 
majority of the vendors in the night market were kept uninformed of the 
relocation policy by the contending patrons. Among them, some vendors 
with “made” connections to the EMO office, if resourceful and reflexive 
enough, were able to advance their own interests by leaving the night 
market as early as possible. In contrast, many more vendors were trapped 
by patronage ties, looking away from the signs of the relocation because 
there was something that they didn't wish to lose. The rumours and gossip 
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circulated among them did not form much solidarity against the relocation 
scheme but rather reinforced their hope upon the continuation of the 
existing patronage, even though the power of their patron, the EMO of the 
community, had already been compromised.  
Compliance, Imitation, and Resistance  
In a critique of Scott’s (1985) everyday resistance developed from 
Southeast Asian contexts, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) argue that 
individuals can be simultaneously positioned as powerful and powerless 
within complex systems. Scott (1985, 6) himself has also acknowledged 
that the peasantry “has no monopoly on these weapons [of the weak], as 
anyone who has observed officials and landlords resisting and disrupting 
state policies which are to their disadvantage can easily attest”. Kerkvliet 
(2009) suggests that focusing on everyday resistance elides other forms of 
politics in peasant societies. By politics he refers to Lasswell’s  definition 
(1958), politics being the process of resource distribution that specifies 
who get what, when and how. According to Kerkvliet’s typologies, politics 
in peasant societies covers a wide range of forms from support, 
compliance, modifications and resistance (table 4.1). Compliance is the 
maintenance of the relationship, for instance, between landowners and 
tenants or between ordinary people and government authorities, and the 
modifications lie between resistance and compliance, conveying 
“indifference to the rules and processes” and they are “typically things 
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people do while trying to 'cut corners' so as to get by”. Modifications51 
sometimes were carried out at the cost of other vulnerable people in the 
same boat (Kerkvliet 2009).  
Table 4.1 Kerkvliet’s typology of everyday politics  
  Support Compliance Modification Resistance 
In
ten
tio
n
al 
Endorse authority’s 
expectation 
support    
Within the line of 
authority 
 compliance   
Indifference or 
apathy to rules and 
authority 
  modification  
Against authority 
but taking disguised 
forms 
   
everyday 
resistance 
C
o
n
seq
u
en
tial 
Against authority’s 
interests 
  
modifications 
by cutting 
corners 
 
Against interests of 
the people in the 
same boat 
  
modifications 
on basis of 
distrust 
 
  
Kerkvliet’s expansion of everyday resistance to everyday politics and his typology is 
based more on intention than on consequences.  I fit Scott’s everyday resistance to his 
typology, and distinguish two types of modifications according to their consequences. 
The cells with grey colour indicate possible categorisation of vendors’ behaviours. 
They could be everyday resistance, since they were intentionally opposed to the 
                                                          
51
 Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson (2013), however, argue that the modification or 
‘cutting corners’ are resistance because they run against the interest of the powerful people. 
Vinthagen & Johansson and Kerkvliet thus seem to differ with regard to the definition of 
resistance by intention or by consequences. But it seems to me that this redefinition of 
compliance pulls back to the dichotomy of domination and resistance, thereby reducing the 
complexity of real lives. 
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relocation. They could also be modifications since each was trying to maximise his 
gains regardless of other vendors’ interests.  
I suggest that although the notions of compliance and modification 
are developed from peasant societies, they nevertheless shed light on the 
behaviours of vendors in the course of the relocation in 2012. Who among 
the vendors complied and who resisted?  
Before the government’s decision was announced, I observed that 
while the “insiders” aligned themselves to the powerful people, the 
marginalised people blindly placed hopes on the continuation of patronage 
ties to people who were no longer powerful. Therefore, both groups 
complied with the relationship.  
After the government’s decision was announced, almost all the 
vendors participated in drawing lots. However, after the relocation, not all 
the vendors moved to the new site. Only those who moved to the new site 
complied with the new policy. The difference can be explained by the fact 
that the government’s order was implemented in two steps. The first step 
was the forceful relocation and the lot drawing procedure. Even though 
vendors expected business losses, they attended the meeting in the hope 
that they could obtain the best places by luck. This measure by 
government indeed saved a few vendors from their previous precarious 
situations. For instance, Vision Barbeque had been forced out of the old 
market because of extortion by his greedy landlord. He was grateful for the 
new government decision because his condition would be bettered 
regardless of which place he could obtain.  
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The second measure was the exemption of rents for six months 
before the new office signed contracts with vendors in December, 2012. 
The measure reflected a new relationship between vendors and the new 
stakeholders. While new market stakeholders, namely the sub-district 
government and the PMC, took direct control of the night market, turning 
it to their own tax base, they were unable to stop vendors leaving the 
market. Instead, they had to face reality: one third of vendors left the new 
market after the relocation, and the remaining two thirds had their 
incomes dropped by 70% for small commodity vendors and by 20% - 60% 
for outdoor restaurant bosses in the first month. Should they collect the 
rents, the remaining vendors would definitely leave the market or protest 
against them. To offset the low morale of vendors, in the first few days, the 
CALE, PMC staff and public security policemen consumed at the outdoor 
restaurant stands, and each person used a 50 yuan coupon from the PMC 
to encourage vendors to stay in place (Thin Zhao made a record amount 
the first night). Later, the new office did not charge vendors a lump sum 
deposit as initially planned, but waived the rents for two months, which 
then extended to six months until the market prospered again. This 
measure more or less prevented some vendors from leaving. Nonetheless, 
while these measures were made on the grounds of market principles, we 
should not dismiss the fact that the government forcefully delineated the 
space of the night market—vendors were not allowed to go back to the 
original site. Thus, vendors’ compliance discussed here was induced by 
both the market principles and government’s coercion.   
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When it comes to the time immediately after the government 
announced its decision, a closer examination reveals that there was a 
mode of compliance which was not made with the patrons but with the 
more powerful vendors, who were believed to have close ties with even 
more powerful people. This “imitation” strategy was adopted by some 
marginalised vendors, who settled on two groups of people to calibrate 
their own actions. One group was some “big households”; the other was 
vendors from the local community. Fat Man told me that he would do 
whatever Pebble Zhang does during the relocation, even though Pebble 
Zhang was his business enemy because the latter had taken Fat Man’s 
premium position. By the same token, Thin Zhao’s neighbours followed 
whatever Thin Zhao did. Thin Zhao was the first outdoor restaurant boss 
to start his business in the new market, who sold 90 fish dishes the first 
night because he was the only food vendor there. His legend spread 
quickly and other outdoor restaurant bosses followed suit. In both cases, 
the imitators’ theory was that the “big households” possess stronger 
connections, and such strong connections can ensure access to “insider 
news” which leads to prompt, reasonable actions. In addition, it is better to 
observe what “big households” do rather than what they say, because they 
normally would not disclose their secrets to outsiders.  
There was also open resistance by some vendors who were allocated 
disadvantageous places owing to the new measures by the government 
and the PMC. Their marginalisation was because of authority’s ignorance 
of the “local knowledge” of the market. According to the design, the blocks 
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of the barbecue stands and quick food section were located at the far end 
of the new market (see Figure 4.3). Had barbeque stands mixed with 
outdoor restaurants as in the previous market, their businesses could have 
been bettered, because customers prefer to order different kinds of food 
from adjacent stands. On the other hand, having stands of same kind 
cluster together would only exacerbate fierce competition among vendors. 
Just as Scott has suggested (Scott 1999), the neat design of the new market 
made it easier to manage, but the local knowledge and experience was 
brushed aside. On an August midnight, when a typhoon struck Nanjing, I 
saw a few quick food stalls in the last row were still lit, while lightening 
was tearing open the dark sky and the torrential rain was drumming on 
their canopies.  
A few days before the typhoon, Old Wang and several other barbecue 
vendors staged another open resistance, because their daily incomes 
plummeted. The mobilisation was easy because those vendors were 
already desperate. For instance, Sister Sun had only made twenty yuan the 
night before. These vendors pulled their barbeque equipment to the open 
place of the new market, intentionally breaking the management rules in 
order to meet the person in charge. Director Zhu arrived at the scene and 
promised a negotiation on a coming Sunday morning. However, he did not 
show up. He was said to be attending a meeting held by the district 
government to draw a lot for apartments assigned only to government 
staff. 
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The rest of the vendors’ spirits were initially enlivened by Thin 
Zhao’s new record. However, they soon realised that revenues were 
decreasing. Some vendors even began to fight with each other. For 
instance, both Mrs Lee and another vendor moved their carts to the mouth 
of the night market and fought for that place, and they resorted to an office 
guard for arbitration. A barbeque vendor secretly moved his stand closer 
to the first row of the planned zone for outdoor restaurants, and he was 
reported to the new office by another indignant vendor. A local barbeque 
vendor smashed his neighbour’s fridge screen, because the fridge of the 
latter blocked the view of his potential customers. Little Yin, whose new 
stand was at the far end of the new market, placed a basket of oysters to 
claim a empty stall next to Old Feng, who also intended to use that space. 
Old Feng’s son pushed the basket out of the canopy shade, and the oysters 
died very soon under the sun. Little Yin took this chance to claim 
unreasonable compensation, unless his neighbour made space for him. 
When indignant Old Feng and his wife consulted me, they even had the 
thought of using blood money to take revenge on Yin, who used to be their 
good neighbour. On the whole, these cases show that the overall drop of 
customer flow in the new market had created an air charged with 
commotion and tension as a new, arbitrarily made neighbourhood 
replaced that of the previous night market. It remained to be seen whether 
these individuals would seek new patrons or form new connections to 
protect their interests in the long run. 
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To sum up, vendors adopted various tactics in response to the 
government’s decision. They complied with the government’s decision 
partly because the contents were favourable for them, and partly because 
the decision had a coercive element that limited their choices. There were 
also competition among them when the overall resources were reduced by 
the relocation. A few vendors openly protested the new policy because 
they were marginalised by both the relocation and the poor design, owing 
to authority’s ignorance of their lived business experiences.  
Given the indeterminacy of local politics caused by the competition 
among patrons, some marginalised vendors were able to cope without 
knowing too much about the underlying force. They held a wait-and-see 
attitude and imitated the behaviour of those who were more advantageous 
in the patronage network. Such strategy reflects a risk-averse propensity 
developed through experience in Society. 
Conclusion 
So far I have discussed the two attempts to relocate the night market 
by local government and vendors’ responses to these attempts. The two 
attempts produced different outcomes, one leading to an open resistance 
and the other to partial compliance.  
Counterintuitively, these two responses are not completely 
incompatible. From an individual vendor’s perspective, resistance and 
compliance are both crucial to ensure livelihood in the urban context. 
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Resistance ensures survival in the local setting against inimical grassroots 
politics while compliance with patrons ensures both survival and profit.  
To connect to a patron is an easier way to advance one’s own 
interests, particularly when the premium resources are controlled by a 
few powerful people such as officials in the EMO office or the new 
stakeholders of the market. Nonetheless, patronage networks are also 
unequal because they extract resources from vendors. Such patronage 
networks are driven by principles of asymmetrical gift exchange and 
glossed by sentiments. However, the patronage networks are fragmented. 
Patrons also use violence to contest resources, for example, during the 
confrontation between the EMO and CALE in the 2012 market relocation. 
This adds a layer of complexity and indeterminacy to the environs of 
vendors.  
Resistance, on the other hand, takes place when people are affected 
by both an unfavourable government decision and by a lack of patronage 
ties. In 2011, the protestors were vendors from the illegal night market 
extension and who had less connections with EMO. In 2012, the barbecue 
vendors who protested were those who were marginalised by the 
relocation decision and the poor design. In contrast, there was rarely 
resistance against the government’s decision in 2012; rather, a willingness 
to continue the patronage was obvious. However, political marginalisation 
and absence of powerful connections do not necessarily lead to successful 
protest. As I have shown in the case in 2011, open resistance requires 
skilful mobilisation of resources and cultural tools to achieve its goals in 
186 
 
an authoritarian context. Vendors’ identity as marginalised businessmen 
with rural background makes their mode of protest distinct in 
contemporary China’s contentious politics. 
Apart from collective resistance and compliance to patronage, there 
were other minor but equally important types of practice that ensured 
survival or profit. Those include imitation and forging connections in a 
wider commercial world.  
Last but not least, through the analysis of the two attempts of the 
government to regulate, remove or control the night market, I show how 
the urban government managed to take the tax base of the market from 
the relocated community. While the case bears striking semblance to the 
Wenzhou migrants in Beijing in that the clientelist ties are superseded by 
the state (Zhang 2001), I have two further observations. First, the new way 
of governing adopts coercion and market principles to regulate migrant 
vendors. Second, the open resistance in 2011 did improve the conditions 
of vendors, even though its achievement seems less recognised by vendors 
themselves.   
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Chapter 5 
Masculinities among men 
 
In previous chapters I have laid out migrant vendors’ networks and 
the ways they build their networks in response to external life pressures 
such as harassment by local hooligans or local government’s decision to 
relocate the night market. But the vendors also establish relationships 
with each other and with their wives and these also affect their business 
and personhood.  As I focus on male vendors in this thesis (partly due to a 
strong gender segregation in their lives), I will examine manhood in the 
following two chapters by examining how the migrant vendor men relate 
to each other and to the other gender, with an emphasis on how men 
ritualise their masculinities.  
This chapter will focus on men’s relations with each other and the 
masculinities (in plural) manifested in such relations in a wider context of 
contemporary urbanising China. To avoid essentialising such masculinities, 
I embrace the notion that masculinities are situated in and must be 
analysed in social relations (Connell 2005). To illustrate, I pick several 
settings including street fighting, drinking and other everyday activities in 
which men engage each other. It is from these activities an array of 
masculinities are imagined, practiced and weaved into lived experiences. 
188 
 
Inasmuch as the masculinities are not from a tabula rasa, I will go on 
situate them in contemporary migration and urbanisation.  
The scope of research in this chapter is largely limited to men, 
although the practices of women are of equal importance. Admittedly, 
masculinity has to be understood in relation to another sex or gender and 
is not inextricably tied to biological sex (Connell 2005). Furthermore, 
masculinities are further articulated in production processes (for example, 
labour market) or in relations to the state and to other institutions 
(Connell 2005). However, I focus solely on men’s connections in this 
chapter and set aside their relations to the state and to women to other 
chapters (Chapter 4 and 6 respectively). Connell’s theories of masculinity 
still apply as certain aspects of masculinity essentially involve power 
relations, domination and hierarchy which apply to both men and women. 
The questions I ask in this chapter are both theoretical and 
existential. Theoretically, I ask how to characterise masculinities and what 
are the underlying factors that inform such masculinities? Existentially, I 
was puzzled by the ways my “brothers” treat me and how they treat each 
other: men can be as close as family members but also as distinct as 
enemies. Why can they be nice to some but cruel to others?  How to situate 
such paradoxical relations in the so-called Rivers and Lakes society?  
Drawing on my ethnography of marketplace relations, I suggest that 
three dimensions of masculinity can be detected, namely bodily, discursive 
and relational. I try to situate such manhood as being cultivated from 
processes of urbanisation and socialisation, socialisation in Society.  
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Characterising masculinities 
The region of the night market is said to be “chaotic” (luan, 乱). 
Chaos not only refers to its noisiness and heavy traffic, and deteriorating 
environment, but also designates a feeling of insecurity because of the 
presence of street violence. Indeed, violence was common and sometimes 
severe when I was there. Whilst some informants, according to their past 
travel experience, consider this region much safer than newly bourgeoned 
county and town centres elsewhere in China, and while the number of 
fierce street crimes has gone down in recent years, violence is still 
rampant, carried out by local gangs, street toughs and even among 
vendors. 
Instances of conflict reveal much about the local Society. They are 
occasions where values are tested and where norms are generated. In the 
following, I introduce a violent altercation between a customer named Liu 
and an outdoor restaurant boss named Little Yin. It also involved many 
other vendors who acted as onlookers, moral supporters, physical 
supporters or judges. Noticeably, though the conflict took place between 
customer and a boss, it did not fall completely into the relation between a 
service provider and recipient on a contract basis as one would commonly 
assume; rather, they used a language of brotherhood, respect and 
disrespect reflective of a certain view of Society.  
The customer Liu was a conductor on the trains shuttling from 
Xuzhou to Nanjing, and was an old customer to Han. Whenever the train 
would stop in Nanjing, he would always have a banquet with his brothers 
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(who were, more properly, his colleagues), so he got to know Han for a 
couple of years to the point where he called him “Brother”. Little Yin was 
another outdoor restaurant boss, who also brothered Han, but their 
relationship seemed closer.  
One night, I was playing chess with Master Zhou and Master Jin 
(outdoor restaurant bosses) who happened to have a day off. They were 
accompanied by a local man called Brother Ai. They had already consumed 
some beer, and were in the mood to have a second round when a quarrel 
was heard from Han’s stand five metres away, and an air of hostility 
seemed  about to explode. It was Liu and Little Yin. When I approached, 
Little Yin was breathing heavily, his breath smelt of alcohol, and Han and 
his wife Rui tried to pull them apart. Yin threatened Liu: 
Stay here; do not leave, if you have the balls. If I don’t chop you 
tonight, I won’t have the face to get by in this street anymore.  
Liu was held back by another two vendors, arguing something, and 
he seemed unafraid of the threat. Han asked Little Yin to save his face, 
which I inferred was a veiled warning that they had better not make 
trouble in his stand. Close to the venue of dispute, other vendors did not 
intervene. Master Jin was sitting at a table at Pebble Zhang’s, watching the 
scenario callously, while Big Brother was intoxicated, waving his head as if 
seeing double. Upon hearing the threats, my curiosity drove me to 
approach the quarrel, and I tried to stop Liu by pushing him away in order 
to avoid serious harm. They finally separated, albeit only temporarily.  
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When Liu calmed down and sat down, Han and I managed to drag 
Little Yin out of the stand. Little Yin recounted the story to Brother Ai, the 
local who has his store across from Yin’s stand and who was standing 
nearby. According to Yin, he had just passed Han’s stand and saw Liu, upon 
which he toasted a cup of beer to Liu. However, Yin was turned down by 
Liu who threw his beer to the ground, an action which was a grave insult 
to Little Yin. Moreover, Liu apparently remarked that “You always will be 
beneath me!”  
“What does he mean by saying that I am always beneath him? 
Little Yin asked Brother Ai rhetorically, “His dick?” 
“Beat that pussy”, echoed Brother Ai, supporting Little Yin, and Yin 
left the scene to his own stand. 
I then went to Master Jin and asked Liu to join me, hoping to clarify 
Liu’s version of the event and hear from Master Jin. After an exchange of 
greetings, Liu learnt that Master Jin is about forty, so Liu changed the 
appellation to Uncle, and offered his explanation. According to Liu, he was 
Han’s old customer and he knew Brother Han very well. But recently he 
went to Little Yin’s stand to enjoy barbecue seafood. Several days ago, he 
invited two of his supervisors and several colleagues. When he paid the 
bill, he thought Little Yin charged him an extra 200 yuan on something he 
did not order, so he asked Little Yin to check the bill, but Little Yin rejected 
his complaint and stated that the money was correct. The dispute did not 
reach a conclusion, and Liu did not get the supposed surcharged money 
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back. He then decided that he would never go to Little Yin’s. That is why he 
rejected Yin’s toast intended for reconciliation at Han’s stand.  
Upon listening to Liu’s account, Master Jin suggested he not suffer 
from loss without making his argument explicit for appeasement or 
harmony; rather, he should make it clear before the audience, despite any 
unfavourable consequences that may occur to him. In Master Jin’s lexicon, 
“explicit loss is better than implicit loss” (ning chi mingkui, bu chi ankui). Liu 
agreed, and he toasted Master Jin and claimed that “if any misfortune 
occurs to you, then your nephew [Liu himself] would definitely be able to 
share your worries”. Brother Ai was also there, and upon hearing the 
dialogue between Master Jin and Little Yin, he frowned again to show his 
impatience, “That does it! We are all brothers, there is no need to fight!” and 
he left the site to drink elsewhere.  
However, Little Yin came back very soon, and people crowded into 
Han’s stand again. Their argument shifted back to the disputed 200 yuan. 
Liu set up his defence: since he earns more than 5,000 yuan a month, he 
would not have been motivated to eat without pay. “The Communist Party 
gives me only a small salary, but as I can earn 5,000 yuan a month, I don’t 
care about such a small amount of money.”  
Irritated, Little Yin exclaimed “Don’t you think that earning such a 
large amount of money makes you a dick (diao, 屌, literally penis, means 
think highly of oneself)? We are small bosses, but we are living on our own”, 
he continued to exaggerate the insult he had, “what do you mean by saying 
that I will be always be beneath you? I have been big brother and younger 
193 
 
brother [I’ve been both head and member of gang]; I still have more than ten 
brothers inside [the prison] and I send them money monthly, what do you 
mean by saying I am beneath you forever?”  
Little Yin also involved Han in his speech, stating that in order to 
save Han’s face, he would not chop Liu tonight if Liu would make an 
apology; otherwise, Little Yin would definitely use knife on Liu, since he 
could not “get by” in this region if his face was gone. In response, Liu 
argued that he would just withdraw, which was not a sign of weakness 
because he could also “mobilise one hundred staff from the railway work 
unit” to fight for him. He further implied that Little Yin had cheated him 
and was not trust-worthy.  
Then something dramatic took place before the audience: Little Yin 
raised a bottle of beer and struck his own head. “Bang!” the glass broke 
and down flew the yellowish liquid with white foam from his forehead. 
Little Yin’s wife and two outdoor restaurant bosses arrived at the scene in 
time, and having witnessed Yin’s self-mutilation, they were agitated, 
causing another round of pushing and hassling. Han dragged Liu away 
from his stand to the opposite side of the street, followed by Yin and his 
pals.  Han, another vendor and me tried to block them out from each other. 
Han shooed away the two young men, as did Little Yin to his wife.  
After another half an hour the fight came to its end. Han managed to 
have both parties seated at his stand with three bottles of beer placed 
before Han, Little Yin and Liu. Han asked Liu to fill the cup, toast Little Yin 
first, and apologise for insulting him. Then he ordered Little Yin to fill the 
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empty plastic cup for Liu, and they should drink the beers simultaneously 
and pledge that each one had no malicious intention towards each other. 
Whilst the resentment could be felt from both Yin and Liu, the two 
followed Han’s instruction. When it was Liu’s turn to fill the cup of Little 
Yin, he made sentimental expressions, stating that it would be the last 
banquet he had in this night market.  
“Brother Han, I didn’t tell you that we are leaving next Monday, 
and perhaps not coming back. You know our train guys are just 
like soldiers,52 ‘While the barracks are solid as iron, the soldiers 
are as fluid as water (Tieda de yingpan Liushui de bing, 铁打的
营盘流水的兵)’, and we may not see each other again,” he 
continued, turning to Little Yin, “I come from the North, you are 
also from the North (Xuzhou). Why do we leave our hometowns? 
It is only for a good fortune. I don’t want to argue with you 
anymore, for one knows himself better than anyone else. Let 
me toast you.” 
He drank the full cup in one go and thanked Han for his care during 
the past two years. He then left the table, and Little Yin did not stop him.  
                                                          
52
 Railway soldier was an arm of service in the People’s Liberation Army.  In 1983 some 148,000 
railway soldiers were disarmed and incorporated into the Ministry of Railways during the 
reduction of the size of the military. Such reduction continued to the 1990s and 2000s. In the 
meantime, a throng of military staff were transferred and assigned jobs as grassroots officials 
(for example staff of sub-districts), or became individual entrepreneurs while remaining in close 
contact with their former comrades-in-arms. The tough military lifestyle is thus diffused to the 
society, and is arguably contributing to the construction of masculinity. In my field, several 
vendors and grassroots officials have themselves served in the army, or have their family 
members who served in the army. For example, in another conflict, Little Yin called for his 
friends (also his countrymen) to the site, and his elder friends, now contractors and bosses, had 
served in the army. Nevertheless, since the cases are quite sporadic, military influence on 
masculinities is not my major concern.  
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What did the fight tell us? A thorough examination of its crescendo 
and decrescendo will reveal to us something more than the use of violence 
itself. The ways they quarrelled and performed in addressing the 
meddlesome issue illuminates three interrelated facets of masculinities: 
the discursive one, the bodily one and the relational one. Specifically, the 
discursive one defines proper expression in public; expression should be 
sentimental and sincere but not instrumental; the bodily one epitomises 
martial valour and encourages the use of force; and the relational one that 
seeks real or fictional alliance in time of crisis; this ethos also extends to 
everyday interactions among men. 
Discursive masculinity 
By discursive masculinity I mean public expressions that are 
considered manly in the eyes of society. Two subject matters, namely 
sincerity and face, were repeated in their quarrel. The discursive aspect of 
masculinity is not confined to the content of this specific event, but 
represents socially appropriate ways for a man to negotiate.  
As the case revealed, both parties strove to prove their own sincerity 
while reproaching each other as lacking such sincerity. Although the 
conflict was initially over money, both parties did not seek evidence so as 
to reach a practical solution; instead, they made great efforts to defend 
their honesty. Furthermore, the case ended with the recognition of the 
sincerity of both parties by a mediator. 
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It is noteworthy that such sincerity or honesty is associated with a 
sense of being generous and looking down upon money. In fact, even 
though Liu was reminded by Master Jin to make the case explicit, he 
instead stressed his capability for making money, a capability which 
justified his contempt of money.  
Throughout the event, many ways of expressing sincerity emerged. 
Apart from the nullification of money, sincerity was also recapitulated 
through sentimental speech and self-sacrifice by each party. Liu expressed 
sentimentality by using a melancholic overtone. Although moving from 
place to place is common for vendors and people in Society at large, 
departure is often an occasion for reinforcing existing ties by expressing 
lament. By emphasising that he would leave the night market and his 
brothers soon and won’t be back, Liu actually meant that he couldn’t have 
been fraudulent. In response to Liu’s speech, as if to show a greater extent 
of sincerity, Little Yin hit his head with the beer bottle. The meaning of the 
self-harm was that Little Yin was in no way pursuing monetary interests 
since he was even willing to harm to his own body.  
Meanwhile, and contrary to the expression of sincerity, their FACEs 
had to be safeguarded by putting each other down, and the contest over 
face was contingent to the use of violence.53 In other words, face discourse 
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 A contradiction lies in the tension between face and sincerity: combativeness and mateship 
co-exists. Nevertheless, I would only like to highlight the difference between them in this context. 
Having face or not is a zero-sum game between both parties. The direct consequence of losing 
face is one could not “get by” in this region if he was not able to beat his opponent. In this sense, 
vying for face contradicts the logic that underlies sincerity, for demonstration of sincerity could 
pave the way for compromise or repair of the relationship. The demand made by Han in settling 
the conflict illuminated this point: he requested both parties to state that they had no fraudulent 
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was essentially competition for status, and using force was the last option. 
Face discourse is masculine, because face was consistently paired with 
metaphors of genital organs—“having balls”, “being a dick”, “beating that 
pussy”, not “to be beneath him”. Furthermore, the competition was limited 
to men as Yin chided away his wife, because women were not supposed to 
get involved and their participation would only corrupt the valour which is 
considered exclusive to men.  
Apart from the face that was contested between Liu and Little Yin, 
there was another type of face. Han also quoted “face” when requesting 
that Liu and Yin stop fighting upon “looking at his face”. Why did the first 
type of face matter so much that it had to be defended by means of fist? 
Why did the second type of face function to dampen the anger?  
It is thus necessary to distinguish two Chinese terms mianzi (面子) 
and lian (脸), both of which are translated as face in English, but each 
carries quite different meanings54. Mianzi and lian by themselves mean 
surface and the physical front of one’s head, respectively. As discussed by 
Hu Hsien Chin (1944), while mianzi “stands for a reputation achieved 
through getting on in life, through success and ostentation, lian is “the 
respect of the group for a man with a good reputation” and it “represents 
the confidence of society in the integrity of ego’s moral character”. In his 
discussion of mianzi, favour and personal network, Zhai (1994) sees 
favour and personal network as derivative of mianzi. He defines mianzi as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
intentions towards each other, so the fight was able to be terminated. In another words, 
sincerity was forged by an external authority.  
54
 Note not all of Chinese dialects have division between lian and mian (such as in Fujian and 
Guangdong the dialects there do have word of lian). 
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the “public image of the self being formed through evaluations on 
attributes that matter to the self by relevant others” (Zhai 1994, 47). 
Andrew Kipnis (1995) further differentiates mianzi and lian in terms of 
orders of visibility. While lian is directly visible in social interaction,55 
mianzi, literally the surface of the lian, bears a second-order visibility. A 
person’s mianzi may not be directly apprehended. Rather, it is necessary 
to observe how other people look at the ego, so the mianzi interactions 
require at least three people or a third party. While Hu argued that lian is 
conceived of as being maintained or lost as a whole, Kipnis points out that 
mianzi can be more or less, large or small because it is “extendable 
through third parties not immediately present”.  
Such perspectives, both the all-or-none nature of lian and 
extendibility of mianzi, as well as their order of visibilities, shed light on 
the abovementioned talk of face. When Little Yin stated that he would lose 
“face” if he did not use force on Liu, he used lian. Little Yin’s lian, bearing 
the coupled meanings of business reputation and self-integrity, had to be 
safeguarded just because losing lian would disable his proper functioning 
both as a man and a businessman in this Y region. In comparison, Han 
prevented both parties from fighting by requesting them to “look at his 
mianzi.” As a response to Han, Yin stated that he would definitely chop Liu 
if he did not “look at Brother Han’s mianzi”, in which Han’s mianzi is bigger 
than those of Liu and Little Yin, and thus needs to be deferred. That Han 
                                                          
55
 In this regard Hsu differed from Kipnis in that she emphasised lian as internalised sanction 
which can function without the presence of others. This contradicts Kipnis’ interpretation that 
lian is largely felt in social interactions. While it is hard to choose between the two theories, one 
may argue that the ego feels having no lian is still based on the imagined presence of the society 
even when he is alone.  
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has a bigger face that the others need to “look at” will be further discussed 
in relational masculinity. 
The visibility of both mianzi and lian has everything to do with the 
gaze from the crowd. Indeed, such gaze could even transform a mianzi 
issue to a matter of lian. The more people witnessing, the less likely for 
both parties to calm down, since the extendable mianzi at stake grew 
proportionally to the increasing number of the audience. Thus, rather than 
any active intervention, withdrawal of the audience could effectively 
subdue the anger of the fighters. That was why some vendors such as 
Master Jin took a laissez-faire standing. Pushing both parties beyond the 
gaze of the audience reduces the stakes invoked. Otherwise the escalation 
from mianzi to lian would leave no space for compromise: the world just 
was not big enough to hold both of them. One had to go. 
According to my observation, the significance of mianzi differs 
among individuals according to their age and social experience. “They will 
keep fighting until they know who is ‘elder brother’ and who is ‘younger 
brother’”, remarked one of the audience, “so it is no use to stop them”. 
Several others recalled that when they were young, fighting for them was 
“as frequent as having meals”. In this regard, mianzi is age-sensitive. But 
upon scrutiny, age is virtually a metaphor of power relations.  
Guoguang Huang and Hu Hsien Chin (Huang and Hu 2004) further 
study mianzi practices in power games in both interactional and 
institutional contexts. They show that mianzi work that mixes 
instrumentality and sentiments is widely applied among acquaintance 
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than primary groups and strangers. In fact, the efficacy of Han’s mianzi 
when he stopped the fighting rested on the recognition by both Liu and Yin 
that Han was more powerful than them, because Han’s brother-in-law was 
a powerful local hooligan. By giving mianzi to Han, Liu and Little Yin 
strengthen their symbolic subordination to their Elder Brother Han. Thus, 
age as a criteria for the establishment of order, which is typical in rural 
areas, gives way to the local / non-local discernment and the power of 
force in this setting. 
That people call each other elder brother and younger brother as a 
way to establish order and express their power relations can also be seen 
in the following case between Han and Yang, a young local hooligan who 
intended to gain a foothold in the beer business after the relocation in 
2012 (see also chapter 4). In order to flaunt his force, Yang and his men 
smashed several boxes of beers of some vendors including Han. However, 
with the mediation of Director Zhang, his adopted father, Yang apologised 
by admitting that he is “younger brother” to Han, and pledged that he 
would not forcefully promote his beers to Han’s stand.  
In summary, the language used among men has two features: 
sincerity and combativeness (as manifested in face discourse). While 
sincerity is expressed to deny the instrumentality of the vendors’ 
orientations (despite the fact that they are businessmen), it enables the 
rebuilding of community. In contrast, the spirit of combativeness sets 
them apart.  
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Bodily masculinity 
By bodily masculinity I do not mean mere bodily strength, but a 
spirit of aggression, the courage to fight or defend respect. In addition, I do 
not situate such masculinity in any particular relationships but in the 
dialogue between individual and Society, thereby reflecting upon vendors’ 
migratory lives and the amorphous nature of Society. 
Visual clues to such masculinity are many, such as those from 
hairstyle, dress, tattoos, etc. For example, Pebble Zhang likes to put on a 
black tight underwaist and camouflage pants, indicating his identification 
with military culture. Fat Zhao and many other vendors have tattoos on 
their wrists. They can be as simple as a crooked cross or several vein-
coloured dots.56 Though shaded by their tan skin, these symbols allude to 
their youthful delinquency and the ability in fighting they gained through 
this delinquency. Brother Jin is a man of moderate temper, but he likes to 
wear a belt with a dragon head buckle (dragon head means big brother 
and the dragon in Chinese culture symbolises strong masculinity), and has 
a tattoo character “forbearance57” on his wrist, and practices body 
building nearly every day at home. But “showing muscle” is never 
considered as appropriate in customer relations, for it would only frighten 
away these customers. Therefore JR Liu (see chapter 1), assistant to 
Pebble Zhang, changed his “bullet head” hairstyle to a normal one when he 
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 According to the boss of a tattoo shop, dots on the wrist can be either a sign of gang 
members or a wish to remove ill-fortune especially after having suffered from a disease. In 
comparison, tattoos on biceps or deltoid are more indicative of membership of a gang.  
57
 “Forbearance” or “refrain” (忍，ren) can be understood as ability to endure pain; it can 
also be understood as “don’t offend me; otherwise I will not refrain myself from using force”.  
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started his own business. However, these bodily practices nonetheless 
signify an identity of manhood that co-exists with business ethos.  
Expressed obliquely through such bodily features, a kind of 
aggressiveness seems to lie at the core of such masculinity. I will mainly 
examine the aggression, valiance or worship of force in man-to-man 
relations as well as the social, political forces that inform them. Such 
aggressiveness is not always implicit; sometimes it can be made explicit, 
such as when Brother Ai encouraged Little Yin to beat Liu in the first place. 
Brother Han also embraces a spirit of dauntlessness which defines 
manhood. According to him, “A soft-tempered man gives way to a tough 
man; a tough man gives way to a high-handed man; a high-handed man 
gives way to those who do not care about his life,58” therefore, “how can a 
man have his knees bent in fighting? I won’t retract even when I am facing 
one hundred men”.  
Such masculinity differs from that which arises within household life. 
Though the latter masculinity also entails being strong and tough, it is of a 
different kind. That kind of masculinity can be seen as a working class one, 
particularly for outdoor restaurant bosses. A tough and endurable body 
helps ensure subsistence and business successes, as vendors have to 
sustain heavy labour and prolonged working hours. According to Yan 
(2003), within the prevalent corporate family, the significance of the 
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 In Chinese “Ruande pa yingde, yingde pa hengde, hengde pa buyaoming de(软的怕硬的，硬
的怕横的，横的怕不要命的)”. 
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endurable body of men also applies to marital and family lives.59 For 
outdoor restaurant bosses, the ability to “bear bitterness” (literally to eat 
bitterness, chi ku) is valued as essential to being a qualified man and 
husband. That is why when Rui, Han’s wife, cried out in public and scolded 
Han for mistreating her, her neighbour tried to stop Rui. “His life is not easy! 
Think about his shaking the wok for more than ten hours a day!”  The 
neighbour implied that Rui should not have cursed her husband so long as 
he was the breadwinner of the family. If there is any association between 
endurance and the bodily masculinity I discuss here, it is the endurance of 
physical pains after fighting with each other.   
Appearing to be aggressive, like Brother Ai and Han, has its own 
utility. It acts as a pre-emptive measure to forestall potential harm. In this 
regard, I share Bourdieu’s insight into masculinity in societies which he 
called “cultures of honour”. According to Bourdieu (2001), in such 
societies, a quick retaliation for honour is highly valued in contrast with 
cultures of law. Such cultures of honour are typical to nomadic peoples 
and herdsmen who carry their most valuable property with them and risk 
having it stolen, but without having recourse to law enforcement or to 
government. That being said, inspiring fear forms a better strategy than 
promoting friendship in protecting themselves and their properties. The 
culture of honour also is common among criminal underworlds and gangs 
whose members carry large amounts of cash and who cannot seek legal 
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 Yan (2003) argues that “being able to labour” has been replaced by “being able to talk” as new 
criteria in choosing partner in rural areas since the 1990s. Yet in my field, his distinction seems 
less significant along the lines of age or generation than that of occupations. Physical strength is 
still valued more than intelligence or interpersonal skills by outdoor restaurant bosses. 
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redress if the cash is stolen (Nisbett and Cohen 1996); or in modern inner-
city slums where three conditions apply, that is, 1) a lack of resources, b) 
the benefit of theft and crime outweighs the risks, and 3) a lack of 
sufficient law enforcement (ibid.). 
Both Bourdieu and Nisbett associated culture of honor with the 
protection of one’s fortune. In this regard, the logics of using of body as in 
production and safeguarding their production are unified.  Nonetheless, an 
explanation of utility does not suffice to explain the fact that most of the 
vendors are the victims of crime or extortions rather than members of 
gangs. Ironically, having suffered harm, they sometimes inflict harm on 
each other. Moreover, Bourdieu and Nisbett’s argument does not explain 
the dis-utility that occurs when perpetrators suffer after they administer 
verbal or physical force on others.  
Nonetheless, one factor identified by Nisbett is still quite 
important—the lack of justice or arbitration or rule of law. Indeed, many 
disputes arise when people are vying for business spaces which no 
authority regulates, as will be illustrated in the case I observed between 
Little Xia and an old lady. Without legal justice, aggression becomes the 
only viable way to safeguard one's interests, often imperilling the 
weak.  Furthermore, without justice, a man often has to justify his violence 
afterwards, thereby covering up his vulnerability. 
Little Xia was a migrant worker from nearby factory. With the 
introduction of his countryman who is neighbour to Han, he worked after 
hours as assistant to Han’s outdoor restaurant for a month, but he left 
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soon because he wanted to start his business selling watches with another 
young man. As all the places had been allocated to vendors, and he did not 
want to hand in a monthly stand fee, he moved his stand to wherever there 
was space. One day he arrived earlier at the night market, and took a “terra 
nullius”, which was however a place already taken by an old lady for a 
couple of days. When the old lady arrived, they broke into a quarrel. The 
old lady said she would resort to the management office for arbitration, 
even though either of them had registered at the EMO. Then she warned 
Little Xia that her son was a member of “the way,”60 to which Little Xia 
replied, “Go for him, I will wait here”. The dispute finally drew the attention 
of the manager of the medical store right behind their stands. Instead of 
arbitrating the issue as both party would have hoped, the manager drove 
away both of them with a displeased impatience, because both of the 
vendors blocked the way of his store. “Get away from here”, said the 
manager. Both Little Xia and the old lady then nudged a bit to the side of 
the door. The quarrel continued. Yet the young man occupied the premium 
position, leaving little space for the old lady, and continued his bargaining 
with customers as if his poor neighbour was nothing but air. Cornered in a 
very awkward space and sitting almost shoulder to shoulder to Little Xia, 
the old lady finally collected her stuff and walked away helplessly. Little 
Xia won the quarrel. When I suggested that he should pity the old, he 
became angry. His anger seemed to derive from having just been told off 
by the manager or a continuation of the hostility he had for the old lady. 
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 A man of “the way” (道上的) means that he is affiliated with mafia-like societies. 
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But he had reasons. He retorted that I had sympathy for the old, but knew 
nothing about his own condition.  
Later I found the old lady elsewhere in the night market and asked if 
she really had an outlaw son. She said it was only a story to secure her 
space for a living. Then I turned to Brother Du, a book seller, who had 
witnessed the event. He kindly reminded me that such quarrels happened 
every day, and there was no need for me to bother about it (duoguan 
xianshi, 多管闲事).  
In this case the logic of ensuring one’s survival overruns modesty 
and tolerance of each other. “Survival of the fittest” has become the motto 
when the vendors are looked down upon by powerful people and 
dismissed by the public gaze from which they had expected justice. Indeed, 
understandably, the “public” is no longer an organic community. It is 
merely an agglomeration of self-interested persons. The disdainful 
attitude held by the store manager and the nonchalant stand of other 
vendors resulted in the shift of the loci of justice to the parties in disputes. 
Thus, without justice from a third party, a “might makes right” logic 
prevails. Had a third party acted as a reference of authority or even 
concerned neutrality, Little Xia could have been more embarrassed and 
probably given way to the old lady. In the following days, Little Xia stayed 
at that position. When I passed him, he seemed to have triumphant 
defiance in his eyes, which almost made me believe that I should not have 
asked him about the morality of his action. I had better forget it, for 
bothering about it as if my own business was really unnecessary.  
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Besides the absence of informal justice, formal justice is also lacking 
in many occasions. The insufficiency of the latter kind, which should have 
been provided by police or grassroots agencies, has resulted in grievance 
or even resentment on the part of vendors. Even vendors who were seen 
as “street toughs” (such as Han) are no exception. The following anecdote 
illustrates this effect. It also shows that the lack of formal justice can lead 
to a defiant attitude towards Society. 
Han told me his story when I helped fix his trolley one midnight. He 
mentioned that he had another glass food-display cart parked on the other 
side of the alley across from his residence. A minibus parked next to it 
crushed its glass. The minibus owner turned out to be a construction 
foreman working on a project at the district hospital. Han asked  for 
compensation from the foreman by stating that both parties should adhere 
to “the order of arrival”, meaning the one who arrives first at the public 
space has the privilege of usage (Xianlai houdao). “Even if you lay gold 
bullion and I lay a piece of straw, I should have it (the place) if I arrived first”, 
Han recounted the story. The foreman disagreed, so they reported to 
police for arbitration. The police requested both parties to show their ID 
cards first. But the police quickly prevaricated and “kicked the ball back” 61 
to both parties. As a result, Han did not get the compensation he had 
expected. The attitude of the police, according to Han, was simply because 
his ID card revealed his non-local identity. As the police are seen as 
representing the Communist Party or government in general, and 
construction contractors are seen as more or less having connections with 
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 In Chinese ti piqiu (踢皮球), or shirk one’s responsibility. 
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the government, Han concluded that it was a “bullying society”.62 He 
further inferred that “Communists are just like a mafia organisation. All of 
them (the powerful) are connected”.  
It is fair to say that disputes in business and in other aspects of life 
are inevitable. The absence of both formal and informal justice has 
reinforced the use of aggressive display in two ways. First, the anger will 
not disappear after the temporary settlement of a dispute, but will turn 
into a feud, particularly on the side of the loser. Second, an overall lack of 
resources exacerbates the situations, as occurred in the process of 
relocation (see chapters 4). After the relocation of the night market, 
incidents of disputes and fights amongst vendors rose dramatically.  
Bodily masculinity has developed as a hostile stance to the environs 
of Society. If Society is inimical in this regard, it is because it is inherently 
flawed and unjust. An understanding of such aggression at individual 
levels helps us comprehend what I dub as relational masculinity.  
Relational masculinity 
I call the third aspect of masculinity which surfaced during the 
conflict relational masculinity. Drawing upon guanxi (connections) 
theories, I see such masculinity as a cultural product from adapting to the 
fickle urban environment. Guanxi practices (Kipnis 1997) (particularly in 
rural China) are derived from blood ties, and they invoke sentiments and 
the constant exchange of favours / gifts to extend personal connections 
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 In Han’s word qiangquan shehui (强权社会). 
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beyond kinship ties. Relational masculinity among the vendors is modelled 
after the kinship ties, but it is more fluid. As I show below, relational 
masculinity is constructed and manifested via pseudo-kinship appellations 
(particularly “brothers”), and rituals such as drinking as well as acts of 
mutual aid in extraordinary situations. It overlaps with discursive 
masculinity, but involves interactional, dyadic or group dynamics rather 
than a kind of social norm. While bodily masculinity bears the imprint of 
Society on individuals, relational masculinity reassembles and reunites the 
atomised individuals.  
Appellations 
Relational masculinity features colloquial use of “brothers” and other 
agnatic terms in addressing strangers. The saying that a man “depends 
upon his parents at home and upon his friends abroad”63 illustrates this 
logic. In this sense, calling each other brothers serves to establish rapport 
at short notice, precisely because of its power in evoking emotional bonds 
and obligations among family members. Men often address others of 
similar age as xiongdi (literally elder brother and younger brother) even 
when they meet for the first time. When the age gap is apparent, the elder 
one would call the younger “little brother” (小兄弟, xiao xiongdi) or his 
surname with a prefix “Little” such as “Little Chen”. This is not a hostile 
put-down. Rather, the speaker extends his friendship even while asserting 
superiority, whether in age, status or knowing experience. In response, the 
“little brother” would address the elder by the surname plus “elder 
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 In Chinese zaijia kao fumu, chumen kao pengyou (在家靠父母，出门靠朋友). 
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brother” (哥, Ge), for example Master64 Jin is called Jin Ge. The wife of the 
“elder brother” is then called “sister-in-law”(sao, 嫂 or saozi, 嫂子), 
modelling after patrilineal extended families. 
The relational masculinity, however, can be an impromptu or a 
performance of guanxi. For instance, during the interval of the fight, Liu 
pulled guanxi to Master Jin by calling the latter shu (paternal uncle). 
Fictional allies are also strategically invoked and they are also referred to 
as brothers. While Little Yin called for his “con buddies”, Liu invoked his 
“at least one hundred brothers (his colleagues)”.  
The widespread use of such fictive kinship terms has a “River and 
Lake Society” flavour. A “veteran member of Rivers and Lakes” (lao jianghu) 
uses such appellation to familiarise himself with others at short notice, to 
elicit others’ favour for his own sake, to cast doubt or distrust or to 
persuade others with an improvised aura of intimacy. But the very same 
person can also turn down requests from his newly made brothers, or 
disappear without notifying the latter of his new phone number or any 
other method of contact. After all, many of them have been leading a 
mobile life so there is no use to keep commitment to others unless 
necessary.  
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 I learned from TV and earlier experience that I should address vendors or a working class man 
as Master. However, I now consider Ge (哥) as a more appropriate way.  
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Drinking 
The second milieu to observe the relational masculinity is during 
drinking. Drinking is a dynamic way of socialising among men. It is also a 
window as to how relational masculinity is imagined and practiced.  
I note that tolerance of alcohol is a laudable masculine virtue and a 
common topic among vendors. Brother Dragon, the beer distributor, once 
told me that one can drink a box of beer (12 bottles of 600 ml) at outdoor 
restaurants but only a few bottles at indoor restaurants. Even though he 
might have exaggerated a bit, the estimation is not far from the truth. Not 
only customers, but also vendors themselves are good drinkers, perhaps 
even better ones. Instead of “having dinner” together, outdoor restaurant 
bosses invite each other to “drink a cup or two”, often ending up with 
consumption of far more than that amount if they are in a good mood. 
After all, the ample supply and cheap prices of beers in summer (3-5 yuan 
per bottle) and wines in winter ensures such hospitability and 
development of tolerance. But why do vendors show off their big tolerance 
so often?   
The anthropology of drinking differs from medical and sociological 
approaches. Dwight Heath (1975) argues that the non-anthropological 
disciplines exaggerate the problems of drinking, either by expressing a 
strong bias of western culture, or basing their assumptions and methods 
on pathology. However, to what extent drunkenness can be defined as 
“problem drinking” is in doubt as many cultures recognise drinking as a 
social act (Douglas 1987). According to Mary Douglas, the common 
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assumption that alcohol leads to anomie is also challenged by 
anthropologists who are more satisfied with the notion that it is rather the 
state of anomie that leads to alcoholism. Anthropologists also found 
drunkenness allows a relaxation of cultural constraints, which is a learned 
comportment (ibid.).  
Douglas (1987) further suggests that drinking constructs the world 
as it is, either by separating leisure from work, by exclusion and inclusion 
and by channelling competition within communities. It also constructs a 
world as an ideal either by transcending emotions and enhancing a 
consciousness of belonging to a larger society, or by momentarily denying 
a harsh eternal world. Whichever type of world it constructs, Douglas 
argues, the understanding of a culture of drinking “depends on 
appropriate abstractions and counting and calculating techniques of 
drinking habits”. In the following, I will present the forms, patterns and 
etiquettes of drinking in order to grasp how men flip-flop between the two 
worlds by performing their relational masculinity.  
The atmosphere of drinking varies from recreationally moderate to 
intense, depending on the context and the alcohol consumed. Generally, 
individual drinking and reciprocal drinking are moderate, but collective or 
ritualised drinking is intense.  
As for individual drinking, there are times when bosses drink iced 
beers on their dinner tables, especially after they have been exposed to the 
scorching cooking fire for hours in summer. In winter they habitually 
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drink wine and put their feet around a tray of burning charcoals so as to 
resist the chilly wind.  
Drinking is often a way to express gratitude in banquet. The host will 
try his best to create a cordial atmosphere by providing palatable dishes, 
enough beers or wines, frequent toasts and compliments to make the 
guest happy. For example, Fat Man helped Han’s relative to find a job as a 
welder in Fat Man’s brother-in-law’s factory, so Han treated Fat Man and 
his brother-in-law to a meal, and paid the accommodation fee for the latter. 
On such occasions, vendors will stop drinking when they get tipsy and feel 
good. They may drink more, but that is often limited to business slack 
seasons or on rainy days when vendors don’t have to get up early the next 
morning.  
People consume more beer or wine particularly when they make 
acquaintance with each other. On such occasions, drinking can either 
excite men or depress them. But alcohol is not the only source of 
excitement or depression as physiologists would suggest. Rather, the 
bipolarisation of people’s emotions depends on their modes of 
interactions. 
I use Turner’s concept of “ritual as a process” by which structure 
moves to “communitas” (Turner 1974) to illustrate how alcohol mediates 
drinkers’ behaviours in different phases. I observe that drinking often 
begins with a subtle construction of hierarchy through reciprocity and 
competition, which always leads to a state of “communitas” where men are 
likely to reach a sense of common fate and camaraderie. This may not 
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necessarily be accomplished in one banquet but in consecutive parties. 
Nonetheless, such a sequence is apparent.  
In such a collective setting, to drink by oneself is never appropriate; 
one should either make others drink by toasting them (jingjiu, 敬酒) or by 
penalty drinking (fajiu, 罚酒). The drinking allows a grade of hierarchy to 
be built by either proposals or penalties. Through proposals one extends 
one’s respect to the person being proposed. As a general rule, one should 
lower his cup if he considers that the person toasted is senior in age, 
experience or has done the toaster a favour. For people who have met but 
haven’t got to know each other very well, the positioning of oneself in the 
group can be quickly established only through one round of mutual 
toasting and receiving toasts. Such positioning is reflected in one’s calling 
the other as big brother (dage), elder brother (ge), or his name.65 Their 
knowledge of each other derives from not only self-presentation, but also 
from mutual-representations. A principle of reciprocity underlies the 
mutual-representation. Mutual-representation is a way to “give face” to 
each other, allowing one to increase the other’s prestige in front of other 
people even using hyperbolic or sycophantic words. Status differences are 
also reflected in the amount of beer consumed, with the person of higher 
status drinking in sips while the person of lower status drinks in gulps. On 
the receiving side, drinking up upon the toast means respecting the good 
will of the proposer, whereas refusing to drink means not “giving face” or 
not acting brotherly. 
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 Little brother is rarely called because calling another his name already indicates the speaker 
assumes that he is superior in age, experience or power. 
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The execution of penalty drinking requires a sound understanding of 
social etiquettes and rules. It often becomes a game between the 
experienced and novice. One who utters inappropriate statements during 
the drinking, even if inadvertently, will be detected immediately by others 
and asked to have a penalty drink. The ability to pick out such 
inappropriateness demonstrates one’s knowledge of the social norms, 
adding to one’s authority among all the participants.  
Brother Ai, a local, has a good command of such knowledge and 
practices of toasting and applying penalties. He would ask the novice  
(always young men) participants to toast everyone on the table (dayiquan, 
打一圈) when the young just raised his cup, or ask the latter to drink twice 
if the young man does not address a person properly. Brother Ai also stops 
the “little brother” from drinking too fast, showing care to him. When he is 
toasted but he would not like to drink at that point, he would claim that 
they are not competing for drinking so the proposer should slow down the 
pace. The reason for the penalty can also be a touch of humour. For 
example, once Big Brother comments on girl, but Brother Ai immediately 
goes too far in asserting that Big Brother would think of the girl instead of 
his wife, so big brother has to drink two cups if he would like Brother Ai to 
keep the “secret”.   
In most cases, people toast each other at the beginning of a banquet.  
They soon give way to penalty drinking because it is funnier, more 
competitive and more intimate. After all, too many toasts are seen as too 
formal a behaviour among brothers. In the meantime, people play various 
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games to quicken the consumption of beer or wine. The general rule is the 
loser would be punished for drinking a whole plastic cup (150 ml, or ¼ of 
a bottle) in one go.  They may play traditional games, such as finger-
guessing66 or rod-tiger-hen-worm67 which requires a quick response, so 
the unfortunate one with prolonged response time will always be 
penalised—the more he consumes, the slower the response he has until he 
is completely drunk. If all get drunk but are in a mood to continue, they 
may simply swirl a chopstick over a plate, and the person at which the 
chopstick points will drink. The combativeness manifests when men even 
stop each other from going to the toilet, and the one who wets himself will 
lose the game. There are also new games presumably from school or 
company team-building activities, for example counting seven.68 However, 
this game is considered boring because it is reckoned as competition of 
“intelligence” among school boys and is less physically intense. In a 
vendor’s words, it is not “forthright (豪爽，haoshuang)”.  
Precisely, being forthright is less a kind of frankness than a frank 
acknowledgement of obligation, and it lies at the heart of the relational 
masculinity. A forthright man will never refuse to drink if he is penalised 
in the drinking game. This is actually a metaphor of a kind of commitment, 
for everybody knows that to drink a cup in one go is a rather unpleasant 
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 Guessing five is a simplified version of Guessing numbers. Guessing numbers requires each 
person to present a number from 1-10 by gesturing simultaneously and uttering a digit from 
0-9. The one whose uttered digit coincides with the single-digit number of the sum wins and 
the loser will be penalised by drinking. For example, if A presents 6 and speaks 0 and B 
presents 9 and speaks 5, then B wins because 5 is the single digit of 15=6+9. In guessing five, 
each part has only to present a gesture of zero or five, and speak five or ten to decide who 
will win and who will drink.  
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 A game in which rod beats tiger, tiger eats hen, hen pecks worm and worm erodes rod. 
68
 A game in which multiples of seven or numbers containing “7” digits are avoided when 
people are counting numbers clockwise or counter clockwise. 
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experience (though people never make it explicit). When one pours a cup 
of rice wine or beer down his throat, he feels that he is “burning his heart” 
(shaoxin, 烧心, physiological pain from oesophagus or stomach). Yet the 
symbolic meaning of such behaviour rests in the very uneasiness: it shows 
a willingness to sacrifice for one’s brothers, and it is further associated 
with the yiqi, the spirit of honour, which I will discuss later. 
Usually, having consumed a certain amount of beer or wine, the 
toasting becomes more casual and less structured and a rule of equality 
begins to apply, reaching a phase of “communitas” as Turner (1974) would 
call it.  As he put it, “during the liminal phase in a ritual performance all are 
treated equally, deprived of all distinguishing characteristics of social 
structure, constituting ‘a community or comity of comrades and not a 
structure of hierarchically arrayed positions’” (Turner 1974). In this phase, 
each should tune up with every other man in consuming equal quantity of 
beer or wine, and they may count the number of empty bottles next to the 
feet of their opponent in case the latter has urged them to drink too much. 
In addition, having had endless toasts and penalties, each is happy to be 
recognised by each other, a recognition they can rarely find on other 
occasions. Meanwhile, as the willingness to compete is diluted in such 
camaraderie, the macho masks men wear during everyday life are stripped 
away, giving way to complaints, cheap shots and lamentation. A sense of 
being common—commonly experiencing hard lives and suffering—
surfaces in this stage.  
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Getting back to Douglas’ distinction of the world as it is and the 
world as ideal, the communitas that features equality, common fate and 
mutual recognition is ideal in two regards, and each world has meanings 
only in relation to each other. First, the world constructed is ideal as 
opposed to the cold, indifferent reality facing individuals. Secondly, if we 
see drinking as a prelude for men’s relationship, the masculinity 
(particularly the self-forthrightness) and mutual commitment are subject 
to future tests and trials. On the one hand, keeping promises on basis of 
their sense of common fate allows vendors to initiate many other 
interactions, such as introducing jobs to each other, bargaining collectively 
against vegetable and fish providers, helping each other in everyday 
business and protecting each other’s fortune in an emergency. On the 
other, there are occasions when such promises are betrayed and when 
relationships are broken. Then people would think the drinking as merely 
ideal, if illusionary, from a hindsight perspective. 
The extent to which one can reflect upon the relations between the 
two worlds distinguishes two types of men, one being immature, 
thoughtless and daredevil, and the other being mature and sophisticated. 
If one takes the communitas formed during drinking as absolute and long-
lasting, or he is somehow “intoxicated” by the ego boosted by mutual-
recognition, promises, compliments and unconditional sharing, he is 
fixated by the pleasure from drinking unless he realises that his brothers 
are merely “friends of wine and meat” (jiurou pengyou). After the 
relocation in 2012, Little Zhang, a young man and neighbour to Little Yin, 
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complained to me that although he had brothered Little Yin, the latter still 
managed to invade his business space by treacherous means. “I won’t 
believe him anymore”, remarked Little Zhang, “he is not reliable at critical 
moments”. Upon hearing his complaint, Fat Man suggested that Little 
Zhang learn from experience, because Little Yin was only a “friend of wine 
and meat” to Little Zhang.  
Local terms reveal the transition from a gullible relational 
masculinity to a more conservative and sophisticated one. In local terms, a 
man grows from a “little rod (xiao ganzi in which ganzi hints at penis)” to 
“old rod (lao ganzi)” or from someone who is “tender (nen)” to a veteran in 
the so-called Rivers and Lakes Society (lao jianghu). A veteran in rivers and 
lakes is double-minded. While he is able to enjoy the warmth and 
brotherhood brought by drinking, he sees into the instrumental 
relationship among people. After all, vendors are businessmen, not 
brothers. In this train of thought, wine and banquet is a tool to develop 
business ties, and men are never overwhelmed by the chemical effect of 
the wine. 
Consider the case of the transfer of cooking technique from Han to 
Little Yin.  Little Yin would like to learn how to barbeque fish from Han, 
who had learned from Master Hu and wife. However, although Yin and 
Han are brothers, they are also potential business competitors. Everyday 
sayings suggest that “two of a trade never agree” (Tonghang shi yuanjia,同
行是冤家) and “once an apprentice masters techniques, his Master will be 
starved (jiaosi tudi, e si shifu, 教死徒弟饿死师傅). Thus, Han tactically 
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refused Little Yin’s request, claiming that “I should teach you (as we are 
brothers), but the tuition fee I would charge is too high to be affordable”.  
Little Yin then consults Brother Ai and Master Jin, who suggest that Yin 
treat Han a banquet with expensive liquors.  In the end, Han still charges 
Little Yin some “tuition fee”, but it is much less than the original amount.   
Brother Lei, a former soldier and a small merchandise vendor, told 
me how to drink with a potential business partner and befriend brothers 
in the Rivers and Lakes Society. He said I should propose a toast in the first 
round of drinking by stating that I had heard about his would-be business 
partner for a long time, and he feels “predestined” (yuanfen, 缘分 or karma, 
a Buddhist expression) to see him in person. In the second proposal, I 
should state that we should have met long ago because we share many 
things in common, and he should look ahead into the future. In the third 
round, or after they have discussed business plans, I should propose a 
third toast that we will corporate well so as to make big money. While the 
first proposal is merely a polite formula, the second and the third toasts 
help bring both parties closer together so that they can call each other 
brothers, ritualising a relationship which is conducive to business trust 
and commitment. 
Relational masculinity for vendors also entails appropriateness in 
maintaining relationships among men. Unlike their fiery, daredevil young 
counterparts, a veteran rivers and lakes is less likely to offend others, in Fat 
man’s language, by “leaving a space” (liu yudi) between people. Little Tian, 
employee of Brother Dragon (the beer distributor), once requested Fat 
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Man drink in one go just because he had drank the same amount after he 
toasted Fat Man, and he insisted so even when Fat Man refused by 
claiming that he had high blood pressure; otherwise the latter was not 
“giving face” or respecting him, said Little Tian. Infuriated, Fat Man threw 
away the plastic cup showing his anger (recalling what Liu did for Little 
Yin), for he considered Little Tian way too pushy and arrogant just 
because he was the beer provider. Fat Man then talked to Brother Dragon 
and made Little Tian apologise to him the next day. According to Fat Man, 
Little Tian was good by nature, but he needed to learn to respect others 
and “leave some space” so as not to trap himself between a rock and a hard 
place. “Only if you leave space to people, will you be welcomed again once 
you come back to this night market (in case you leave the night market). 
Everyone would treat you a meal or invite you for a drink”, said Fat Man to 
me.  
Mutual-aid and Yiqi, the spirit of honour 
The third milieu where relational masculinity manifests itself is 
emergent situations in which unconditional mutual-aid is badly needed. 
The helper is regarded as having yiqi. A person with yiqi is never a “friend 
of wine and meat”. Yiqi, or having yiqi, is a touchstone against which 
brotherhood is tested. In this sense, being forthright can be seen as 
rehearsal of yiqi, which is expected in real lives. 
Yiqi is translated as spirit of honour by Boertz (2011). He observes 
that “brothers” should always be generous towards each other by 
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adhering to yiqi that trumps profit. It is a defining characteristic of River 
and Lake 69(江湖, Jiang Hu) culture, as Boretz  puts it: 
Yiqi, which can be glossed as “honour” or “righteous spirit,” 
implies a measure of manly courage and generally indicates 
acts of (or a spirit of) selfless generosity. An act is deemed 
honourable and righteous only if there is no ulterior motive or 
expectation attached. It is not the repayment of a favour, nor is 
it intended to incur an obligation or counter-favour. Honour 
entails self-limitation; sacrifice; and a postponement of 
personal interest, need, or desire. Honour here trumps profit 
(Boretz 2011, 35). 
His definition of yiqi includes self-limitation over profit, a principle 
illustrated in situations where money is shown contempt and where 
fortunes are shared among brothers regardless of rich or poor. I will 
advance his argument in two directions. First, while I endorse his notion 
that yiqi manifests itself in generous behaviours, I argue that being 
generous is not the defining character of yiqi; rather, timely generosity is. 
In other words, yiqi has a temporal dimension. Being generous, in my field 
site, was more associated with forthrightness. Second, I will associate the 
construction of yiqi to the environment to which vendors adapt. I argue 
                                                          
69
 We need to address the sociological aspects of River and Lake here. According to Shahar 
(2001:380), River and Lake is “a realm of freedom, where the laws of family, society and state 
no longer apply”. As Boertz (2011:35) argues, it is imagined rather than practical.  Note 
Chinese elites also use River and Lake, by which they refer to a social domain far away from 
the imperial court or from the centre of state power. For them, river and lake, the society of 
ordinary people, are only places of temporary resort away from power and heavy official 
duties. 
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that the calling for yiqi reflects the risks that randomly occur to individuals 
in the urban settings. Boretz insightfully depicts yiqi as not the repayment 
of favour. More precisely, I would suggest that there is a continuum 
between face-related practices and yiqi-related practices, which I will 
illustrate below.  
Take borrowing rice for example. Vendors cook rice beforehand, but 
there are often shortages of rice when one stand has many customers, 
which makes borrowing rice from neighbours unavoidable. Borrowing fish 
and other raw cooking materials is similar and perhaps matters even more. 
However, the neighbour can choose to give or not to give, depending on 
his/her relationship with the borrower. After all, the act of borrowing 
means the borrower is having good business so that the lender has to 
suppress the instinct of jealousy, unless he expects that the borrower 
would help him out when he is running out of cooking materials next time. 
Such reciprocity is phrased as giving mianzi to each other; a neighbour 
who does not “give face” to the borrower will be rejected next time.  
In comparison, lending money entails similar logic but entails yiqi 
rather than mianzi, because it causes a high level of risk to the supplier. 
Helping out in fights to prevent bodily harm is a practice of yiqi of a higher 
level, for it is not only badly needed by the receiver, but also may cause a 
greater extent of risk to the helper. The following case exemplifies the yiqi 
of the latter kind.  
It was May 2012 when I was walking eastward along the night 
market, and people told me that there was a fight in Eighty Thousand’s 
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stand. A customer said that his phone was lost in Eighty Thousand’s stand, 
and demanded compensation. It could be extortion. One of Eighty 
Thousand’s friends beat the customer, who then retreated to the stand of 
Zhuge barbeque fish, a neighbouring stand to Eighty Thousand’s. I found 
this young man, drunk, sitting on the filthy pavement. His voice was mixed 
howling and sobbing, calling for assistance because he could not stand on 
his own feet. Zhuge’s wife advised that he’d better leave, but he begged her 
to lift him to the rim of the pavement. The crying boy then made a phone 
call. “I am Little Four! I was bullied by the boss of a restaurant, come to 
beat them!” He then announced the location, and advised the number of 
people should be “as many as possible!” He then rang another number, 
telling the receiver that he has “deployed”70 some forty gang members to 
the site (which was obviously an exaggeration) and requested the latter to 
“deploy at least ten people to the site.” After the phone calls, Little Four sat 
at the same place waiting for his brothers, despite Zhuge’s wife’s 
complaining and urging him to leave.  
In only five minutes his men arrived, headed by a stout guy with a 
club-style object, followed by some ten men wearing plain clothes, all 
rushing into the stand. Another strand of people came from the other side 
so that no one could escape. They identified Eighty Thousand and his 
family with the guidance of Mr Little Four. All the customers were 
frightened and left their tables. The club and fists of the mob then rained 
down on Eighty Thousand, on his wife, and on Eighty Thousand’s father. 
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 Note “deploy” (调, diao) is actually a military terminology as in “move a troop”. It is much 
more exaggerated or pretentious than “call” (叫, jiao). 
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Tables were lifted over, plates slipped down and smashed onto the ground 
with dishes and gravy splitting everywhere. Benches, beer bottles and 
frying pans were grasped at hand as weapons for attack or defence by the 
attackers and Eighty Thousand’s family members. Then, before one could 
utter a word, Fat Zhao, Eighty Thousand’s neighbour, joined the melee 
with his two sons. Fat Zhao was a man of forty, chubby yet amazingly agile. 
He grabbed a bench and hit the tallest and strongest guy on his back 
(which could be fatal) so ruthlessly that one could hardly associate him 
with someone who had just discussed with me on how to “cultivate oneself” 
(xiuyang, 修养), a concept central to Confucian peaceful personhood. The 
battle lasted only a minute or two before the group withdrew to the other 
side of the street, with a last member slipping down onto the greasy 
ground but quickly got up and ran away. The raid by Little Four’s fellows 
was successful because they smashed the stand and had the boss’s family 
beaten. Eighty Thousand and wife disappeared, with the father moaning 
on the ground. However, unprepared for Fat Zhao’s outflank on their back, 
the attackers also suffered.  
In this case, not only was yiqi embodied by Fat Zhao, it is also an 
accepted social norm according to witnesses’ comments. After those 
attackers (who the vendors called “peasant workers” and who were later 
proven to be migrant workers from a nearby construction site) fled to the 
opposite side of the street, Fat Zhao’s elder son followed them alone with a 
bench in his hand, aiming to catch one of those thugs but lost his target.  In 
contrast, Fat Zhao’s second son later told me and several of the audience 
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that he slipped on the ground so he did not join the fight. However, when I 
reviewed the story with the audience, they thought it was merely a subtle 
excuse: the second son was actually less courageous than his father and 
elder brother.71  
Without the ready action of the wife and the help of Fat Zhao, Eighty 
Thousand’s family would have suffered. Not only were cooking equipment 
smashed, but the wife was badly injured so the whole family had to stop 
working for two weeks.  
Fat Zhao was thought of as righteous or having yiqi by many because 
he helped Eighty Thousand in an emergency unconditionally. Yet he 
alluded to me that Eighty Thousand did not give the residual vegetables 
and meats to him (Eighty Thousand stopped working for two weeks 
afterwards so the raw materials would go off in a few days); instead Eighty 
Thousand gave them to Han, a person not involved in this event. As I have 
analysed, this was an effort to build connections with people with 
powerful connections.  Nevertheless, Fat Zhao’s complaint shows that even 
yiqi people are caught between calculations and altruism.  
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 Ironically, whilst women are largely excluded from public displays of virility and courageous 
which are considered manly, their bravery excelled men’s. Eighty Thousand fled to an alley 
across the street, but his wife had bitten one man’s hand, scratched another man’s face and 
captured a suspect before the police arrived at the scene. People said that she protected his 
restaurant as if a hen protects her chicken. Indeed, when I saw her at the scene, she was 
short-breathed, grabbed the man firmly, with blood shedding from her forehead that 
obscured her eyesight and stained a large bloc of her T-shirt above her chest. The man’s shirt 
was twisted by her so firmly that it was nearly taken off from his torso. He claimed himself to 
be innocent and was just a passer-by, but the wife insisted that he was at the same table with 
the young man (Little Four) and conspired by calling people and left quickly before the raid. 
She was right. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have characterised masculinities from three angles, 
the discursive, the bodily and the relational. They are not independent of 
each other but weave into an intricacy of life streams of extraordinary 
(such as fighting and drinking) and ordinary (such as business activities). 
In this regard, such categorisation is somewhat arbitrary and thus only has 
analytical value.  
In summary, men advocate sincerity and look down upon 
instrumentality, even when they fight for their interests; they strive for 
mianzi, the status and prestige and defend their lian using force when 
dishonoured. Such prioritising of using force, as I argued with regard to 
bodily masculinity, can be seen as internalised aggression in adapting to 
the fickle business and living environment that is lacking of proper 
arbitration, justice or moral gaze. Therefore, a “might makes right” rule 
permeates Society, feeding on and even intensifying the riskiness of the 
environs, particularly when the overall resources become scarce (for 
instance during relocation). The environs have dual impact on individuals 
in shaping their connections. On the one hand, people seek brotherhood, 
belonging and warmth (as seen in drinking); they also long for an ethos of 
yiqi and friends with yiqi. On the other hand, their friends and friendship 
are continuously subject to trials appertaining to practical considerations. 
In this regard, individuals of Society dwell in a pendulous state between 
trusting and distrusting others, navigating between an idealised and a 
practical world in their outbound journey.  
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Chapter 6 
Conjugal masculinity: 
Inadequacy and excess 
 
In this chapter, I ask what constitutes the conjugal masculinity of the 
migrant vendors in their urban lives. By conjugal masculinity I mean 
manhood manifested in men’s connections to the other gender at both 
performative and practical levels. Drawing on my observations and voices 
from both unmarried and married men, I take up the question in several 
spheres: peer’s circle, the context of emerging digital information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), and the stage of street business lives.  
My point of departure is scholarly writings on contemporary Chinese 
families and romance in both rural and urban settings. Yan Yunxiang 
(2003), for instance, has noticed significant transformations that deviate 
from patrilineal institutions. In his Private Life under Socialism, he 
proposes that the conjugal relationship has replaced the patriarchal 
relationship as the central axis of the Chinese family (Yan 2003, 109). 
Happiness in family life largely depends on the conjugal relationship, and 
Chinese villagers frequently express their feelings and love using their 
own words (Yan 2003).  Yan (2009) also observes that in rural areas the 
emphasis of kinship ties has been expanded from agnatic to bilateral, 
which he attributes to the rise of the market and migration. 
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However, in reviewing Yan’s work, Li Zhang (2005) reminds us that 
the “triumph of conjugal power” could not be generalised to other areas of 
China and to migrants. Indeed, getihu, the self-employed population with 
urban or rural hukou, has particular difficulties as far as gender relations 
are concerned. According to John Osburg (2013, 6), self-employed 
entrepreneurs were looked down upon by most urban Chinese with 
suspicion and disdain up until the early 1990s regardless of their urban or 
rural identities. Carolyn Hsu (2006) observes that the stigma continues to 
disadvantage the urban self-employed group in the marriage market in 
Harbin, a northern China city in the 2000s. While entrepreneurs are 
considered to be most attractive bachelors, self-employed getihu are seen 
as uncultured, lacking suzhi or even conflated with ex-felons (Hsu 2006).  
Economically speaking, household production requires coordination 
of a couple. Li Zhang (2001) focuses on the labour division of Wenzhou 
migrant private entrepreneurs. Even though she observes exploitation of 
wives by their husbands through discursive spatial segregation, which 
confines wives and female migrant workers to the household (Zhang 2001, 
115-136), she does not indicate that husbands and wives can run their 
businesses independently. Historical analysis of petite bourgeoisie in 
nineteenth century Europe, though distant in space and time, provides 
other points of reference. According to Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-
Gerhard Haupt (2013), the centrality of family was the defining character 
of petit-bourgeois families because the family embraced a wide range of 
functions and dimensions (ibid., 87-111). The working space and domestic 
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space overlapped amongst shopkeepers and artisans (ibid., 90-93). The 
household structure was also flexible to incorporate servants, children and 
apprentices when more labour was needed (ibid., 99-107). And the 
shopkeepers and artisans tended to marry earlier than other occupational 
groups. However, despite socio-economic imperatives that made the 
family the centrepiece of petite bourgeoisie lifestyle and a moral frontier, 
shopkeepers and artisans maintained wide connections with the outside 
world. Besides, the intensity of their workload did not guarantee a warm 
family life. The home was at best a venue of “protective domesticity” (ibid., 
108).   
Drawing upon the above literature, this chapter examines the 
interactional and dramaturgical aspects of the conjugal masculinity. It also 
aims to postulate the form of conjugal masculinity regardless of age 
differences, marital status and contingencies of performances. In other 
words, I seek the ideal against which most of my informants measure up 
and perform their gender connections. I argue that on the one hand 
unmarried men experience an intense inadequacy in their gender 
relationships. This inadequacy finds expression through a piece of Internet 
slang diaosi (literally penis hair), which carries a sense of erotic frustration 
and inadequacy, because they lack the necessary capital in the marriage 
market in the urban settings. On the other hand, married men speak of 
their marriage as if they are bound in chains, and some of them bear a 
nonchalant or even misogynistic attitude towards their wives. But such 
downplaying and exclusion of women arguably serves a dramaturgical 
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purpose to perform when maintaining masculinity in petite bourgeoisie 
worlds.  
This chapter is divided into two parts, focusing on unmarried 
migrant men and married ones respectively. In the first part, I present the 
notion of diaosi, trace its word origins and its spread over the Internet, and 
then examine how ICTs (Internet Computing Technologies) enact and 
contribute to the development of intimate relations of young male 
migrants as well as how they eventually find their partners. In the second 
part, I examine the way married vendors perform their conjugal 
masculinity. Taking the two groups together, I argue that although dersire 
for partnership by the unmarried and seeing marriage as excessive by the 
married men seems contradictory, both groups present themselves as self-
reliant, autonomous and as a source of economic value to the other gender. 
This conjugal masculinity underlies their displays in different spheres. 
The diaosi discourse:  
Internet, sexuality and consumerism 
The first group I investigate are single young vendors in the night 
market. In chapter 2 I discussed how some youth move from their 
hometowns to factories or service sectors in the cities. They venture into 
the business world either because of their ambitions or because self-
employment serves as an alternative to factory lives. If they gain stable 
revenue, they may settle in the night market and become full-time 
businessmen.  
Wen and his fellows are such young men. They were in their early 
twenties, from different places and had travelled and worked in many 
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places as factory workers, construction workers, direct sale agents, and 
automobile technicians. Four of them worked in a nearby café during day 
time, and the fifth in a nearby factory. They sold some electric toys when 
they were off work, displaying them on a cloth laid on the ground. What 
captured my attention was that they derided themselves as diaosi when I 
asked about their earnings. The term indicated their relatively meagre 
income in that context, but it literally meant penis hair. Why did they use 
this erotic, derogatory term to refer to their economic condition? 
 
Figure 6.1: Prototype of diaosi  
The Chinese reads: I love Internet games and DOTA72; I love web surfing, but love lewd ideas 
(YY, or Korean jokes) even more; I do not have much money, nor do I have a sense of existence; 
I do not have a girlfriend; I am a superb player in video games but have nothing in reality; I am a 
video game player and I am a diaosi. 
Diaosi is actually Internet slang, and the diaosi identity is a youth 
subculture shaped by Internet and media influence. The term explicitly 
expresses undisguised sexual desire, the lack of means to realise it, and the 
concomitant class antagonism.  
Initially, diaosi was coined in an online forum of fans of a former 
soccer player Yi (Figure 6.1) in 2010. Yi’s fans, many of them Internet 
                                                          
72
 DOTA is abbreviation for Defense of the Ancients (DotA), a multiplayer online battle arena 
mod video game. 
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users, called themselves Yi-si (毅丝), with the word si as part of the 
transliteration of fans. In a dispute with another online video game 
community, Yi’s membership were disparaged as diao-si (屌丝) in which 
the diao, literally penis, meant little worth or arrogance (similar to “cocky” 
in English). However, Yi’s membership incorporated the term and 
identified with it. The compound word diaosi was soon rendered as penis 
hair by many more Internet users, because the polysemic character si (丝) 
can also mean hair-like object.  
When the word spread over the Internet, netizens created even more 
vocabulary associated with the word diaosi, attaching connotations of sex 
and class to it.  The diaosi is personified as any young man who is “short, 
poor and ugly” (ai, qiong and cuo, 矮穷矬). When a diaosi communicates 
with a “goddess” (nvshen, 女神), a socially desirable woman who is “white, 
rich and beautiful” (Bai, fu and mei, 白富美), he behaves clumsily, knowing 
that the goddess belongs with the ideal man who is “tall, rich and 
handsome” (gao, fu and shuai, 高富帅). According to these abbreviations, 
the possession of wealth (fu, rich) is associated with gendered bodily 
features of men (tall and handsome) and women (white and beautiful) of a 
higher class, while diaosi with less money and bodily attractiveness lie at 
the lower end of the dating market. Diaosi is deemed a pitiful onlooker 
when the “tall, rich and handsome” is having sex with the “white rich and 
beautiful”; he is a loser and suffers from sexual exclusion.  
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Figure 6.2: Criteria for male/female diaosi. 
Then the word was widely spread by Internet media. Lisa Rofel 
(2007) has argued that “consumption is about embodiment, embodying a 
new self” in the post socialist China,  and “a properly cosmopolitan self is 
supposed to be desirous and this desire is supposed to be open and 
unconstrained” with regard to “sex, consumption of various sorts” (Rofel 
2007, 118). If the diaosi has sexual and class meanings, the prototypes of 
diaosi (Figure 6.2) on a major portal website73 show that it has encoded 
consumerism in its later development. The description reads: 
1) Man (labels counter clockwise): he carries less than 1000 
yuan in his purse; wears jeanswest® or 361°®.74 He has not 
travelled in the past 3-5 years. He wears shoes worth less than 
800 yuan. His car is less than 100,000 yuan. The cigarettes he 
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 The website (www.qq.com) ranks second in China and 8
th
 globally in 2015 according to 
Alexa ranking.  
74
 A second-tier sportswear brand.  
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smokes are less than 20 yuan a pack. His annual bonus is less 
than 10,000 yuan. He drinks MasterKong® bottled green tea.75 
He has less than three girlfriends before marriage, and he only 
drinks rice wine or beer. 2) Woman (counter clockwise): she 
never wears bikini or set underwear. She has been losing 
weight for more than five months and seldom looks at herself 
in the mirror. She never wears shoes with heels higher than 5 
cm, and tends to fall behind males when walking together. She 
doesn’t wear nail polish and dares not to grin broadly. Her 
hairstyle hasn’t changed for more than six months. 
The iconography reveals the effects of a capitalist modernity which 
homogenises male and female consumers while simultaneously producing 
changes and differences within each gender (Lo 2010). Here, diaosi links 
gender relations with consumption patterns of both men and women 
though each gender is assigned with different types of commodity goods, 
that is, the number of girlfriends one could have is juxtaposed with the 
brands he consumes and women’s criteria are associated with body 
weight and clothes that mark femininity. The iconography further reflects 
a sense of lack or inferiority in terms of consumption. 
Notably, the inferior social status conveyed by diaosi seems to have 
replaced the discourse of suzhi of young rural migrants. Suzhi, literally 
human quality, has referred to the innate and nurtured physical, 
psychological, intellectual, moral, and ideological qualities of human 
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 A very common brand. 
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bodies and their conduct since the 1980s (Jacka 2009). Andrew Kipnis 
(2006) argues that those of "high" suzhi are seen as deserving more 
income, power and status than those of "low" suzhi. Ann Anagnost (2004) 
suggests that the nascent middle class learns to consume appropriately to 
“participate in a highly coded realm of social distinctions” that construct 
their bodies, while migrant girls pursue commodities that can mark them 
as city girls (Anagnost 2004).  
Unlike suzhi discourse, the state plays no role in discussion of diaosi. 
In fact, the epithet met strong criticism in the People’s Daily, a mainstream 
and party-endorsed newspaper76 in November 2012, demonstrated the 
term’s unofficial origins. Chronologically, the denouncing of diaosi by 
People’s Daily came immediately after the screening of a comedy series 
“Diors man” (i.e., diaosi man with a bourgeois transliteration) modelled 
after its German counterpart Knallerfrauen (which was referred to as 
“Diors lady” in Chinese) on another portal website in October 2012. In the 
editorial of People’s Daily, “diaosi mentality” was listed along with other 
social evils such as “anxieties with regard to wealth distribution (rich-poor 
gap) and environment deterioration, competition of family background, 
extreme events (disruptive protests) and collective resistance in a ‘sensitive 
era’”. However, considering the fact that the term diaosi had been widely 
known by 2012, People’s Daily has had little impact in deterring its 
popularisation. On the one hand, the anonymity of web users allows naked 
sexual desire to be expressed  without social sanctions or a sense of shame 
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 See http://cpc.people.com.cn/18/n/2012/1103/c351073-19483801.html. Access date: 6 
April, 2015. 
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(Giese 2003). On the other hand, the introduction of Internet technologies, 
especially web 2.0,77 has facilitated the formation of identities and the 
creation of neologisms to make these identities. Therefore, it seems that 
the Internet as a fast-paced technological innovation outruns authoritarian 
control. One of the corollaries is that a young migrant is less likely to admit 
that he lacks suzhi or human quality; but he is likely to acknowledge that 
he is a diaosi.  
ICTs consumption and romance expression 
A clarification has to be made, though. Now the term diaosi on the 
Internet refer to two groups: urban young white-collars such as IT 
technicians and young migrants from villages and towns. The descriptions 
of the man and woman (Figure 6.2) seem to better represent the first 
group comparing themselves to people much richer than themselves 
rather than my informants whose incomes and expenditures are much 
lower.78 However, since my informants have identified with diaosi, it is 
necessary to understand how consumerism impacts their lives and gender 
identities.  
The consumption of ICTs has expanded their repertoire of romantic 
desire while intensifying their sense of inadequacy. Diaosi bore an imprint 
                                                          
77
 Web 2.0 describes web sites that use technology beyond the static pages of earlier web 
sites. Websites using web 2.0 include social networking sites, blogs, wikis, folksonomies, video 
sharing sites, hosted services, web applications, etc. See Wikipedia term.  
78
 The internet business may have popularised the eye-catching term through Internet 
Marketing. Indeed, there has already market differentiation targeting at the diaosi group. To 
the extent that the criteria are much higher than these of my informant, for instance my 
informants do not have cars, nor do they wear a pair of shoes more than 800 yuan, my 
informants cannot even be counted as a diaosi. Furthermore, diaosi has evolved to a self-
deriding label of the middle class or even rich people, pop stars or opinion leaders, who use 
the label to narrow the social distance between them and lower class audiences. 
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of consumerism already, for it is invented by online game players. 
However, while the Internet provides an image of diaosi or a heuristic 
device for our understanding of unmarried young men, there are surely 
discrepancies between subject positions and experiences. Jacka (2015, 11-
16) argues that subjects can eschew certain subject positions that are 
invidious to them, or choose from other subject positions that are 
advantageous to them; only those who are caught in a situation where 
every subject position available is marginalised identify with negative 
labels. How do my informants internalise, resist, appropriate, or counter-
signify the invidious meaning diaosi carries in certain life tasks, 
particularly in courtship? In the following I will explore three major 
domains where ICTs are consumed: the internet café, internet mobile 
phone, and social network software and instant messengers including QQ 
and Wechat.  
If one walks into an Internet café in this region or elsewhere in towns 
and cities, one will find that it is dominated by teens and young migrant 
men who play video games just as the prototypical diaosi (Figure 6.1) 
depicts. My young friends are no exception. The most often played games 
are League of Legends, a multiplayer online battle video game and Counter-
strike, a shooter game that requires corporation between players. The 
online games they played were actually pirate versions with the servers 
installed by the internet cafés to attract those who cannot afford playing 
online games on official servers. Unlike official versions, the rules of these 
pirate games are reset in a way that one’s hero can upgrade more rapidly 
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and get more precious artefacts when the hero kills monsters, thereby 
providing more instant gratification to the player. By combining better 
graphics and more realistic characters, these games produce a 
psychological addiction. According to the “hostess” (manager) of the 
Internet café, a young man would only give up playing online games when 
he gets a girlfriend.  Nevertheless, she has witnessed a few couples break 
up just because of the boyfriend’s addiction to video games.  
Rangswamy and Cutrell (2012) observe that Indian low-income 
youth take enthusiastically to the mobile Internet but restrict their use to 
the realm of entertainment. My informants show great interest in 
upgrading the functions of their Internet mobiles, downloading free games, 
and putting more expensive items such as laptops in their future shopping 
plans. They do learn skills when they surf the internet, and one of them 
has almost become a technical guru, avidly teaching his friends how to 
block potential adware once they have downloaded free games. 
Nevertheless, the expertise does not necessarily empower them in 
developing intimate relationships with women.  
However, despite the condition of diaosi caused by addiction to 
online video games, ICTs provides a technical solution to offset this 
inadequacy. Almost every young man has instant messengers such as QQ79  
and Wechat installed on his internet mobile. Both the QQ and Wechat have 
                                                          
79
 QQ is based on ICQ (which means I seek you) technique invented by four Israeli youths in 
1996. The technique spread to China in 1998 and was localised by a company in Shenzhen. By 
2013 QQ claims an active user population of 500 million, that is, nearly every web user had a 
QQ account. With the popularising of mobile access to the web, QQ became a major 
application in smart phones. For the internet and web mobile phone development in China, 
see the annual report by CINIC (China Internet Network Information centre )  
http://www.cnnic.cn/gywm/xwzx/rdxw/rdxx/201307/W020130717431425500791.pdf  
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built-in blogs where users can display their photos or write personal 
diaries and allow comments, functioning as social network software. And 
many items they post are about romance. In this regard, the Internet does 
expand the public sphere of intimacy among young men and women. As 
early as the 1990s, Yan observed that young rural women desired young 
men with the ability to “talk”, by which they meant both a general 
willingness to talk in public and in private occasions in flirting and 
speaking romance (Yan 2003). If talking forms a starting point of romance, 
then the popularisation of mobile Internet devices has made possible the 
expression of romance in a larger scale.  
Anne McLaren (2007) observes that in online marriage games people 
may develop emotional ties even when they haven’t met. The participants 
in web interactions can be deeply emotionally involved, although they may 
assume few responsibilities. Yet she says little about the forms of romance 
expression. The personal QQ blogs of my informants and their instant 
status80 show that both genders, and particularly women, tend to post 
articles lamenting or addressing the topic of relationships with refined 
sentiments as well as various tips or strategies to win another’s love. 
These articles are followed by comments from their friends or by a simple 
“agree” mark, implying the Internet is an active space to learn and share 
how to express love. However, these articles are often not personal 
expressions, but rather copied and circulated from other websites. Thus, 
the platform offered by QQ space more resembles a classroom where 
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 “Instant status” is a functional module of QQ. It is comparable to “what’s in your mind” 
dialogue box of facebook. One may update his or her status instantly by inputting, for 
example, “I am get bored” or personal tenets such as “life is too short to be serious”.   
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“textbooks” about romance are learned by young Internet users 
collectively.  
In Chinese culture, there are many ideological structures that define 
one’s personhood as in relation to others but not in one’s own right. They 
are arguably revamped in the consumption of the Internet and ICTs. As far 
as the contents on QQ blogs are concerned, a mood of self-pity or 
loneliness dominates. Confucianism has some influence in that it defines 
one’s identity in relations; that is, the individual is and should be always a 
part of a whole, whether the whole is the family, kinship ties or friends. As 
a consequence, when young men leave home behind and are leading a 
drifting life, the status of being alone turns to a kind of nostalgia or even 
trauma-like sentiment that needs to be cured by regaining personhood 
through relationships. This may explain why lovers today still call each 
other “elder brother” and “younger sister”. The appellations are 
expressions of those who seek to restore a feeling of family warmth.  
Not only Confucian influence, but Buddhist concepts such Karma 
(yuan fen, 缘分) or predestined lot also justifies bonds between lovers. 
Originally, karma refers to the primary and auxiliary factors that explain 
people’s connections in an ad hoc manner, but it gains different 
connotations in love affairs. When lovers feel a liking to each other, they 
often claim that the attraction stems from years of relationship in their 
previous lives. When they are about to terminate a relationship, it is 
because the karma accumulated through cultivation has been used up.  
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I argue that this cognitive approach to relationships fits a social 
milieu in which one is less dependent on the introduction by a third party 
(such as a matchmaker) to seek a partner as commonly practiced in rural 
settings. There is less certainty when love is sought among strangers. Why 
it is me that is chosen? Why is it you that I choose? Why do we break up?  
The notion of Karma has been revamped not only as kind of cultural 
attribution but also an aesthetic problematic in this regard. By the same 
token, exotic, modern or pseudo-scientific measurements such as 
compatibility of blood types, star signs and personality are also popular on 
QQ blogs, all of which serve as means of self-divination through which 
certitude is sought. The visual aspect of the social network applications 
may have amplified the sentiment as well. For instance, the start-up image 
of Wechat is a person who stands on the horizon and faces the enormous 
“blue marble” of the earth (see Figure 6.3). Hanging on the night sky and 
tangent to the horizon, the gigantic area of the earth creates an 
ambivalence in which it is simultaneously near and far, contrasting to the 
infinitesimal silhouette of the person. It is evocative of loneliness and a 
desire to be connected in this world.  
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Figure 6.3: Wechat start-up image   
Then, to what extent have ICT technologies empowered young men 
in building their intimate relationships? Certainly, the technology has 
partially replaced the roles of parents and that of matchmakers, granting 
more autonomy to users. Many young men search for girls according to a 
certain age or sex criteria via QQ. The function of Wechat is even powerful. 
When the GPS location is enabled, one can search and add strangers of 
geographical proximity (within two kilometres, for example) using a 
“people nearby” function of Wechat. Nonetheless, the gender ratio in the 
searched result is disproportional with men far outnumbering women, 
meaning men are more active using this technique.  
However, among the young migrants I met during fieldwork, most 
find their partners through face-to-face encounters rather than through 
ICTs. For instance, a young restauranteur, JR Liu, met his girlfriend when 
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he was invited by his former colleagues for a meal at the canteen of a 
Korean company in the development zone. He was queuing in the line and 
noticed the girl. It happened that she spoke the same dialect of his home 
county, which served as a good excuse for JR Liu to invite her to join the 
meal. They exchanged their QQ and phone numbers, and she finally 
became his girlfriend. JR Zou, a shoe vendor, met her boyfriend, now her 
husband, when she was a beer salesperson and he was her customer. The 
reason she chose him was because she saw him fight dauntlessly. She 
thought she could be protected by him.  
I suggest that the difference of efficacy between online and offline 
means of courtship is explained by women’s criteria. I discover that a 
“sense of security” (anquan gan) is crucial to girls when they decide 
whether to accept or refuse a potential relationship. Their sense of 
security derives from geographical closeness of native place, such as in the 
case of JR Liu and her girlfriend; it also reflects the need for protection of 
young women in tough urban settings. It can also mean trustworthiness. 
Hui, a small commodity vendor, met her first boyfriend online who is from 
a near native place. However, they broke up because she knew from the 
cousin of her boyfriend that her boyfriend had never told his parents that 
he was in a relationship. Internet romance does not bring any sense of 
security to women. According to several migrant women, using “people 
nearby” function only reflects a man’s desire for romantic adventure. 
Some young men also acknowledge this, referring to the usage of the 
function as simply “for fun”.   
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Yan (2003) observed that pre-marital sex is tolerated in rural 
settings. Nevertheless, he argues that it was “the commitment to marriage, 
together with the social charter of the engagement ritual that legitimises 
the young couple's sexual intimacy” (Yan 2003, 72). This rule applies to 
migrant men in the cities as well.  
The economic basis for marriage is increasingly gauged by car and 
property ownership.  In a conversation among the five young men who 
sold small merchandise, the one who had been to Zhejiang province told 
me he could never make sense of some young people, that is, typical “tall-
rich-handsome” guys, owning brand cars as expensive as 17 million (he 
knows the exact price), which may take him several lives to earn. Another 
man seriously discussed with me about the feasibility of obtaining a 
Maserati. Although worth several million dollars, he perceived it as 
“common” in some coastal cities. 
Lisa Rofel argues that consumption enables a more cosmopolitan 
person because by embracing consumerism, one can make claims about 
transcendence of place (Rofel 2007, 29). As I have argued in chapter 2, 
young men move and change workplaces and even occupations. These 
shifts are often involuntary, but the movement is often rendered by the 
subject as a voluntary adventure. In the same way, the places to which one 
travels marks one’s prestige among peers. The flashier world one has seen 
the more one feels superior to his peers.  
Contrary to the sense of inadequacy expressed on private Wechat 
blogs, young men perform their virility in the peer group. In another 
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conversation, the five vendors compared the age at which they lost their 
virginity, the earlier the better. One man in this group was reluctant to tell 
his friends so he was derided by the others, who doubted if he had ever 
had sex. They encouraged him to do so by “getting drunk and firing it out”, 
that is, to experience sex by visiting a brothel or sauna room.  
But the consumption of sex also leads to a sense of insignificance and 
nihilism. The young man told me that he often asked himself “Am I seeking 
pleasure for just a few seconds trembling after hard work? Is such life worth 
living?” This remark, once again, echoes a diaosi identity of inadequacy as 
he lacks a serious relationship. 
Blind date, an end to inadequacy 
Jacka, Kipnis, and Sargeson (2013) argue that proper employment or 
clear work positions in young men and women’s lives continue to be 
important and a conservative criteria for getting married. When both 
conditions are lacking, blind dates arranged by their left-behind parents 
regain popularity among many of my informants after they have roamed 
the city for some time.  
Many young men tell me that they will go back to their home villages 
and marry a girl by arranged marriage with the help of their parents, 
simply because they could not afford an apartment on their own in cities. 
After all, according to my estimate based on a wedding party I attended in 
a village in 2012, the construction of a new house costs around 150,000 
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yuan and gifts for the bride another 50,000 yuan, totalling 200,000 yuan.81 
As vendors’ jobs are not seen as proper jobs or stable employment, house 
ownership continues to be a requirement for these men to get married. 
However, some married vendors joked that the younger generation 
become increasingly picky because they benchmark their candidates 
against urban standards. The nick name “squad leader” or “platoon leader” 
is given to young men who have had blind dates arranged with as many 
girls as the number of soldiers in a squad (10) or in a platoon (30).  
There are very few cases where men choose to lead a single life. 
Brother Du, a book vendor in his forties, remained single and led a 
carefree life. He often went hiking by himself to a nearby mountain on 
weekends—but he was the only one in the night market to do so. 
According to him, he had a vagrant life when he was a teenager. He once 
loved a girl in his native village, but she was too young (16 years old) and 
he was poor, so he was warned off by her parents before he left the village 
for a better life. He now keeps dating women via QQ and has had sex with 
several of them. He does not have a plan for saving for a future marriage, 
but he assists one of his nephews with university tuition fees, hoping that 
                                                          
81
 It is 200 times an estimated monthly saving of 1,000 yuan, which has to be earned in 16 
years by a single young man who could earn 3,000 yuan a month working in a factory. 
Therefore, it is very common for the young men to rely on their parents finally.  
To make sense of the barrier of hukou, it is useful to calculate the affordability of an 
apartment in this region. According to advertisements provided by real estate agencies, 
apartments with limited property rights (xiao chanquan fang, 小产权房) with a size of about 
60 square meters are priced around 520,000 yuan. On basis of a loan amount 70%, that is, 
one has to pay 150,000 yuan for the down payment, while his monthly payment is 2,700 yuan 
and 4,100 yuan based on a 10-year or 20-year loan term. As said, the outdoor restaurant run 
by a couple has revenue of some 6,000 – 9,000 yuan, that is, 3,000 - 4,500 yuan/person which 
is a bit higher than the factory salary of 3000 yuan/person. Based on this calculation, the 
barrier to overcome for an urban household is still very high for a young couple, and the 
situation can be more tenuous if expenditure on their perspective children is included. 
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his nephew would take care of him when he gets old. Brother Du justified 
his lack of desire for a permanent partner as follows: if a man was to live 
80 years, the one who spends first 60 years working hard would enjoy his 
last 20 years endowed by his offspring. He would rather enjoy life for the 
first 60 years and live in solitude for the last 20 years. According to such 
calculation, remaining single and carefree was not a bad deal.  
Getting married defines a complete manhood and maturity, implying 
that a man is no longer “immature”. This rite of passage introduces abrupt 
discontinuations of men’s behavior. Playing video games after marriage is 
thus considered immature.  JR Cui, a small commodity vendor, tells me 
that he deleted all the female contacts in his QQ when he married.  
Performing conjugal ties 
Paradoxically, I observe that men no longer desire women after they 
get married. Instead they refer to their marriages as chains that limited 
their freedom. In extreme cases, husbands and wives bicker and even fight 
with each other, usually ending up with the husband posing a nonchalant 
attitude towards his cursing wife. When I hang out with outdoor 
restaurant bosses, many of them lectured me that the marital life is not 
desirable at all. “You will understand one day”, they often ended the 
dialogues this way. I argue that many of men’s words and their conduct 
can be described as misogynistic, and they must be understood in terms of 
performance of the conjugal masculinity by husbands in the “street 
theatre”.  
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The proud husband 
One night, Han’s wife Rui came to Fat Man’s wife during a business 
interval and told the latter that she was just abused by Han in front of their 
customers. Feeling wronged by her husband and in anguish, Rui raised her 
voice, “Did I treat you mother [Han’s mother] badly? Did I serve her with 
only rice porridge? Did you catch me with another man in bed? Why treat 
me badly? ” Her sentimental remarks were echoed by Fat Man’s wife, Aunt 
Zhang, who exchanged her recent experience. When Aunt Zhang charged 
five yuan on a box of take-away rice as requested by an old customer, her 
husband chided her, “You have shit in your brain, don’t you?” 
David Gilmore’s notion of misogyny is illuminating for our 
understanding of the conjugal masculinity in question. In his discussion of 
women-hating in his Misogyny: The Male Malady, Gilmore (2009, 99) 
attributes misogyny to the tenuous positions that men occupy within the 
social structure. In patrilineal and patrilocal arrangements, men wish to 
keep the agnates together in place and through time to augment 
sentimental solidarity and to maintain both genealogical continuity and 
material corporacy. In-marrying wives are alien to the agnate ties, are 
easily distrusted and scapegoated by men because they represent the 
interests of their natal families and their own children.  
Nevertheless, having noticed that the most misogynic men are those 
who desire and lavish attention on women, and that Victorian nuclear 
families and other-worldly Buddhists also exhibit similar misogyny though 
not living in patrilocal societies (for instance Melanesia and Amazon 
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societies), Gilmore (ibid., 202-218) goes on to argue that the misogyny is a 
fundamental psychodynamic phenomenon which cannot be explained by 
socio-political factors nor by simple hatred or wish to dominate. Rather, 
men experience a tension-ridden state. They desire women because 
women provide not only sexual pleasure but also food, tenderness, 
nurturing and heirs; they nonetheless have to repress such needs or their 
internal “femininity” to maintain a manly self-image. Men actually suffer 
from this repression and blame their sufferings on women. 
While I do not intend to follow Gilmore’s psychodynamic reading of 
misogynistic behaviour, I take his structural approach. I argue that 
conjugal masculinity should be understood in the conjuncture of working 
place and domestic domain. The public working place is the “front region” 
in which the husband performs conjugal masculinity and his wife is 
expected to play a supporting role with other men or customers as 
audience, using Erving Goffman’s (1959) terms. In other cases, the 
husband and his male friends are performers and the wife is an “outsider”. 
By region Goffman (1959, 66) means “any place that is bounded to some 
degree by barriers to perception”, and by “front region” he refers to the 
place where the performance is given (ibid., 66). Disputes between 
husbands and wives are disruptive to the performance delivered by men 
as it indicates his failure of him in keeping his wife as a team-mate. And 
the domestic domain and men’s circle where the events are mulled over 
constitutes the back regions of the said performance. By back region or 
backstage Goffman means “a place, relative to a given performance, where 
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the impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a 
matter of course” (Goffman 1959, 69).  
As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter (chapter 5), 
patrilineal kin groups are replaced by quasi-agnate ties among outdoor 
restaurant bosses. Such ties are created from ritualistic occasions such as 
drinking. Yet the solidarity is put to the test in subsequent interactions 
amongst men. The morality men extolls is yiqi, literally spirit of honour, 
which guarantees mutual safety in street lives and helps reduce business 
risks against market fluctuation. Fighting for each other glorifies yiqi. 
Borrowing and lending money among men is another common practice 
that embodies yiqi.  
Such fraternal ties are so pervasive and strong that they arguably 
shape the relationship between husbands and wives. For instance, men 
often kept their borrowing and lending secret from their wives, for wives 
who are responsible for other domestic expenditures such as that on their 
children may feel unhappy if a man lends money to his friend. In this 
regard, being taciturn is a kind of silent performance by husbands in front 
of their wives. Men are often caught between the household expenditure 
and their brotherly ties, and the stringent economic conditions make them 
more vulnerable to pressures from both sides. In order to maintain an 
image of able resource provider in domestic lives, the husbands tend to 
form teams with each other. Another reason is that wives are excluded or 
not interested in joining the drinking activities with men so that they 
know less about men’s relationships that mix reciprocity and patronage, 
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and husbands do not bother to let their wives know the situations. This 
ignorance on the side of the wives leads to the following type of disruption 
among husband and wife.  
Brother Xu and his wife run an outdoor restaurant with his cousin, JR 
Xu and his wife. Brother Xu and his wife left the night market for 
Hangzhou (a city not far from Nanjing) in March, 2012 to join the business 
of his native brother. Unfortunately, his native brother pre-paid a large 
amount of rent to his landlord, which was embezzled by the landlord, who 
fled with the money.  Brother Xu’s bankrupted native brother could no 
longer support Brother Xu so Brother Xu returned to the night market, 
taking over the stand of his cousin JR Xu who had moved to another 
province after the relocation of the night market in June 2012.  
Starting almost from scratch, Brother Xu and wife resorted to their 
old friend Fat Man, who kindly gave the couple a used oven and cooking 
utensils. And with the help of his friend, Fat Man found a storehouse as 
small as a pigeon hole but for free in the nearby food market for Brother 
Xu and his wife. As a tacit form of reciprocity, Brother Xu recommended 
the barbecue fish produced by Fat Man to their own customers. Later on, 
his wife planned to cook crayfish when she saw that the dish sold well in 
other outdoor restaurants. But the wife’s initiative was denied by Brother 
Xu. A squabble broke out between the couple, and Brother Xu’s wife felt 
wronged by his husband who unreasonably abused her as too simple-
minded.  
253 
 
In this story, Brother Xu could not explicitly discuss the exchange of 
interests between Brother Xu and Fat Man, because it would remove the 
glamour of sentiments of the brotherhood, reducing it to only a matter of 
money. In the domestic domain, to disclose his economic reliance on 
another man would damage a man’s status (mianzi) and self-dignity (lian) 
in front of his wife. Men are obliged to protect each other’s self-dignity, 
thus making Brother Xu’s wife a confused outsider. That Brother Xu called 
her simple-minded can be seen as an ingrained cultural attribution to 
account for the disruption but also his defensive measure to reiterate his 
loyalty to Fat Man.  
Another way for husbands to perform their conjugal masculinity 
involves customers as audience or supporting roles. The husband of a 
household is called a “boss” (laoban) by his customers. Since the word 
boss implies an autonomous, rich and generous person, husbands have 
plenty of reason to perform the role. In most cases a boss’s reputation is 
that of his wife and family. For instance, Fat Man was famous for his 
introduction of barbeque fish to the night market which outcompeted the 
once popular fish fillet with pickled vegetable soup, and he made a big 
fortune owning to this “revolutionary” technique. However, as Aunt Zhang 
(his wife) told me in private, it was actually she who learned the skills of 
barbeque fish and taught it to Fat Man. That she did not make it public, 
according to Aunt Zhang, was to maintain Fat Man’s face (mianzi) in line 
with the social normalcy by which men are more clever than women. In 
addition, more than half of the outdoor restaurants use husbands’ 
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surnames, names, nicknames or native places in their store signs, for 
instance Fat Man’s and Little Sichuan’s of Han’s family (Han is from 
Sichuan province), there is no store sign that specifically uses the wife’s 
name, surname, or native place. 
Face (mianzi) can be also earned through showing generosity to 
others. However, being generous requires giving economic resources to 
others. I argue that the mianzi or respect a man can earn is necessarily 
constrained by his economic capacities. Furthermore, wives may refuse to 
act as a team-mate to maintain her husband’s mianzi when her 
contribution to the household economy is not recognised by her husband 
or the family.  
The case of Han and Rui illustrates this dynamic. Like other couples, 
they work almost seven days a week. In the morning, Rui or Han buy raw 
materials in the nearby market around 10:00 a.m. Then Rui prepares the 
raw materials and sorts them in dish plates or into foam boxes. Then they 
load everything onto the vehicles and have breakfast around 2:00 p.m. 
Around 4:30 p.m., the couple drag the trolley out of the back street, and 
unload gas cylinders, cooking utensils, seasonings, dishes for display, a 
water bucket, another bucket full of washed bowls and other equipment. 
They then set up canopies, hang the light bulbs under the canopies and 
arrange wires to reach the extension cord nailed down to pavement trees 
(which can be very dangerous especially in summer showers, but no one 
cares). Then Rui takes out dish plates covered by plastic wraps and 
stretches the wraps tightly so that the dishes shine on the display board. 
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Meanwhile, Han begins some preparation such as oil frying peanuts and 
other common appetisers, and waiting for the first wave of customers.  
 
Figure 6.4: Household production. 
Having had laid out the outdoor restaurant together, the husband is 
moving a water bucket with his wife. They wake up around 12:00 p.m. 
and collect their stands from 2:00 a.m. to 8 a.m., depending on their daily 
turnover.  
Throughout his working time, Han holds a scorching frying wok and 
shakes it to heat the raw materials evenly, and keeps an eye on the road 
traffic and greets some old customers passing by. Even though he is 
confined in a space no more than one square metre, he does not stand still 
but has to move to and fro very frequently. The bottoms of his shoes are 
soaked in the greasy and filthy waste water. Therefore, small commodity 
vendors avoid selling shoes to outdoor restaurant bosses. JR Zhou, a shoe 
vendor, tells me that outdoor restaurant bosses often blame them for 
providing shoes of inferior quality and ask for more discounts. Her 
business wisdom attests to the heavy workload of a boss.  
The wife’s work is no less light than her husband. When Han is 
cooking, Rui introduces the guests to tables, laying chopsticks and bowls 
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and taking note of the ordered dishes. She has to cut raw materials during 
intervals if the stored quantity is insufficient, while responding in time to 
impatient customers. After customers finish their meals, she settles the 
bills, cleans the tables, washes dish plates and stacks them into the bowl 
bucket. During business intervals or when there are only one or two tables 
of customers, the couple may have a second meal together, and Han often 
leaves his stand to chat with his friends elsewhere, leaving the wife 
catering to the remaining customers. At midnight or in the early morning, 
Rui and Han collect all the equipment in the hour before they go home. 
Sometimes they end their work as late as 8 a.m., just before city police 
begin to patrol on the street. 
As I have depicted above, the hostess’s workload is actually on par 
with the boss’s. In this type of household economy, she functions as a 
restaurant manager and waitress at the same time, though her work is still 
deemed auxiliary. While Han often takes pride in his being able to “fry a 
thousand dishes in one night”, his wife’s catering of a thousand customers 
is less credited though equally important to the household production. 
Husbands are seen as being in charge of the business, which is in line with 
the traditional notion that men work outside and take charge while 
women work “inside” and are responsible for domestic issues (nan zhu 
wai, nü zhu nei). Thus, even though the spatial order has reversed in the 
outdoor restaurant—now the husband is confined to the open kitchen and 
the wife is catering for customers—the husband is nevertheless deemed to 
be in charge.  
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When catering for customers, Rui often does them a favour by 
knocking off the odd shillings in the hope that they would choose her 
restaurant next time or “take care” (zhaogu) of her business. Some 
customers take advantages of the reciprocal formula, requesting more 
discount by stressing that they had taken care of the restaurateurs many 
times; and  they would not return to the restaurant should they not be 
granted more discount. Often times, by insisting that she is doing “small 
capital business” (xiaoben shengyi), Rui is able to turn down the customer 
without offending him. If the customer persists, she may offer him a 
smaller discount. However, Han is prompt to show his generosity by 
asking the wife to knock it off, thereby earning his own face. As a result, 
Rui feels not only deprived of autonomy in decision-making, particularly 
when she has already made a concession, but also that her husband’s 
intervention implicitly derogates her as parsimonious. It also makes her 
loose confidence when bargaining with customers. Rui finally burst out 
into a quarrel with Han when they were doing business, and came to Fat 
Man’s wife for comfort just as I introduced in the beginning of this section. 
According to Rui, Han should have endorsed her position, for instance, by 
promising to add more food in the dishes next time or by simply 
presenting a cigarette to the customer. But he had never done so.  
Sometimes the men and women collectively define the role of 
husbands as master and main contributor. Another night, I heard Rui 
shout at Han and curse him in front of their customers. To pacify Rui, their 
neighbours Eighty Thousand’s wife and Aunt Zhang pull Rui to the dark 
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side across the street so as not to disturb the customers. In other words, 
they leave the “front stage” where Rui’s behaviour was considered 
inappropriate. I follow them. The wife of Eighty Thousand, to my surprise, 
does not take side with Rui but rather defends Han. “Think about his 
holding the frying wok for hours – without him you could not do the 
business”. Later, Han’s friend Ning came across the street to appease Rui. 
“It’s ok. Stop crying! Don’t cry in front of the guests. Harmony brings fortune. 
It is not good for your businesses.” At the stand, Han’s customers comfort 
Han in a different manner. “It’s ok, women are just like that. They are just 
irrational.”  
Men control several forms of backstage. The first backstage is the 
men’s circle. It seems that the more a man conforms inwardly to his pals, 
the more he shows contempt for women. Their socialising is not 
necessarily for economic imperatives but for recognition or sympathy 
from each other. Drinking or playing mah-jong together serves as asylum 
for men escaping from life pressure and women’s garrulity. To be sure, a 
few of them even quote the saying that “Brothers are hands and women are 
clothes” (xiongdi ru shouzu, nüren ru yifu), meaning the women are 
dispensable. But no one would divorce his wife for a blind belief in the 
epithet. Although we may argue that having a wife provides the 
fundamental sense of stability and the completeness of manhood, as 
Gilmore would suggest, no man would express it publicly, because such 
expression impairs conjugal masculinity.  
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But men also take advantage of women’s lower status. Since a proud 
man is less likely to be parsimonious than a woman in public, if a customer 
owes Fat Man for example, some money, he would ask his wife Aunt Zhang 
to bargain with the customer. And he shared this “secret” with me. “Don’t 
you know? These Niangmen’er (a slightly derogative term of women) can be 
useful when they speak.”  
Another factor that shapes men’s attitudes is the reconstituted 
patrilocality that often occurs in cities. I came across two common types of 
families, namely the nuclear family and stem family. A couple may start 
their business in a city and leave their children behind. If their economic 
conditions permit, they will next take their children with them and have 
them enrolled in nearby schools. Still, for most restauranteurs, they cannot 
perform day-to-day care of their children, as school hours differ from 
working hours. There are also safety concerns. Many parents report that 
their kids have to cross No.2 road to have dinner at their stalls, and the 
road is notorious for car accidents. So they often ask the husband’s parents 
to live with them in the city and help with the children.  
Such help can cause problems, however. The tension between the in-
marrying wife and her mother-in-law is structural. Father-in-law and 
daughter-in-law do not have much conflict because they tend to avoid each 
other in daily lives. A common sense held by ordinary people is that both 
the mother and the wife are competing for the loyalty and attention of the 
son-cum-husband. While the mother demands filial piety from his son, the 
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wife calls for conjugal satisfaction from her husband. The conflicts 
between the wife and the mother are thus inevitable.  
Not all the patrilocal families have such confrontations. It depends on 
the roles a man assumes and whether he has wisdom to moderate 
potential conflicts. Advisedly, a man had better perfunctorily listen to 
complaints from his mother and his wife without passing the messages to 
each other, according to JR Xu. His mother often complains that his wife, 
cute and small, is not ideal labour in the family. But if he takes side with 
his mother, JR Xu says, his wife would be marginalised in the family. 
Different to JR Xu, Han’s attitude towards his wife is influenced by 
both his brothers and mother. When I pay a visit to Han’s residence, Han’s 
mother complains that she does the housecleaning which she assumes to 
be the responsibility of her daughter-in-law, who gets up very late (the 
young couple work very late till early morning, though). She could have 
enjoyed her remaining years in comfort or taking care of her grandsons as 
she would expect, but she is now working hard for her son’s family. In a 
banquet held at Han’s place, the old lady repeats this complaint to Brother 
Ai when Rui is absent. Her complaint is immediately endorsed by Brother 
Ai, who is a smart fence sitter in social occasions such as banquets.  He 
tells the old lady that she is not doing an easy job, because she has also to 
take care of her two grandchildren for Rui. “I’ve never seen mother-in-law 
[as industrious] as you!” says Brother Ai. While the mother is pleased by 
Brother Ai’s compliment, Han is awkwardly silent. A few days later, Han 
beats Rui at home.  
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Some women invite their natal family members to the city to actively 
change the composition of backstage. Whyte (1979) suggests that women 
may use affinal kin or the natal family to win disputes in their marriage, 
thus counterbalancing the gender inequality brought by patrilocal 
institutions. Yan (2009) observed that in rural areas the emphasis of 
kinship ties has been expanded from agnatic to bilateral, and he attributes 
it to the rise of the market. Yet his conclusion is made with those who 
come back from cities, rather than a direct observation of the migratory 
lives in the city. I argue that sometimes the strengthening of affinal ties has 
less to do with marketization per se than with balancing power relations in 
patrilocality restored in cities.  
Before the 2012 spring festival, Rui insisted to go back to her natal 
village in Ningxia province (northwest China). She hadn’t been back to her 
parents for five years since the birth of her second son. She pleaded to her 
husband Han, but Han was not interested in her plan. She then tried to buy 
a ticket through the online ticket system. However, her limited IT skills 
prevented her from doing so. She then went to the railway station but the 
tickets had all been sold out. Finally, she resorted to one of Han’s powerful 
friend who had connections to the ticket office and succeeded. After the 
spring festival, she returned to Nanjing with her brother and sister-in-law 
and rented a place for their short stay and urged them to find a job. With 
the help of Fat Man, her brother found a job as a welder and his wife was 
enrolled in a nearby factory. They also helped with the business when they 
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were off work, and took care of Han and Rui’s two kids, which used to be 
part of the job of Han’s parents.  
This triggered another crisis when the brother and his wife stayed 
one night at Han’s place when Han and Rui were away. The mother-in-law 
complained that one “would rather host a coffin inside one’s hall than 
hosting a young couple (ning ting sang, bu ting shuang)”, a proverb 
underpinned by principle of residential segregation. The reason seemed 
farfetched and led to another round of quarrel between Han and Rui, 
ending up with Rui renting a new apartment for her and Han, and 
subletting one room to her brother and sister-in-law. Rui thus finally got 
rid of the “suffocating atmosphere” where she lived with her mother-in-
law.  
Public display of sexuality  
Another element of an ideal man involves his sexuality. Sexuality is 
no longer a taboo in public talk in the night market. It finds expressions 
through the foods vendors promote to customers as aphrodisiacs. They 
include barbeque mutton, mutton soup, and mutton kidney in particular 
because kidney is believed to be the seed of the body’s Yin and Yang, that 
is, the seed of energy for organs, which include sexual function according 
to traditional Chinese medicine. Notably the Chinese word for aphrodisiac, 
namely Yang-invigorating substance (Zhuang yang), does not carry an 
association with Yin, the female and the recessive, and there is no food 
sold in the night market specifically promoted as good for women.  
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Likewise, conjugal contentment is often reduced to conjugal 
sexuality, and the conjugal sexuality of men is depicted as aggressive and 
dominant. For instance, when a vendor complains that his wife nags too 
much, Pebble Zhang suggests that he “discipline” his wife when the vendor 
goes home. The “discipline” does not mean sadomasochism; it rather 
implies that men see women desire sex but are less likely to express it. 
Although women can nag for different reasons, nagging as kind of 
“pathology” can be treated using sex as a panacea.  
The same logic applies when men often joke, even in front of their 
wives, by proposing to visit a brothel together. Such expression can be a 
way to construct brotherhood through sexuality. As a popular proverb 
reveals, brotherhood is tested through “shouldering guns, dividing spoils, 
and visiting brothels together.”82 In other words, visiting a brothel means 
both parties are witnessing each other being morally low, so that they can 
trip up each other, thus they must be loyal to each other. On the other 
hand, such expression also reflects a desire for wealth, as Brother Xu jokes 
by proposing that he and I pay a visit to a nearby Dignified Hot Spring 
Commerce Chamber to enjoy the most expensive sex service.  
Of course wives can take such jokes as performance that they are 
never realised. However, it is perhaps men’s ongoing reference to escorts 
for various reasons that trigger suspicions in their wives. Fat Man used to 
be a truck driver, and his wife refers to truck drivers as the most morally 
decadent job because they stop in small towns where it is easy to sauna 
                                                          
82
 In Chinese Yiqi kang guo qiang, yiqi fenguo zang, yiqi piaoguochang (一起扛过枪，一起分
过赃，一起嫖过娼). 
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rooms or prostitutes. To prevent Fat Man becoming such a morally corrupt 
man, she put their baby son in the passenger seat when Fat Men went out, 
so he was unable to leave his son. One day they had a quarrel. Fat Man 
asked for some money from his wife but did not return home until late. 
Upset and feeling sad, his wife told me that she is all fine with Fat Man 
visiting a brothel, as long as he pays the tuition fee for their children. 
Fortunately the husband came back home and told his wife that he was 
settling bill with a fish supplier and just had some beer with him.  
Conclusion 
The conjugal masculinity of migrant men has undergone 
transformation in the process of migration. My major findings are three.  
First, both married and unmarried men exhibit reliance on peers, 
and such reliance has both economic and affective meanings which impact 
on the conjugal masculinity being performed. For the unmarried men, the 
brotherly ties encourage transgressions such as visiting prostitutes. The 
married men rely heavily on other men who provide not only economic 
support but also mutual recognition of each other as autonomous, self-
reliant and resource provider in conjugal relationships.  
Second, migration is the primary force that remoulds and amplifies 
conjugal masculinity. It puts constraints on both unmarried single men 
and husbands. For the unmarried young men, the drifting life and low 
economic conditions do not equip them with a “sense of security” to find 
potential partners, but rather intensify their sense of inadequacy. For the 
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married vendors, the efforts required to sustain the household economy, 
such as the maintenance of customer relations and stem family, cause 
disruptions among husbands and wives when men are trying to maintain 
their conjugal masculinity in front of their brothers and customers.  
Third, the city as site of consumption has a dual impact. While young 
men consume ICTs for entertainment purposes, they also try to expand 
their chances in looking for a partner. However, mobile SNS and instant 
messengers do not contribute concretely to their successes, but only 
amplify the sense of loneliness which looms large in their migratory lives. 
Suffering from extended periods of loneliness, a few young men try 
commercial sex, which in turn aggravates their erotic frustration and 
sense of being unfulfilled. Married men refer to consuming prostitute only 
for fun, performing their virility and aspirations to be rich in front of their 
audience.  
To sum up, the conjugal masculinity described in this chapter 
embodies men’s aspiration to be autonomous and able husbands in their 
conjugal relationship. Such idealised roles in their marital lives are at stake, 
because their low socio-economic statuses continuously dampen their 
hopes and cause the disruptions of their performances.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions: A migrant petite 
bourgeoisie subject and 
sociality? 
 
In December 2014, I paid another short visit to the new night market 
and met many of my old friends. The four lanes of restaurants were roofed 
with tin-plate as if they had become indoor restaurants. When asked about 
their businesses after the relocation in 2012, Fat Man told me that the 
turnover was still lower than that before the relocation, even though his 
place was very close to the entrance of the new market. Han’s business 
was good, and he bought a new apartment and posted piles of RMB on his 
wechat blog when signing the property contract, as if showing his 
achievement. Sister Sun’s business was poor because her stand was at the 
end of the night market, and she did not have strong connections to move 
her stands closer to the market entrance as a few other vendors did. 
However, many close informants had left, and they did not leave phone 
numbers with those who had stayed. If everything went well, Brother Xu 
had plans to open a lottery / gambling station or Karaoke house in Yunnan 
province where he married his second wife. JR Liu was said to return to a 
factory in the nearby development zone (industrial park). Old Wang and I 
kept in touch from time to time, but he was abroad in Hanoi, Vietnam 
because his stand was also at the end of the night market. He was 
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investigating the local seafood market and planning to establish a seafood 
processing workshop even though he does not speak English or 
Vietnamese.  
That night Fat Man treated me to a banquet and several other 
vendors joined. Afterwards, I noted a new, spacious restaurant seated in 
front of Fat Man’s. Fat Man told me that it was run by someone who had 
connections with the nearby resettled Community (shequ), and that the 
owner had a fight with the new beer patron, Yang, the god-son of Director 
Zhang from the ex-EMO (see chapter 3). After the blood-shed, Yang was 
arrested by the public security and was still in prison.  Overall, the new 
night market was less prosperous but safer than before, according to Fat 
Man. 
These new pieces of information did not radically alter my 
conclusions regarding the formation of migrant vendors and their 
business environs. I have shown the regional heterogeneity and different 
institutional origins of migrant vendors and have demonstrated that they 
were from late-socialist villages and towns or laid off workers from the 
reformed urban industry system (chapter 2). Their occupational 
trajectories sometimes involved shifts in class identity such as JR Liu’s 
returning to factory life and Wen (chapter 6) becoming a white-collar 
worker when market turnover fell. Furthermore, subjects in their prime 
ages expected their children to seek white-collar careers so as to avoid 
market risks and instability. But few of the children I knew were able to 
satisfy their parents’ ambitions. Vendors are also characterised by 
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geographical mobility and the night market is a semi-open space to the 
floating population. The blurring boundaries of class, geography and 
heterogeneous social formation, however, are typical of the petite 
bourgeoisie according to Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt 
(2013, 8).  
What distinguishes my subjects from the working class with rural 
background or migrant workers, according to a Weberian definition, is 
their self-employment and access to the market. Another Weberian 
scholar has found the influence of the petite bourgeoisie was “too weak for 
them to be able to impose themselves politically in the face of powerful 
urban elites and bureaucratic states” (Crossick and Haupt 2013, 220). 
Similarly, I have analysed the weak positions of migrant vendors in the 
market within the power structure of contemporary urban politics. This 
structure reflects the “urban transformation” depicted by You-tien Hsing 
(2010) and the process Li Zhang (2010) has termed "accumulation by 
displacement". I have examined these processes as part of the forces 
behind the relocations in 2011 and 2012 respectively. While the urban 
transformation has conferred opportunities for the migrant vendors to 
accumulate wealth through hard work, exploiting the values created by 
the migrant vendors, it has also caused instabilities and risks to vendors 
particularly when they were expelled or when the night market was 
relocated by local government (chapter 4). The displacement that 
accompanies urban development was made at the cost of marginalised 
groups, and the vendors in the night market were no exception as they 
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were forcibly to be relocated to places of low land value. In everyday 
business lives, different strands of local hooligans who emerged as a result 
of urban transformation have posed threats to these “outsiders”, too, 
blatantly threatening vendors’ survival in the market which these 
hooligans patronise.  
The external threats on migrant vendors have shaped the sociality of 
migrant vendors in two ways. On the one hand, I have observed 
individualisation manifested in their standing vis-à-vis the inhospitable 
environ or Society (shehui), ingrained distrust towards strangers and bad-
mouthing of competitors’ products. Squabbles and even fights amongst 
vendors stand on this extreme. On the other hand, the external economic 
pressures and isolation felt by vendors pushed them to build various 
connections within neighbourhood in the form of business reciprocity, 
valorisation of “yiqi” (spirits of honour) among men vendors as well as 
solidarity among marginalised vendors against the government’s unfair 
decisions. Thus, unlike historical accounts of petite bourgeoisie in which 
shopkeepers and craftsmen are labelled as autonomous producers who 
embraced frugality, hard work and family values, all of the 
abovementioned connections of my informants at different levels go 
beyond family and kinship domain and played important roles in their 
survival and business successes. The cohesions with varying degrees and 
of different kinds can be categorised into three levels, namely 
everyday/interpersonal level, masculine level and political level, each 
featuring distinct scales, temporality and modus operandi. There is also a 
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fourth type of sociality, namely familial relations or gendered connections, 
which are less “social” at first glance but have performative meanings. 
Since I have depicted the four layers of sociality and dynamics in previous 
chapters, I will offer a synthesis in the following.  
The political cohesion is noteworthy in that politics could accentuate 
the identity of migrant vendors as a unity when external attention is 
bestowed upon them. Nevertheless, vendors’ open protest against CALE 
and the EMO (chapter 4) was cautiously framed by participants as a 
protest by “disadvantaged outsiders” who were unable to be incorporated 
into the local, urban economy rather than advancing their own claims 
forthrightly as a class. Apparently, the framing was made out of strategic 
considerations and a fear of government retribution. Nonetheless, 
although vendors achieved their goals, the leader and core members had 
to hide their knowledge and tactics, making them ineluctable and vague to 
the others. Therefore, the vendors remained amorphous in structure and 
vague in terms of their political identity. Furthermore, they rarely referred 
to their political cohesion as guanxi. Rather, the rebellious spirt against 
social injustice was personified or attributed to personal charisma. As 
many participants told me, the leader in this first protest was an 
“awesome (lihai) old Rivers and Lakes Society” (laojianghu), indicating that 
the hero’s experience, clairvoyance and merits counted rather than 
vendors’ own capability of self-organisation.  
Aside from such critical moments when the solidarity of migrant 
vendors flashes, at the level of everyday sociality, guanxi or relational 
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thinking is pervasive amongst migrant vendors in the chaotic Society. 
Guanxi practices are produced in a number of settings, annexing individual 
vendors to customers, their neighbours, other vendors, and to their 
patrons in the local community and even to local hooligans (or “ghosts” in 
local terms). If guanxi connections in rural settings can create a guanxi 
subject (Kipnis 1997), what kind of subject can be created from making 
such connections in the night market? In reviewing Kipnis’ work, Yunxiang 
Yan (2000) argues that a person "can hardly construct his or her 
self/subjectivity by engaging in instrumental exchanges of gifts and 
favours,” because "in urban settings during recent decades, guanxi often 
evolves into a network of short-term, instrumental connections". While 
Yan rightly pointed out the mobile bedrock of the guanxi network in the 
urban setting, the subject making of migrant vendors calls for careful 
examination.  
Following the dramaturgical approach of Erving Goffman (1959), 
guanxi practices can be defined as performances on “front stages”. In my 
case the front stage performances include presenting gifts and money to 
the local powerful people, socialising with other vendors, and constructing 
guanxi with local hooligans. These three types of guanxi have to be 
understood through performative meanings, and one thing in common is 
the legitimation of guanxi by human sentiments (ganqing). Such 
legitimation of ganqing was carefully manipulated by the performer in 
front of an audience including the powerful people (chapter 2 and chapter 
4), and the “ghosts” (chapter 3) and other vendors (chapter 5) so that the 
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performers can obtain premium stands, avoid risk and gain mutual-aid. 
The performances in this regard are instrumental to the individual’s goals. 
The negative side, however, is that some performances are regarded as 
scam, extortion and manipulations.  
But the performers are not a fixed “cast”. In a network which consists 
of familiar strangers, an individual vendor takes turns acting as performer, 
audience and outsider. He and his performances are subject to 
interpretations and judgment by others. For instance, an EMO officer or 
powerful person is discussed by ordinary people, and a vendor who claims 
yiqi is judged by other vendors if he really possesses yiqi. In light of this, 
when taking Goffman’s notion of “region” to analyse ongoing guanxi 
practices, the opposite side to front stage or front region is not a clear-cut 
“back stage” defined as “a place, relative to a given performance, where the 
impression fostered by the performance is knowingly contradicted as a 
matter of course” (Goffman 1959, 69), but a stage with a different audience 
where a performance of guanxi is referred to and made sense of by a third 
person. Oftentimes, performances that are glossed over by ganqing 
(human sentiments) when delivered are interpreted by others as lack of 
authentic ganqing. To offset the negative consequences which disrupt 
one’s performance, performers have to invest more effort in long-term 
interactions on the front stage to prove their authenticity. As a 
consequence, a world of strangers is humanised by ganqing. And a 
performer can obtain a sense of community, in vendors’ own word, 
turning a strange place full of strangers (rensheng di bushu) to a familiar 
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world. Long-term efforts invested in relationship can transform a vicious 
ghost to a friend (for instance the case of Fat Man and Ning in chapter 3), 
or a patron to an information provider who reduces business risks for the 
client (for instance the case of JR Cui in chapter 4), and through long-term 
observation one can identify a self-claimed yiqi person as an imposter (for 
instance the case of JR Yin in chapter 5). As far as masculinity is concerned, 
the anxiety to claim the authenticity of brotherhood has to stand the test of 
reality. As far as customer relationships are concerned, an experienced 
vendor persuades another one to give up an idea to make fake seasonings, 
for the latter would lose his reputation in the long run. The saying “time 
reveals a person’s heart” (rijiu jian renxin) reveals the logic that underlies 
the transformation from a strangers’ society to a community in all regards.  
Nevertheless, the external environs are not controlled by 
marginalised vendors and a real community can hardly be achieved, given 
the fluidity of its composition and their positions in the urban politics. 
Returning to the polysemic word “hun” (to mix, to scam, to get by or to 
muddle through) vendors use to refer to their existence, when one cannot 
prove his authenticity in a short time span and when he cannot judge the 
authenticity of others, the opportunistic facet of guanxi practices surfaces. 
I have analysed having shili (influence) and having beijing (background, 
particularly official background) as two important attributes of others on 
the basis of which one takes action (chapter 3), not only in front of local 
hooligans, but also when one performs brotherhood. To hun well is to be 
in making such discernments when one builds connections. One also has 
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to build connections with both good guys and “bad guys”, “laying eggs in 
different baskets.” Consequently one’s repertoire of guanxi connections 
can hardly bear any moral certitude.  When Fat Man used tricks to reduce 
his competitor’s power by teaching barbeque fish techniques to the latter’s 
rival, he built connections with the beer distributor, another “ghost”, to 
strengthen his power in the market. One may argue that he was 
“scamming”. Nevertheless, his tactics must be seen as a necessary 
expediency because of the plight caused by his competitors.  Therefore, if 
the temporality of external power structure or urban politics has any 
impact on the subject-making, the connotations of “hun” cannot be easily 
dismissed.  
We can find many correspondences of hun practices to those of so-
called new rich and their elite masculinity (Osburg 2013).  According to 
John Osburg, along with government officials, the new rich “constitute an 
elite network whose power cannot be rooted in either the state or the 
market” (Osburg 2013, 59). Instead of using “entrepreneur masculinity” 
proposed by Li Zhang (Zhang 2001), elite masculinity captures "the 
convergence of the practices and ideologies of entrepreneurs and 
government officials". Furthermore, the new rich also have connections 
with heishehui, mafia-like brotherhoods (Osburg 2013). Hun practices, 
performances and logic bear semblance in this regard as vendors told me 
that one was better to have connections to both white ways, the 
government officials or police and dark ways, the “ghosts” who engage in 
shady businesses and patronage via violence. Thus we may call such 
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masculinity and their belief in guanxi subaltern masculinity, and the only 
difference to the masculinity of the new rich is the less advantageous 
positions my informants have in Society and a lack of the symbols of elite 
masculinity such as mistresses, imported cars, and luxury brand clothing 
and accessories.   
The family and inward family values are defining features of the 
petite bourgeoisie (Crossick and Haupt 2013), and the principle is true 
with my informants, who rest their everyday businesses on household 
production. I have shown that unmarried men have a sense of inadequacy, 
an anxiety caused by the dual forces of both family values and their 
marginalised status in the marriage market (see chapter 6).  The women-
hating attitude of married men seems to contradict the values of conjugal 
masculinity, but again such attitudes have to be understood in a 
dramaturgical sense. The conjugal masculinity husbands performed in 
front of customers and peers in fact reflects their reliance on these two 
groups and their ego-centric sense of being autonomous, self-reliant and 
perhaps a source provider within the domain of family. Furthermore, the 
husband and wife may continue their quarrels / fights when they come 
back to their residence, where they may reach reconciliation because the 
household production has to be sustained and the conjugal ties have to be 
maintained for the sake of their children. In comparison to other short-
lived social relationships, conjugal ties endure despite difficulties. 
Therefore, the gendered power relations in this regard cannot be reduced 
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to male domination, but rather reflect a common difficult situation both 
men and women face as small business units in the market and in Society. 
This study has left many questions to future studies. 
Methodologically speaking, this research is restricted to men, and 
women’s roles and perspectives are less discussed. Furthermore, speaking 
of petite bourgeoisie sociality and subaltern masculinity here, this 
research is short of cross-cultural comparisons and historical insight into 
the history of the People’s Republic of China, a history dating back to the 
1950s to 1960s when small merchants and vendors were eliminated from 
cities through socialist transformation movement (shehuizhuyi gaizao). 
Such historical studies may illuminate the boundary-making of the 
socialist state throughout time. Given the ever-increasing mobility of 
contemporary China and the world, a final question I would like to explore 
in the future regards the new forms such household production will take.   
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Appendix:  Chronology of the night market 
The arrangement of chapters is not congruent with the timeline of 
events which occurred in my research. For example, Chapter four is largely 
based on ethnography of contentious politics in year 2012 which took 
place at the end of my field stay. To eliminate confusion, I list major events 
occurred to the night market and milestone activities of some vendors 
below. 
2000-2010 
Sunglow district government continuously relocates 
hundreds of thousands farmers to Y region. 
2003 
Several migrant vendors start their business on the No. 2 
Road.  
2005, second 
half 
Eight vendors were regulated by the CALE, the city police. 
Fat Zhao and Master Jin were two of the eight vendors. 
2008, 
October 
 
More vendors agglomerated in this region. Community A 
took over from the CALE and delineated the business 
street. 
2010, March 
 
Fat Man arrived at the night market and soon started his 
barbecue fish business. He achieved big success in that 
year. 
2011, March 
 
As notified by the district government, the night market 
should be removed. However, Old Wang led a successful 
protest. The former head of EMO was removed from 
office by district government. In the chaotic market 
rearrangement, Fat Man lost his premium position to 
Pebble Zhang. Then rumours began to circulate among 
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the vendors that the night market would be relocated, 
owing to the 2014 Nanjing Youth Olympics. 
2012, June 6 
 
Official decision reached night market via the EMO, which 
requested that all the vendors attend a mobilisation 
assembly held by district government on 8th June. 
2012, June 8-
11 
 
The relocation assembly was held by CALE and Bureau of 
public security on 8 June. Fat Man obtained the best place 
in the night market through drawing a lot. Many others 
were not fortunate and their businesses dropped 
afterwards. At midnight of June 11th, some local vendors 
from Community A resisted the relocation but were 
suppressed by the CALE. 
2012, 
September  
 
The relocated vendors and the Realty Management 
Company signed contracts with a term of one year. Before 
that, a few vendors protested in the hope that their places 
could be rearranged. Unfortunately, their protest was 
neglected by the new market regulatory office. 
2014, April 
 
Old Wang travelled to Bangkok and carried out business 
investigation there. 
 
 
